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ABSTRACT

The dissertation involves a study of the emerging international norm of ‘The Responsibility to
Protect’ which states that citizens must be protected in cases of human atrocities, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and genocide where states have failed or are unable to do so. According to the
work of the International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS), this response can
and should span a continuum involving prevention, a response to the violence, when and if
necessary, and ultimately rebuilding shattered societies. The most controversial aspect, however,
is that of forceful intervention and much of the thesis focuses on this aspect.
The history and context of the Responsibility to Protect are examined as an evolving norm in
international law. The study thus serves as an analysis of how a fundamental and controversial
international principle has been established: its promotion, creation, formulation, acceptance, and
ultimately its implementation. The dissertation identifies five critical sociopolitical issues of
significance affecting the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect in international law and its
implementation and considers remedies where appropriate.
Analysis of an application of the principle through force is undertaken in the context of the UN
sanctioned intervention into Libya in 2011. This case study provides a clearer picture of what the
Responsibility to Protect means as a legal basis for international intervention in genocidal
situations. The study finds that international law is but one factor in the substantiation of the
Responsibility to Protect – legitimacy counts as well as legality and for it to be implemented the
self-interest of states must acknowledge ‘universal’ legal and ethical principles of a humanitarian
nature. Also contributing to the success of a Responsibility to Protect intervention are
nongovernmental actors as part of transnational governance who in a particular situation cry out
for action in the face of evolving humanitarian atrocities in spite of rules of sovereignty and state
hegemony. The more general significance of this research is in its understanding of existing and
new forms of hard and soft governance and how they adapt in the international and transnational
arena.
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Chapter One: Introduction
By withdrawing, I had undoubtedly done the wise thing. I had avoided risking the lives
of my two soldiers in what would have been a fruitless struggle over one small boy. But
in that moment, it seemed to me that I had backed away from a fight for what was right,
that this failure stood for all our failures in Rwanda.1
What I have come to realize as the root of it all, however, is the fundamental indifference
of the world community to the plight of seven to eight million black Africans in a tiny
country that had no strategic or resource value to any world power. An overpopulated
little country that turned in on itself and destroyed its own people as the world watched
and yet could not manage to find the political will to intervene. Engraved still in my
brain is the judgment of a small group of bureaucrats who came to assess the situation in
the first weeks of the genocide: ‘We will recommend to our government not to intervene
as the risks are high and all that is here are humans.’2

I.

Introduction

The above quotes refer to the Rwandan genocide of 1994 when the majority Hutu tribe, through
murder, rape, and maiming, eliminated as many as one million Tutsi civilians in the culmination
of years of ethnic competition for political control. This was a bleak period in the history of the
United Nations (UN), and hence the international community in general, for though it had a
small peace-keeping force on the ground (the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda --UNAMIR) it
was instructed not to interfere. This tragedy generated considerable discussion about whether the
international community could do more in such situations of internal national strife to stop such
intended annihilations of one segment of the population by another. Romeo Dallaire, the
Commander of the UNAMIR troops, accused the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK)

1

Romeo Dallaire, with Major Brent Beardsley Shake Hands with the Devil. The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda
(Canada: Vintage Canada, 2003) at 4 [Dallaire, 2003].
2
Dallaire 2003 Ibid at 6.
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and France of ‘shirking their legal and moral responsibilities' by simply allowing the combatants
to fight it out regardless of the conflict's impact on the civilian population.3
Subsequently, the United Nations attempted to strengthen its ability to intervene to protect
civilians in times of civil war through its support for the doctrine of the Responsibility to
Protect.4 This concept states that the international community may intervene in a national
conflict if large numbers of its civilians are being targeted by one or more of the combatants for
extermination as part of the adversarial process. This provided the basis for intervention in
Libya, though it has so far not provided the basis for international action with respect to the
current civil war in Syria in which it is estimated that hundreds of thousands of civilians have so
far perished. There have to be compelling legal and humanitarian reasons for the international
community to intervene in cases such as Rwanda, Syria, Kosovo and Libya -- and it is these
rules, regulations and reasons that the thesis turns itself toward.
In the words of Ramesh Thakur, the Responsibility to Protect is a remarkable narrative of
empathy, reasoning and moral sensibility that forces us to consider what we have learned from
the past. To Madeleine Albright it is the most fascinating principle in international law.5 To me
it represents hope. So let me take you into the world of the Responsibility to Protect that I have
explored, struggled with and interpreted.
This dissertation involves a study of the evolution of the international norm of ‘The
Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) from an idea or concept toward a legal norm. It traces its

3

Romeo Dallaire, Kishan Manocha, and Nishan Degnarain “The Major Powers on Trial” (2005) 3 Journal of
International Criminal Justice, 877 [Dallaire, 2005].
4
While it has become quite common to refer to the Responsibility to Protect principle in short form as R2P, I have
refrained in the thesis from doing so. The term R2P in my view is robotic in nature and detracts from the very
seriousness of its purpose.
5
CCR2P Conference, March 29, 2014.
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formative development and application in the international world and enters into the debate
regarding its legal status. Such a study uncovers the controversies that surround the meaning of
and implementation of this norm, particularly in terms of forceful intervention, the most
contentious, and raises questions regarding the supremacy of states’ rights versus ‘universal’
humanitarian laws.
The principle of the Responsibility to Protect came to light as a result of the work of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS -highly influenced by
Canadians) although the history of the idea goes back much further in time.6 The ICISS
developed the Responsibility to Protect as a guiding principle for the international community
that rested on a wide range of legal obligations and political responsibilities already in existence.
While the original ICISS report did not explicitly call for legal reform, it did lean toward the
view that international morality and international law should be more closely aligned.
The World Summit Outcome Document, the formal document articulating the Responsibility to
Protect adopted by resolution A/60/1 of the UN General Assembly (GA) on 24 October 2005
contains the provisions for the responsibility of states to protect population from four
international crimes: war crimes, genocide, human atrocities and ethnic cleansing. It was agreed
by consensus by all participating member states and the provisions were reaffirmed in UN
Security Council resolutions 1674 (28 April 2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict
6

The Responsibility to Protect I.1.5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
December 2001, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, at 11. http://www.idrc.ca The ICISS was
launched at the UN Millenium Assembly in September 2001 in response to Kofi Annan’s challenge to the
international community to act upon future violations of human rights and humanitarian law. (Kofi Annan, Annual
Report to the General Assembly, press release SG/SM 7136, 20 Sep. 1999 cited by Jennifer M.Welsh, From Right to
Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society (2001) 8 Global Governance, 503-521; pp 520
[Welsh 2001].The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography and Background, Supplementary volume to
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre for ICISS, 2001), 410 pp. United Nations, 2004, at 65, para 201; see also United Nations World
Summit 2006 Resolution 1674 April 28, 2006 which reaffirmed paras. 138 and 139 of the World Summit 2005
Outcome Document.
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and 1706 (31 August 2006) calling for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force to Darfur.7
The consequences of resolution A/60/1 are different from those of a treaty that becomes effective
through a required number of ratifications which then become binding. The GA resolution is
recommendatory rather than binding.8 However, it has high political and moral significance and
the obligations come from well-established rules and principles of customary and treaty
international human rights law (IHRL), and international humanitarian law (IHL), which are in
fact universally binding. The thesis provides a more detailed description of international law and
its relevance to the Responsibility to Protect in Chapter Two. Genocide, however, is outlawed
by the Genocide Convention, a treaty so widely endorsed that it is regarded as fundamental
international law, binding on all.”9
The Outcome Document, however, is most readily categorized as ‘soft’ law. Soft laws can
signal the direction of future legal development, act as a precursor of treaties or ‘harden’ into
custom in relation to the Responsibility to Protect and it is the evolutionary path of this norm that
will be explored in subsequent chapters. Even if the Outcome Document is not legally
enforceable “it does represent an important step in the evolution of international protection
law”10 and the Responsibility to Protect principle. Many states, however, refuse to accept ‘soft
laws’ in that they may turn into enforceable rules, while other states claim these principles carry
universal effect as a restatement of existing custom. The Responsibility to Protect is a powerful
principle which begs the question of whether it gives rise to legal obligations. My own study of
the evolution of the norm enters into a debate concerning the ambiguous nature of the
7

Dorota Glerycz, The Responsibility to Protect: A legal and Rights-based Perspective (2010) 2 Global
Responsibility to Protect, 250-268 [Glerycz, 2010] at 250.
8
Glerycz 2010 ibid at 251.
9
Michael Doyle, International Ethics and the Responsibility to Protect (2011) 13 (International Studies Review, 7284 at 73.
10
Doyle 2011 supra note at 230.
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Responsibility to Protect as a new norm of customary international law. In order to fully grasp
the status of the norm I draw on international law, international humanitarian law (IHL),
international human rights law (IHRL) and legal scholarship as well as apply a broadened
theoretical interdisciplinary framework to explain the controversy. While one may ultimately
conclude it remains an example of soft law, it nonetheless can exert significant influence on how
states interpret their legal obligations towards preventing and responding to mass atrocities.11 In
addition it appears to be still evolving in ways I will demonstrate throughout the thesis.
Consequently, the research considers what it would take for the Responsibility to Protect to
become legally binding and what factors are holding back or promoting this development.

This

requires a perspective on how international law is created and maintained which will be provided
in the thesis to come.
Overall, it a story of norm entrepreneurship – the norm has been conceptualized, articulated and
is being progressively refined in expert and scholarly reports, in detailed responses by the
Secretary General and in Security Council Resolutions. The thesis revisits the existing set of
legal standards, institutional structures and the jurisprudence underpinning the principle in order
to see how it can best be understood and applied – as a means of protecting the person and not
only as a military doctrine aimed at justifying intervention. Human rights, for example, are not a
part of the mainstream activities of the Security Council, but the Responsibility to Protect brings
together international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the context of the
Security Council.12

11

Jennifer M. Welsh, and Maria Banda International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or
Expanding States Responsibilities (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 213-231 [Welsh and Banda. 2010].
12
Glerycz supra note 7 at 251.
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According to my analysis, I am prepared to affirm the principle as a new international norm on
its way “to becoming a rule of customary international law.”13 I also agree with Kofi Annan who
tended to see it as a way to strengthen existing international humanitarian law, such as the
Genocide Convention and the further implementation of existing commitments.14

The analysis

requires an understanding of how norms become become ‘soft’ law (lex ferenda) or ‘hard’ law
(lex lata) and I strive to unravel exactly how this principle has evolved and its legal status to
date.15
The question of whether the Responsibility to Protect has transitioned into law is important for
theory and practice. For one thing, states are more likely to act if it is legal. The law also
emphasizes precedents and practice over national interest and preferences; as a result “legal rules
may exert a greater ‘compliance pull’ because of the legitimacy associated with the obligations
they outline.”16 In addition legal obligations as opposed to moral obligations have specific
remedies if they are not fulfilled which soft law does not allow.17
The thesis further locates the Responsibility to Protect doctrine as an aspect of transnational law
and global governance. The role of nongovernmental actors as contributing to its place in
transnational law is researched and explored. The study therefore serves as a unique analysis and
a case study of how a fundamental and controversial international norm can be created,
promoted, and accepted at the level of transnational governance and finally implemented. In
general terms, the research is of an interdisciplinary nature involving the study of transnational,
13

Louise Arbour as cited in Gareth Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and
for All (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution Press, 2008) 349.
14
Jennifer M. Welsh, and Maria Banda International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or
Expanding States Responsibilities (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect, 213-231 at 227 [Welsh and Banda,
2010].
15
Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid at 227.
16
Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid at 228.
17
Welsh and Banda, 2010 ibid.
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international and global forces in relation to human peace and security. The broader significance
of this research is in its contribution to the understanding of existing and new forms of hard and
soft law and global governance and how norms and laws can evolve and survive in the
international and transnational arena.
In academic writing, governance is often associated with the state, but the paradigm change
underlying the study of governance does not centre on the state, but usually more broadly
includes a research question on the nature of the relationship between the state and non-state
actors or citizen groups. This relationship can be expressed through a change in the authority of
the state, its sovereignty, and globalization. Under these conditions, we find the distinction
between national and international governance has changed. As the thesis engages in its
consideration of whether the principle of the Responsibility to Protect has evolved into either
international law and/or an international soft law norm, it firstly determines what the
impediments and the factors that support and enhance its evolution and implementation are.
Secondly, it investigates whether there are cases where it has been implemented. To consider
both of these questions, the investigation has utilized an interdisciplinary approach drawn from
mainly international law, international relations, anthropology, and political science.
Five sociopolitical issues of significance are identified and elaborated on that impede as well as
support its acceptance in the international environment. The issues include the following: 1) the
tension between the principles of state sovereignty and state responsibility to the individual; 2)
the legality and legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect; 3) the self-interest of states versus
altruistic principles; 4) the inclusion of non-governmental actors as players; and, finally, 5) the
UN and its limited institutional authority for resolving conflicts.

7

The thesis also illuminates one other major impediment that has grown and continues to exist
today; i.e., that of fear and mistrust, exacerbating the tensions with regard to state sovereignty.
The suspicion on the part of non-western states of the motivation of western states remains a
major challenge for the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in its soft form. Some
states oppose the crystallization of the Responsibility to Protect into law for fear of excessive
interventions, and reject the idea that the Responsibility to Protect has evolved into a new
customary rule.
In addition, the thesis will examine the role the Responsibility to Protect has played and is
playing in humanitarian crises. It will trace its history and context as both an evolving norm and
as potentially customary international law. An analysis of the first true application of the
principle will be carried out as a case study of the UN-sanctioned intervention into Libya in
2011. There will also be a discussion of other cases where the Responsibility to Protect has been
attributed incorrectly as responsible in principle for international action -- that is Iraq (a US led
action) and Kosovo (a NATO intervention) -- because they were not UN sanctioned. In this way
we will gain a clearer picture of what the Responsibility to Protect means as a legal basis for
international intervention in genocidal situations, and thus gain a clearer picture of its growth and
prospects as well as barriers to its implementation.
In UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s report entitled In Larger Freedom: Towards
Development Security and Human Rights for All, he states that “The protection of human rights
is a collective responsibility.”18 One of the obstacles, however, is that the support of the
Responsibility to protect is influenced by cultural beliefs, historical circumstances, ideological,

18

Kofi Annan, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development and Human Rights for All A/59/2005, at 37, para. 140.
[Annan, 2005].
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national and political identities in spite of any international agreements already achieved on
human rights and the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect. The problem of
accommodating regional or cultural differences in a universal human rights framework is part of
“the disagreements between the Western developing states, on the one hand, and the Eastern
Bloc and many developing states on the other.”19 These latter groups fear the dominance of the
post-war human rights agenda of Western liberal ideologies. Tensions remain with the Universal
Declaration and the covenants seen as largely Western constructs. Ideally, human rights
advocates would like to see human rights interpreted and applied in a consistent way which also
accommodates their own local traditions and cultural norms.20 This renders the application of
truly universal human rights problematic. The 1993 United Nations World Conference on
Human Rights attempted to address this controversy through the adoption of a Declaration and
Programme of Action.
All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The
international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on
the same footing, and with the same emphasis. While the significance of national and
regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be
borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms. 21
The thesis thus moves into highly contentious territory as the Responsibility to Protect claims
that, while sovereign governments have the primary Responsibility to Protect their own citizens
from human atrocities, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, when they are unable or
unwilling to do so their responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community.
According to the work of the International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS),
“this response can and should span a continuum involving prevention, a response to the violence,
19

John H. Currie, Public International Law, second edition (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2008) at 440 [Currie, 2008].
Currie 2008 ibid at 440.
21
World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, UN Doc. A/CONF.157/23
(1993) at para. 5.
20
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when and if necessary, and ultimately rebuilding shattered societies.”22 The Report also sets out
three pillars (to be elaborated on in Chapter Two). The most controversial issue, however, is that
of the international reaction to forceful intervention and much of the thesis focuses on this
aspect.
To date, work in the area of the Responsibility to Protect principle has focused on the roots and
rationale for the Responsibility to Protect, but little has been done on the evolution of the norm
and its status in international law, along with the ethical principles involved in making soft law
work, as well as the role of non-state actors in its promotion and implementation. This
dissertation contributes to the literature in such a way as to fill those gaps. Due to the nature of
the Responsibility to Protect as soft law, lex ferenda bordering on hard law, lex lata, I also show
how ethics, values and principles, norms, good faith and shared expectations about appropriate
social behavior held by the community of actors must continue to be taken into consideration.
In the investigation of the principle, I am therefore not only concerned with international law as
it has existed and does exist, I am also concerned with the values that international decisions
(legal and otherwise) hold, and the ethical basis upon which decisions are made. The research
explores in more depth both the moral perspective and the perspective that it is in the interests of
the state, as well as the broader international community, to act ethically, and to account to civil
society and other states for its actions. Sovereignty, non-intervention, self-determination and
self-interest must sometimes take a back seat to crises of a humanitarian nature. Ostensibly, the
nub of the controversy is the clash between the norms regulating state sovereignty and the
question of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention to protect human security.

22

ICISS supra note 6.
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In order to understand the significance of the Responsibility to Protect as a shift in international
norms, the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention are discussed in historical and legal
terms. Sovereignty and non-intervention have been the basic principles around which the
international environment has operated and are the cornerstones of the UN Charter and its
attempts to achieve world order. While my study to date has persuaded me that there is solid
justification for the objectives of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, I have
investigated arguments that do not support humanitarian intervention and/or the Responsibility to
Protect in order to aid my understanding of existing impediments to its success.
Research shows that some countries continue to oppose the Responsibility to Protect principle,
particularly the notion of intervention, by emphasizing non-intervention’s connection with selfdetermination and sovereignty. By emphasizing what to some extent can be considered as both
an ethical and a legal principle of self-determination, some countries attempt to protect
themselves from stronger powers who they regard “at minimum as furthering their selfish
interests and at maximum neo-colonialists. The Chinese, for example, in reaction to the Kosovo
campaign (1996), regarded this as an attempt “to legitimate interventions designed to force
countries to change their political systems.”23 (Similar objections were voiced by Russia and
India in the debates leading up to the approval of the Responsibility to Protect and continue to
affect more recent decisions and/or actions in support of the Responsibility to Protect). By
raising these roadblocks, however, they raise questions about their own motivation. While I do
not deny the history of colonialism and the current functioning of capitalism, I argue that it is
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vital to recognize that the Responsibility to Protect, as a principle that must go through the UN to
maintain legitimacy, is meant to provide something beyond state self-interest.
I do accept that international law can be used for imperialist purposes but I do argue the
Responsibility to Protect, when interpreted and exercised properly, can be a check on
imperialism and hegemony. The Responsibility to Protect as a principle, approved at the United
Nations, was designed to protect the world from unilateral action from the West as well as from
the North and South. The Security Council process, through the use of the veto, offers the
opportunity for the Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (Permanent Five
or P5) to have their say and functions as a corrective to imperial intervention.24 A problem does
arise, however, when one state allows its vested interests to dominate the humanitarian purpose
of intervention.
While there has been a growth in the literature on the Responsibility to Protect, I have
approached the literature in new and different ways. There has not been any extensive study of
the evolution of the norm in international law nor of non-state actors involved in the analysis and
support of the overall the Responsibility to Protect principle. I have met with and interviewed
some of the more established NGOs as well as the founding authors of the Responsibility to
Protect in order to understand what their contribution is and what they understand to be the
problems or impediments to the development of the norm at the international level. I have also
considered the role of international institutions, particularly the UN, in the development and
implementation of the norm. This research has helped me to reach some conclusions regarding
its ability to survive.

24

The P5 include China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States.

12

The end point for norm development is institutionalization (usually through customary law).25
Chapter Nine presents an analysis of a case study concerning the legitimacy of the intervention
in Libya in 2011where the Responsibility to Protect was invoked in the Security Council and the
international community came together sufficiently to move forward with a military intervention.
Chapter Nine is original in that it presents what may be argued to be the only bona fide instance
of the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in its pillar three form. I develop a novel
framework of legitimacy and test the Libyan intervention against it, and illustrate the necessity of
the Responsibility to Protect operating within the context of not necessarily a legal but at
minimum a legitimate authority.
The analysis also shows, however, how easily implementation can be judged by the international
community in a negative light, increasing skepticism and fear of imperialism and neocolonial
intentions. In this way it also illustrates that geopolitical interests remain very near the surface in
international affairs and emphasizes the vulnerability of the principle. These concerns may push
opportunities for implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in future situations backwards
for a time, serving political interests, rather than ethical considerations. The impact of the various
impediments affects the international community in its responses to other areas of great concern,
particularly the three to four year old conflict in Syria. While a deeper analysis of the Syrian
situation is not a goal of the thesis, I will go so far as to suggest the Syrian case demonstrates that
political interests can still trump humanitarian concerns in the UN Security Council and that the
quest for a disinterested regime or a neutral, principled and unbiased international organ is
elusive.
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II.

Theoretical Perspectives, Concepts and Arguments

Concepts such as norms, morals, ethics, values, universal principles, intervention, humanitarian
intervention, foreign policy, human rights, human security, human cultural security, international
and transnational law and global governance are used and elaborated upon in the course of the
discussion. To elucidate the context for the different norms, laws and principals involved at the
international level in the Responsibility to Protect debate and the meaning and significance of the
conceptual framework referred to above, the relevant literature and theoretical perspectives are
explored and articulated. The dissertation identifies some of the ways in which these theoretical
approaches or ideologies have affected and continue to affect decisions for intervention.
The theoretical perspectives stem from international law, conflict resolution, ethics,
anthropology and international relations, with support from philosophy and political science,
particularly through those theories of Realism and Idealism, Constructivism, the Logic of
Appropriateness and the Logic of Consequences.
Briefly: (i) Realists will consider the power and interests of states and how zero sum or
distributional conflicts are resolved; (ii) Neorealists and neoliberals conceptualize states as
rational, autonomous actors; and (iii) Constructivists focus on the logic of the appropriateness of
a set of norms and values which constitute the order of society and which determine the
authorities and the actions of actors in the system; and (iv) those propounding the logic of
consequences see political action as rational, calculating behavior designed to maximize
preferences.26
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In the political theory literature, the classic tripartite division separates Realists, Liberals and
Socialists. These theoreticians posit differing views on the actors in international politics. The
Realist School sees State interests as the essential determinant of public policy. State security is
inherently under threat and therefore primary. States should only intervene when it is in their
interest.27 In theoretical terms my own view of the place of the Responsibility to Protect in
international relations is best explained by Constructivism, Idealism and the Logic of
Appropriateness - those theories that illustrate the importance of eclectic international law
located between the theory of consent and natural law rather than that of Realism or Socialism or
the Logic of Consequences.28 The Responsibility to Protect is deeply familiar to Liberal
international ethics, but even the Realist and Marxist traditions include “commitments to human
respect that make humanitarian concerns far from foreign.”29 Constructivist notions of norm
entrepreneurship, norm socialization and related theories of social movements have found their
application across a variety of political phenomena for which the previously dominant theories of
International Relations, Realism and Neo-liberalism had no analytic models.

Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders,” (1998) 52 International Organization, 943-69) [March
and Olsen 1998].
27
Doyle 2011 supra note 9 at 74.
28
Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 94.
29
Doyle 2011 supra note 9 at 72.

15

III.

Methodology

The study of the Responsibility to Protect also contributes to the larger theoretical understanding
of conflict resolution. The research into the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect serves as a
vehicle for the exploration of larger questions, including those concerning governance,
international normative theory, norm entrepreneurship, the role of the United Nations and the
role of non-state actors in international governance.
The study relies on classical research methods, e.g., bibliographical research, but of an intensely
interdisciplinary nature, as well as the collection and review of documents, reports, resolutions,
agreements, conventions, and statutes from international organizations and bodies located at
regional, national and international levels. The methodology applied to the study of the
Responsibility to Protect searches for motives behind the support of the principle as well as
outcomes as it is considered by key players and its advocates. Interviews are carried out by
means of the pursuit of a social science methodology which is designed to achieve a deeper
meaning or “thick description.”30 Due to the importance of non-state actors the qualitative
research was carried out in the form of policy interviews. The interviews involved collecting
information more generally on political and advocacy groups, other members of civil society,
and international organizations, particularly the UN. 31 Overall, two qualitative research methods
have mainly influenced the interview questions: (1) the anthropology of policy; and (2) norm
entrepreneurship. These methods incorporate ways of doing research in different fields; they
30
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relate to and complement each other in fundamental ways representing the interdisciplinarity of
the theory. The examination of norm formation and implementation requires an
interdisciplinary approach that combines the tools and techniques of the international lawyer and
political scientist with those of the sociologist and anthropologist, who offer insight into the
analysis of social movements, and social change.32
The qualitative research helps to expand our understanding of these factors, and aids us in
achieving a “thick description” of the meaning of the norm, while legal theory and the theory of
norm entrepreneurship provides the framework for its historical development. While on the
theoretical level the thesis considers whether intervention (and the Responsibility to Protect) is a
moral entity or a legal entity, or both, and what this means in terms of implementation, additional
research focuses the thesis on norm development. Many of the non-state actors who are
concerned with human rights and human dignity and the protection of human security33 act as
proponents of the Responsibility to Protect. Social movement organizations are central in the
promotion of UN initiatives and to the movement of UN decisions with relation to the principles
of the Responsibility to Protect. Without these organizations, the Responsibility to Protect
would likely not have achieved the level of acceptance that it has. Some commentators have
gone so far as to suggest that “the roots of contemporary ethical foreign policy are to be found in
the evolution of the NGO movement…” 34
The thesis provides a description of the views, perspectives and actions of key actors with regard
to the norm in both positive and negative ways as it has emerged. Issues of policy,
32
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communication, legitimacy, impact and effectiveness, moral issues and realpolitik are
investigated. Key areas of agreement and disagreement are also highlighted. The research also
involved collecting information more generally on leaders in the formulation of the
Responsibility to Protect, other members of civil society, and international organizations,
particularly the UN, including documents produced by the Secretary General of the UN as they
pertain to the evolution of the doctrine itself.35
III.1

Introduction to Norm Entrepreneurships

One important theoretical and methodological approach which helps us to understand the
development of the Responsibility to Protect as a norm is that of norm entrepreneurship. The
NGOs, their organizations and the ICISS itself can be regarded as classic examples of norm
entrepreneurs in the creation and development of the Responsibility to Protect. The significance
of the relationship of norms to social behaviour parallels in some manner the relationship of
normative action to norm entrepreneurship. Johnstone states that “...norm entrepreneurs are
actors with a cause who mobilize support for their cause and seek to have it crystallized as an
accepted standard of behaviour.”36 Finnemore and Sikkink describe norm entrepreneurship as a
process that works in three stages: In Stage 1, individuals call attention to issues and try to
persuade state leaders to become proponents. These norm entrepreneurs are usually involved
with organizations like NGOs, government or international organizations; Stage 2 comes about
when a tipping point has occurred and the norm is spreading quickly in a ‘norm cascade.’ This is
mostly an exercise in persuasion – not coercion, although such things as sanctions can be used to
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persuade. Finally, in Stage 3, the norm is almost automatically accepted and followed and
becomes entrenched in national and international institutions.37 “At the far end of the norm
cascade; i.e. the third stage, norm institutionalization occurs; norms acquire a ‘taken for granted’
quality and are no longer a matter of broad public debate.”38 Not all norms reach this final stage,
however, and there is some question whether the Responsibility to Protect has achieved this final
status. The controversy surrounding efforts to make legal or political decisions in humanitarian
crisis situations according to the Responsibility to Protect holds back its ability to harden into
law.
Finnemore refers to norm entrepreneurs as “meaning managers” and introduces the term “moral
proselytism” to describe the activity. The language they use to construct these, “cognitive
frames,” is an essential component. New norms must challenge the current “Logic of
appropriateness” and create new ones.39 In the case of the Responsibility to Protect sovereignty
is to be replaced by responsibility. Overall, however, these three phases are not necessarily
sequential; it is a dynamic process that occurs through discourse and deliberation where ideas are
promoted, defended, explained and justified as the thesis will demonstrate.
Platforms for the discussion of the norm often include NGOs or standing international
organizations. Motivations for norm entrepreneurs are usually based on values that include
empathy and an interest in the welfare of others with a shared commitment to humanity because
of a “belief in the ideals and values embodied in the norms.”40 This is a very important point in
terms of understanding the values and ideals that form the basis of the Responsibility to Protect
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principle and those entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial organizations that promote and support it
as a moral and possibly legal principle rather than for any hidden purpose.
One of the central tenets of the thesis is that norm entrepreneurs do function as “moral
watchdogs” and are free to advocate for moral concerns in the middle of a crisis where states are
more often constrained by conflicting interests. NGOs hold some of the tools needed to promote
the Responsibility to Protect. “One prominent feature of modern organizations and an important
source of influence for international organizations in particular is their use of expertise and
information to change the behavior of other actors.”41

NGOs in the case of the Responsibility

to Protect were critical to the development of the norm. At some point, however, norm
entrepreneurs have to gain the support of state actors.
Finnemore and Sikkink suggest that norms that make universalistic claims “about what is good
for all people in all places have more expansive potential than localized and particularistic
normative frameworks.”42 They are more likely to gain transnational acceptance. This
‘universalistic nature’ is an essential part of the obligation the Responsibility to Protect and its
underlying network of legal conventions and covenants imposes on nations to protect citizens
(both their own and others). Three principles relevant to the norm tend to be persuasive:
“universalism, individualism, and world citizenship.”43 Universalism is necessary in that each
country must buy into it. Individualism underlies the Responsibility to Protect norm as it is an
extension of human rights principles. World citizenship is relevant in the sense that it applies to
citizens of every country - not just our own.
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Thus, the key principle of the Responsibility to Protect is to protect innocent persons who are
being subjected to serious or fatal bodily harm. Such a norm must be universal in that it needs to
transcend cultural differences and must be understood and accepted across cultures. This
struggle for universality is a key impediment in the achievement of any kind of intervention and
will be discussed further in the thesis. A major constraint is the diversity of values and priorities
awarded to civilian protection that exists. In order to reach such a universal understanding,
acceptance of the new norm is related to the fit of the norm within existing normative
frameworks. Activists work hard to utilize this fit between existing norms and developing ones.
The Responsibility to Protect’s principle represents a shift from the “rights of states” to the
“responsibility of states” and the participation of activists has been significant toward the
international community’s ability to achieve this shift.44
III.2

The Anthropology of Policy

In addition to norm entrepreneurship, I also adopt an approach which applies the anthropology of
policy as a qualitative research method. Proponents of the anthropology of policy look at the
conceptual vocabulary of policies and what can be understood from the rejection or acceptance
of ideas and map the actors who influence the policies. Policy is seen as an organizing concept in
society, similar to the way family may have been seen in traditional anthropology. In the
anthropology of policy “Field and site are no longer coterminous” and anthropologists follow a
flow of concepts or ‘policies’ or ‘norms’ as they move across the field.45 In this case the field
pertains to a transnational network that encompasses nongovernmental civil actors at the
domestic or local level, international organizations and states as the norm is created and evolved.
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Susan Wright calls this “studying through”46 - events are followed through different sites to
reveal the policy process and the way in which concepts, ideas, policies or norms are negotiated
which in total illustrate “forms of governance and regimes of power.”47 Researchers such as
Sally Engle Merry, Annelise Riles, Sally Falk Moore, Arjun Appadurai, Dorothy Smith and H.
Gusterson provide methodological models for this research.48
Sally Engle Merry suggests “the transnational circulation of people and ideas is transforming the
world we live in, but grasping its full complexity is extraordinarily difficult. To do so, it is
essential to focus on specific places where transnational flows are happening.”49 By focussing on
the norm I have been able to find key individuals involved with the Responsibility to Protect and
either spend time with them and gain their views and insights through interviews or to hear their
personal accounts of their own experience with the norm. This has presented me with a unique
opportunity to gain an original perspective on the evolution of the norm and to see it through the
eyes of the people who live and work with it.
The study of the Responsibility to Protect illustrates that the growth of the acceptance of the
Responsibility to Protect lies not only in a traditional international legal environment with a
dependence on traditional institutions such as the UN and the Security Council, but also nonstate actors and individuals within a transnational legal environment. Transnational law is
regarded here in effect as an institutional framework for cross-border interaction beyond the
nation state.50 Along similar lines to the methodology used by Sally Engle Merry in her study of

46

PhD thesis “Local Conflict an Ideological Struggle, ‘Positive Images’” in Wright 2006 ibid.
Wright 2006 supra note 45 at 45.
48
Merry 2010 supra note 35.
49
Merry 2010 ibid.
50
Gralf Calliess, -Peter Law, Transnational Osgoode Hall Law School/Comparative Research in Law and Political
Economy Research Paper No. 3/2010 [Calliess 2010].
47

22

human rights,51 my own research is intended to provide a vehicle for understanding how new
categories of meaning emerge and are applied to social practices (in this case at the national and
the international level and within groups who advocate for the Responsibility to Protect). In
order for the Responsibility to Protect principle to achieve the broad acceptance it requires to be
successful, it needs to be accepted within local contexts of power and meaning as well as by state
leaders and those already persuaded (i.e., the activist groups). National leaders, of course,
require the support of the citizens and are sometimes influenced by these citizen groups in taking
humanitarian action.
Activist groups can be regarded as intermediaries between different sets of cultural
understandings of what is ethical in the behaviour of states who are making crucial decisions in
the global environment; i.e. as intermediaries between the ordinary citizens and the international
organizations and transnational law. Policy research was conducted through these interviews in
such a way as to allow me to explore subtleties of group perspectives and collect detailed
descriptions of experiences, to explore how concepts are actually understood, and how political
relations are being played out. I sought to understand what, from the perspective of those
involved, have been the successes of the policy, the failures, and the impediments that might
stand in the way of further success along with the ethical commonalities or conflicts that may be
underlying any underlying tensions. I have been interested in gaining a “thicker” comprehension
of the relationship between the political public sphere and the self-legitimating claims of
organizations in support of the Responsibility to Protect. In order to accomplish this I have
examined statements made at the national and international levels as well as the potentially
critical or supportive views of citizen interest groups apart from the political stance of state
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actors. This investigation has provided insights into the discourse that is taking place (directly or
indirectly) at the international level. As expected, there are areas of agreement and areas of
conflict as part of the discourse. Such findings of conflicting discourse or criticism of the
political position would be expected in a democratic system.
My interest is in the professional organizations and the translocal relationship – and even
further the transnational level where decisions are being made that are pre-empted or influenced
by bodies such as those Nongovernmental Organizations interviewed. We will see from the
interviews that many of the NGOs approached have formed coalitions or have at least cooperated
with one another in order to strengthen their positions. This is the area that is covered by
questions asking interviewees about their joint or collaborative efforts and if they find them
worth pursuing. My intention is to show how norms develop and grow through the influence
and cooperation of norm entrepreneurs. Text-based discourses are central in this development.
We will see how transnational organizations shape global governance through their advocacy
strategies. The interviews with individuals constitute an investigation into their transformative
potential to show how the discourse is framed, particularly in relation to the five issues
identified, and becomes part of a chain of action mediated by documentary forms of knowledge
to social action. Documentary data were also collected through website research or written
reports or attendance at events where the Responsibility to Protect was the main topic of
discussion.
The interview questions were unique in their formulation based on documentary evidence,
information gathering, rules and regulations, history and current events. The interview included
the intention to find a balance between directing the interview toward the researcher’s goals and
encouraging those being interviewed to add information or views that might not have been
24

included in the original set of questions. These interviews plus material evidence help to provide
a 'thicker' description of the evolution of the concept as it develops toward the prospect of
becoming a legal norm.
Ultimately, the thesis aims to clarify the problematic relationship between the Responsibility to
Protect and international law. Overall it accepts the view that the World Summit agreement did
not create new law and that the Responsibility to Protect is still best understood as a political
commitment to act upon shared moral beliefs, much of which is embedded in already existing
international law. That is not to say, however, that the Responsibility to Protect is devoid of
legal content nor that there are not signs that it is evolving toward hard law. This growth will be
evidenced throughout the thesis in documents, resolutions, reports, practice, Security Council
resolution and International Court decisions. In relation to the legal responsibilities of states the
Responsibility to Protect principle involves the state’s responsibilities towards its own
population. These responsibilities are deeply embedded in existing international law, much of
which is considered jus cogens. As Louise Arbour, former Commissioner for Human Rights,
suggests there is an emerging legal duty to prevent genocide which suggests an emerging area of
legal innovation that may strengthen the application of the Responsibility to Protect over time.52
In the final analysis, the Responsibility to Protect requires a global order where the legal
structure is based on legal rights as well as responsibilities. Its basis in international human
rights law is extremely important to its evolution. In a soft legal environment, it is likely that the
Responsibility to Protect will always run into obstacles in terms of implementation. Presently,
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for it to succeed, the Responsibility to Protect must be treated as not only a legal and political
doctrine, but as a moral one which stands to protect civilians in conflict in the case of the failure
of states to protect their own population. In my view, however, there is no need yet to despair regardless of impediments, the Responsibility to Protect has evolved and continues to evolve and
is implementable. It is not a flawed principle but an essential one in today’s environment of intra
state conflict. State sovereignty can and must give way to state responsibility when citizens are
in extreme jeopardy.
IV.

What Follows

The following chapter, Chapter Two, provides the reader with a greater sense of the immediate
history and context surrounding the formal approval of the Responsibility to Protect. The story
of its approval commences within the context of the supremacy of state sovereignty and then
moves toward a recognition of the concerns regarding human security and human rights in
international affairs. The story proceeds with the involvement of Canada, the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the acceptance of a limited form
of the proposed norm in 2005 in the UN by the General Assembly. This represents a transition
of historical, legal and moral significance that has taken place since the Peace of Westphalia.
International law is introduced in this Chapter to begin to outline the framework of international
humanitarian law and human rights law, along with a history of international legal scholarship
and the place of the sovereignty rights of states. The legal regime of the UN Charter is also
described to introduce the reader to the acceptance of its formal approval and later means of
implementation. Finally, the four sources in international law are presented to illustrate the
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options that exist for declaring a norm as law. To aid in the tracking of the evolution of the
norm, the concept of soft law is explored, especially as it relates to the Responsibility to Protect.
Chapter Three discusses the importance of human security to the development of the
Responsibility to Protect after the Cold War and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It also
introduces the controversies that surround the notion of forcible intervention and the Laws of
War and humanitarian intervention. On the legal side, it clarifies the legal foundation of the
Responsibility to Protect in the four crimes: war crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic
cleansing. Because of the difficulty in establishing the exact legal nature of the Responsibility to
Protect, the Chapter outlines the importance of legitimacy arguments as distinct from legal
determinations, as either soft law (lex ferenda) or hard law (lex lata).
Chapter Four, addresses moral behaviour and moral philosophy as underlying values and ethical
principle among nations, cultures and religions. It emphasizes the necessity for common moral
principles as opposed to actions in the international community taken by states in their own selfinterest which emphasize their sovereignty rights as opposed to their responsibilities. It suggests
that the achievement of a coherent system of conventions has in some ways already been
accomplished in the human rights legal framework and provides examples of foreign policy
where such ideals can be found.
Chapter Five, lays out the theoretical foundations of the Responsibility to Protect, particularly
focussing on the need for morality, ethics, universal principles and idealism to take precedence
over realist notions of the state acting in its own self-interest. It suggests, however, that even in
an established environment of human rights, realpolitik still serves to guide state actions along
with fears of neocolonialist and imperial motivations. Along with realists who see actors as only
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acting in their self-interest are those who support Third World Approaches to International Law
(TWAIL). Their basic mistrust of international law and its colonial underpinnings lead some to
reject it altogether. Other theoretical perspectives are discussed from international relations
(institutional and liberal theorists), political science, and law perspectives as they reflect on the
way in which the principle is approached.
Constructivist theories, which reject rationalist explanations but stress the place of norms and
shared understanding, emphasize the dominance of normative discourse in decisions being made
in the development of the principle. Finally, two other forms of these two basic theories (actor
oriented versus structuralist) - the logic of appropriateness (in which norms and values dominate)
and the logic of consequences (actions are conducted to realize material interests) - are posed
against each other to help us understand the contrast between rules and roles versus the
maximization of self-interest. The thesis emphasizes the necessity of collaboration and
consensus in ethical choices affecting the preservation of human rights.
Chapter Six focuses on how the responsibility to protect has evolved in the global governance
context, with a particular focus on the role of Non-governmental organizations. The chapter
introduces Nongovernmental Organizations that have taken hold of the Responsibility to Protect
principle along with the rights of the individual and that call on governments of the world to
adopt the moral choice and protect civilians in violent conflict. These organizations tend to be
freer to adopt the moral high ground which has enabled them to advocate for the Responsibility
to Protect with less reservation. The cooperation of NGOs and international organizations and
states suggest the consideration in greater depth of transnational or supranational forms of
governance and of what form of governance is best suited (either from a practical or idealist
vision) to address some of these issues.
28

Chapter Seven discusses the theory of norm entrepreneurship as a framework for taking a deeper
look at International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activities and programs. It
provides a description of the role of INGOs as well as early influential entrepreneurs such as
Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff as a testimony to their own involvement.
Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the principle have been posed
in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed. The responses have been
considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of the
norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle.
Chapter Eight continues the analysis of the responses from those being interviewed with regard
to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal entity, a fundamental
question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary international law. It is
the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect that I sought to assist
in the purpose of deconstructing the evolution of the principle from an idea or concept to a legal
norm. It also seeks the views of those interviewed on the UN and its role as either a facilitator or
an obstruction to the implantation of the Responsibility to Protect.
Chapter Nine presents a case study of the implementation of the norm in its most controversial
aspect; i.e., military intervention into an internal conflict without the permission of the state.
When I first began the work of tracing the development of the norm, no legitimate case of
forceful implementation of the Responsibility to Protect had yet occurred. In 2011, however, the
Libyan revolution began and the Responsibility to Protect was invoked at the UN Security
Council. Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were passed which enabled forceful implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect. Ultimately it brought down the government and brought an end to the
conflict. The steps taken are described and the legitimacy of the action explored. The impact of
29

this action on the future of the Responsibility to Protect is also considered in terms of its success
or failure.
Chapter Ten presents the conclusions of the work, and suggests whether the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect is likely to thrive, adapt or wither away. It also discusses the
responsibility of the international community when the conflict has been brought to an end
regarding any rebuilding - perhaps even restructuring a new system of government. The
concluding part of the thesis, therefore, focuses on global governance (recognized as a system of
political and social authority relationships in the exercise of power and policy) at a national,
international, and supranational level. In the final analysis, the place of the Responsibility to
Protect in the governance of states after intervention and in peace building and the achievement
of stability needs to be more rigorously addressed. In this context the full spectrum of the
Responsibility to Protect principle will be reviewed in terms of not only its reaction to human
atrocities but in its prevention and rebuilding efforts.
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Chapter Two: History, Text and Legal Context of the Emerging Principle of
the Responsibility to Protect

I.

Introduction

Before delving more deeply into the analysis of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect, its
ultimate acceptance at the UN and its subsequent evolution, it is useful for the reader to have a
greater sense of the immediate history and context surrounding its formal approval. The story of
its approval commences within the context of the supremacy of state sovereignty and then moves
toward a recognition of the concerns regarding human security and human rights in international
affairs. Human rights and human security concerns gradually began to shift the sovereignty of
states away from exclusive rights over their own domain to increased responsibility to and for
their citizens and accountability to external states and governance bodies. This represents a
transition of historical, legal and moral significance that has taken place since the Peace of
Westphalia. The story proceeds with the involvement of Canada, the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the acceptance of a limited form of the
proposed norm in 2005 in the UN by the General Assembly.
II.

Canada, the Responsibility to Protect and Human Security

In this climate of concerns regarding human security, states began to seek a legitimate way to
prevent human atrocities from occurring. Beginning in the mid-1990s, a small group of states, as
members of the Human Security Network (HSN), developed a foreign policy of human security.
An enthusiastic and outspoken champion of this policy was Canada. The Canadian government
and its state-based human security fellows were networked, in turn, with a diverse coalition of
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International and Nongovernmental Organizations in what former Foreign Minister Lloyd
Axworthy characterized as the ‘new diplomacy.’53 This eventually led to the formation of the
ICISS, and adoption by the UN of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect.
During Lloyd Axworthy’s term (1996 -2000) as Minister of Foreign Affairs in Canada, he
identified “human security as encompassing three main aspects: conflict prevention, conflict
resolution and peace building.”54 These principles gained even greater substance in the
Responsibility to Protect principle. Conflict prevention, for example, includes strategies such as
mediation between potential combatants, preventive diplomacy and early warning systems.
Conflict resolution involves intervention in ongoing conflicts including peacekeeping and other
military forms of intervention. Peace building refers to what happens when the conflict comes to
an end - at the conclusion of a conflict there may be nothing or there may be peace building or
transitional justice. These three principles are infused in the ICISS document and illustrate how
the principle can be seen through the larger lens of conflict resolution. (While military
intervention is the most controversial aspect, I will in the conclusion of the thesis address the gap
in the literature regarding conflict resolution as well as jus post bellum and peacebuilding. In
Chapter Seven I also give thought to alternatives to intervention and what happens after the
fighting stops).
The Canadian foreign policy at that time contained a lot about the Human Security Agenda,
especially in the work done under the leadership of Axworthy from January 1996 to October
2000. Much of the inspiration of the work comes from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) and the 1994 World Development Report which took the position that the
53
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primary referent of security should be shifted from the state to the individual and that human life
and dignity should be the main concern. (It also included within human security such elements
as food, health, environmental and economic dimensions which are not covered in the qualified
approval of the principle). Security, therefore, was meant to provide a guarantee of human
rights. This human security agenda has been associated with the Landmines Convention
(another Canadian initiative), the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the
ICISS Report, as well as the Kimberley Process to control trade in blood diamonds.55
Axworthy prioritized peace building and the ban on anti-personnel landmines in an effort to
promote disarmament and the need for coherence in policies surrounding human security in
“freedom from fear” as well as “freedom from want.”56 Thus, by 1999, the focus had narrowed
to “freedom from fear” as Canada’s particular conception of human security. Specific priorities
focused on: protecting individuals from threats (including public safety, and terrorism);
protecting civilians in war zones and areas of landmines; and, in extremis, military deployments
to halt atrocities and war crimes, conflict prevention and the economic destruction of civil wars.
This would involve accountability from the global level of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to national and local levels, as well as peace operations.57 In this context, then, the
principle of the Responsibility to Protect was conceived and brought to life.
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III.

The Report of ICISS (2001) and the Formalization of the Responsibility to Protect

The principle of the Responsibility to Protect was formally conceptualized and advocated for in
2001 by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) with
Canada as a major player. The Commission’s goal was to deliver “practical protection for
ordinary people, at risk of their lives, because their states are unwilling or unable to protect
them…”.58 The doctrine represented in the ICISS Report is not solely restricted to military
intervention for protection purposes, but more broadly relates to the responsibility to prevent -“to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises
putting populations at risk;” the responsibility to react -- “to respond to situations of compelling
human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and
international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention;” and, the responsibility to
rebuild -- “to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery,
reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was
designed to a halt or avert.”59
The Responsibility to Prevent is regarded as the single most important principle according to the
Commission and envisages disparate actors working together (including States, the UN,
international financial institutions, regional organizations, and NGOs among others) to achieve
these objectives.60 It also requires that prevention options be exhausted and less intrusive and
coercive measures be considered in the first instance before forceful intervention options are
contemplated. Discussion of peace talks and political solutions should be common at this stage.
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As stated earlier, the most controversial aspect, however, and the one that has drawn the most
attention, and the one that this dissertation in greater part addresses, is its provision for coercive
intervention when human atrocities occur and no peaceful methods seem to work. Drawing this
line, however, is often contentious -- witness the political situation (September 2013) with
Obama’s “red line” over the use of chemical weapons in Syria61 versus Putin’s protection of
Russian interests in earlier Security Council resolutions and the failure of the Security Council to
act in Syria.
The Report recognizes the concept of sovereignty as “the legal identity of a state in international
law” as well as the norm of non-intervention codified in the UN Charter.62 However, the Report
also suggests that the “authority of the state is not regarded as absolute.”63 There are
constitutional power sharing arrangements and obligations that states share as members of the
international community. These obligations raise questions about the principle of ‘sovereignty
as control’ and arouse ethical questions about the importance of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’
within the state and external to the state.64

The basic principles of the Report are, firstly, that

state sovereignty implies responsibility and the primary responsibility for the protection of its
people lies with the state itself; and secondly, where a population is suffering serious harm as a
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is
unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international
principle of the Responsibility to Protect.65
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This new concept of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ requires states to accept their responsibility
to protect their citizens. These principles bear some relationship to existing standards of state
conduct with regard to human rights and humanitarian protection. In fact, the foundations of the
Responsibility to Protect lie in established international laws and principles “(1) obligations
inherent in the concept of sovereignty; (2) the responsibility of the Security Council, under
Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security; (3)
specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and
treaties, international humanitarian law and national law; and (4) the developing practice of
states.”66 These rights and obligations will be outlined in greater detail later in the chapter.
The development of the norm is not a simple one. For example, the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect is treated differently in four main texts: i.e., the ICISS report (2001),
the High Level Panel report (2004),67 the Report of the Secretary General (2005),68 and the
Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit,69 the most comprehensive treatment being the
ICISS report. The main document is the Outcome Document but the others contribute to its
interpretation. The intent of all of these was to solve the legal and policy questions of
humanitarian intervention.70
The UN High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change spoke of an “emerging
norm of a collective international responsibility to protect and linked shared responsibility
66
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directly to the UN.” 71 The report stipulated that the Security Council can authorize military
action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare the situation as a threat
to international peace and security under Chapter VII. It also called for more responsible use of
the veto. The Report, unlike the Commission, did not allow for coalitions of the willing and I
have maintained this position with regard to the legitimate use of the norm.
In March 2005 this finding was endorsed by the Report of the UN Secretary General entitled In
Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. The Report of the
Secretary General stressed the need to use diplomatic and humanitarian methods to help protect
the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. However, the use of force was an
ultima ratio measure to be taken by the Security Council, if necessary. 72
Overall, the Responsibility to Protect has two primary reference points: the first is the ICISS
Report (2001), and the second is the formal acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect in the UN
Summit Outcome Document in 2005 – a qualified version of the principle proposed in the
Report. The Draft Negotiated Outcome document distributed on 12 September 2005 was
approved by the UN General Assembly unanimously. The consensual text reads:
Responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity
138 Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We
accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community
should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility and
support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
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139 The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility
to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to
take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case by case basis and in
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means
be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing an crimes against humanity. We stress the
needs for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.
We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and
conflicts break out.
140 We fully support the mission of the Special Advisor of the Secretary-General on the
prevention of Genocide.73
This document was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly in its Resolution 60/1, 2005
World Summit Outcome Document which incorporated the concept of the responsibility to
protect. 74 Some states questioned the legal nature of the Responsibility to Protect and sought to
frame it as a purely moral concept.75 The final text is an effort to bridge the different positions
and to look beyond pure morality. Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document represent
a rather curious mixture of political and legal considerations, which reflects the continuing
division and confusion about the meaning and nature of the concept.76
The Security Council first referred to it in Resolution 1674 on the protection of civilians in
armed conflict. In April 2006, the UN SC reaffirmed the Responsibility to Protect and agreed to
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adopt appropriate measures where necessary.77 On 12 January 2009, the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-moon issued a Report entitled Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) which
helped to set the tone and direction for the principle and further contributed to its evolution in
international law. His Report established a framework for the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect which has become widely known and accepted as the “three pillar
approach.” Pillar One represents the protection responsibilities of the State to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in
accordance with paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome 2005. Pillar Two is the
commitment of the international community to assist States in meeting those obligations. Pillar
Three is the responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive
manner when a State is manifestly failing to provide such protection (not necessarily by using
force, although it does not exclude the use of force). All three must be ready to be utilized at
any point.78 In terms of the status of the principle, the Secretary General’s Report has
interpretive power and has been persuasive in the eventual adoption of the norm in its legal
context.
In 2009 the General Assembly subsequently adopted a unanimous resolution noting the report
and agreeing to continue consideration of the Responsibility to Protect.79
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This development is part of a growing transformation of international law from a state
and governing-elite based system of rules into a normative framework intended to protect
certain human and community interests.80
These reports issued by the UN Secretary General and certain expert bodies and subsequent
resolutions lend some weight to the Resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 2005
although the text of the Outcome Document is the most authoritative in terms of its legal value.
Let us then consider the wider legal context for this principle.
IV.
IV.I

International Law
Introduction

When considering the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect, it is important to understand
and enter the debate on international hard law (lex lata) versus soft law (lex ferenda). Much of
the debate regarding international law versus soft law centers on a bifurcation of the two. Most
agree soft law (lex ferenda) is a reality and is an instrument of contemporary governance in terms
of its effect on hard law.81 It is a recurrent (legal) practice in contemporary international society.
Defining soft law is a task in itself.82 Goldman claims soft law functions as so-called hard law
by operating through formalized decision-making procedures. On the other hand, it can be
suggested much hard law functions like soft law. Goldman argues for an expansion of the
concept of law to account for this. Given some of this ambiguity and the desire to locate the
Responsibility to Protect in international law, I will start a discussion of the common
understandings of the important aspects of both international law and international soft law.
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The question of whether the Responsibility to Protect norm does or can be viewed as
international law is a muddy one and not one that can be answered with a definitive ease.
Clearly, the Responsibility to Protect is part of the framework of international humanitarian and
human rights law of the ICC and the Rome Statutes. There is also a tension in the literature on
the place of International law, soft law, politics and morality in decisions at the international
level. I am concerned with both as in my view any foreign policy always has a political and an
ethical component. There is no escape from the acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect as
being a moral and political choice as well as a legal one. Law, morality and legitimacy tend to
be bound together when analyzing the implementation of the norm. It would be fair to say I take
a more eclectic approach to international law in that I borrow elements of both consensual and
natural law theories.
There is no central or constitutionally authorized legislature or law-making authority in
international law. The United Nations Charter is not a constitution – it is an international treaty
and has no law-making powers of its own. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), the
‘principal judicial organ of the United Nations,’ only has jurisdiction to give advisory opinions
and agencies and to decide cases submitted to it with the consent of the parties. It has no power
to create binding precedent. The UN Security Council, however, is given the power to impose
binding measures in matters of international peace and security but can only bind member states
that are party to the UN Charter.
IV.2. History of International Legal Scholarship

The main schools of thought in international legal scholarship are natural law and positivism and
there have been three main periods in the evolution of international law: the “primitive” period,
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(scholarship pre-dating the Peace of Westphalia in 1648;) the “classical” or “traditional” period,
(between 1648 and the close of the First World War); and the “modern” period, beginning with
the establishment of the League of Nations in 1919.
The ‘Primitives’ included Vitoria, Gentili, Suarez, and Grotius who posited all law could be
deduced from some “innate, pre-existing normative order that was not dependent for its authority
on the will of its subjects.”83 Law was pre-ordained by God or “nature” and for Vitoria and
Suarez (Catholics) law was universal in scope. Gentili and Grotius (Protestants) held a more
secular view of law whereby human reason was the source of authority. Grotius (1583-1645) a
Dutch scholar is known as the ‘father’ of modern international law. His major work, De Jure
Belli Ac Pacis is one of the earliest attempts to provide a systematic overview of the Laws of
War and Peace.84 Grotius was preceded by Gentili (1552-1608) at Oxford University who wrote
De Jure Belli (1598) and Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546) a Spanish theologian.85 Samuel
Pufendorf followed (1632-1684), a German scholar, and suggests that natural law was the source
or basis of international law.86
The ‘Classical or Traditional Period’ brought a quasi-empirical approach which focused on
behaviour which was not the result of a pre-ordained or intrinsic legal or moral order. Positivism
asserted that “Law simply consisted of whatever was articulated as such or consented to by its
subjects” according to the theory of consent..87 The English legal scholar, Richard Zouche,
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(1590-1660) was one of the early positivists who looked to state practice as the source of
international law, based on the consent of states – its subjects.88
Modern international legal scholarship rejected the positivists and the unconditional theory of
consent. States instead became lawmakers, judges and executioners. 89 In the twentieth and
twenty first century legal scholars attempted to combine both schools of positivism and natural
law. Positivism was used for unconventional matters while natural law was referred to in more
difficult cases like states freedom to perpetuate human abuse against their own citizens. This
pick and choose approach was dubbed as ‘eclecticism.’ “Most 21st C. international lawyers and
judges are eclectics in that they borrow for various purposes and in different contexts elements of
both consensual and natural law theories…”90 This kind of approach also helps to unravel the
Responsibility to Protect.
Philosophy tries to answer the question of why it is binding by proposing it is driven by the
human desire for order. “The law is not externally imposed but self-imposed by humanity based
on its self-perceived needs or interests.”91 Other scholars, realists or sceptics, focus on power
politics which marginalize the significance of binding force.
IV.3

National Sovereignty

The concept of national sovereignty is crucial to the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect
and to the complex structure that defines the relationship between actors, ideas, norms and values
at the international and domestic level. The beginning of the sovereign state system has been
conventionally associated with the Peace of Westphalia, concluded in 1648, which brought the
88
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Thirty Years War to a close. The two treaties that comprised the Peace, Osnabruck and Munster,
permitted the prince to set the religion of his own territory, cuius region eius religion.
The most important right of states is sovereignty which means “exclusive power of jurisdiction
over territory and population, fettered only by the requirements of international law.”92 Next to
this is equality, enshrined in the UN Charter, which means that every states possesses the same
basic legal rights and obligations.93 States have a right to be free from intervention and a duty
not to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states. “…aggression or the use of threat or force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state is categorically outlawed
in the UN Charter” and in customary international law. 94 “This prohibition is considered a
‘peremptory norm’ of international law.’’95
The concept of sovereignty is not static or uniform and its meaning has changed over time. It
assumes different guises in different locales. One central tenet, however, is the right to the selfdetermination of a government which began as the foundation of the right of a ruler to rule as he
saw fit, rather than the self determination of the citizens to be ruled as they chose. Krasner, in an
effort to clarify this complexity identifies three central aspects (or categories) of sovereignty
which helps us to understand the significance of the shift that has occurred and the remaining
tension between the two principles – sovereignty versus human rights and the Responsibility to
Protect.96
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(i)

International legal sovereignty: States mutually recognize each other but at the same

time recognize their right to voluntarily enter into international agreements or treaties. States are
juridically independent territorial entities which are legally free and equal. Most international
organizations limit membership to states.97 The Responsibility to Protect accepts this concept of
sovereignty, but goes beyond it to establish state responsibility for its civilians and international
responsibility for the citizens of that state if the state is failing in its duties.
(ii)

Westphalian sovereignty, or Vattelian sovereignty: As states are juridically independent

and autonomous, they are not subject to any external authority. A key corollary to this in
international relations and law is that “one state does not have the right to intervene in the
internal affairs of another state.”98 Each state has the right to independently determine its own
institutions of government.99 The Responsibility to Protect clearly challenges the right of the
institutions of government to act in violation of key international regulations and rules re its
citizens and establishes the right of intervention. This is a fundamental shift.
(iii)

Domestic sovereignty refers to a state’s ability (and authority) to control activities both

within and across its borders. It refers to the institution by which states are governed; e.g. by
democratic or autocratic, federal or unitary, parliamentary or presidential systems. In addition,
there must be a locus or final source of power. Failed states are those considered to be unable to
govern themselves regardless of their formally legitimated authority structures. The type of
government, whether democratic or autocratic or other, is not intended to enter into the decision
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making. 100 The determination of a state as ‘failed’ is very important in intervention arguments
and is a cornerstone of the Responsibility to Protect.
Krasner’s main interest is in sovereignty and the effect that certain situations or actions have on
sovereignty; i.e. intervention, threats from weakened states, conflict prevention, the stabilization
and management of weak post conflict states, and the increasingly interconnected international
system. These issues are also all relevant to my own work and its attempt to comprehend the
significance of the relationship between sovereignty rights of states versus obligations of the
state to override such rights in circumstances of extreme humanitarian crises. The manner in
which Krasner categorizes sovereignty emphasizes its importance to states and helps to show
why it remains critical in international relations today. It also emphasizes why a norm which
allows and even obliges states to override the rights of other states in the case of humanitarian
intervention remains so contentious and is frequently repelled.
Vattel argued in favor of the hegemony of sovereignty when he wrote that while a nation is
obliged to promote “the perfection of others,” it cannot force such principles on them in violation
of their natural liberty. “Nations are absolutely free and independent.”101 Interventions did take
place nevertheless. An early instance of intervention in the domestic affairs of another state to
protect civilians came about with British Prime Minister William Gladstone in the Ottoman
Empire in 1898 (a century before the Responsibility to Protect was approved). It was considered
to be ‘a duty to protect the vulnerable.’ America also went to war with the Spanish Empire in
1898 claiming its abuse of its own subjects and that the behavior was ‘shocking to the conscience
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of mankind.’102 The Nuremberg Trials introduced a new category of crime and the concept of
‘crimes against humanity.’ The Charter of the UN holds ‘faith in human rights’ in its preamble.
Humanitarian intervention has become “perhaps the most dramatic example of the new power of
morality in international affairs.”103
So far in the discussion of states and sovereignty we have been talking about states and their
external and internal sovereignty and their power to operate and make decisions. But quite often
it is the ‘failed’ state that needs to be identified for the responsibility principle to be called into
play. When states fail, they are no longer able to control their own territory or internal conflict.
Krasner points to four kinds of internal political crises that bring about state failure and
subsequent interventions. He categorizes these as ‘revolutionary’ wars, ethnic wars, adverse
regime change, and genocide. Sometimes the states themselves are the perpetrators.
Krasner refers to the many failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures
that exist, which limit their citizens access to social services, including health care and education,
as well as providing for their physical security and its impact on the sovereignty of states. He
notes these instances weaken or threaten sovereignty as a universal norm.

Endemic violence

often erupts with exploitative political leaders, leading to low life expectancy, economic hardship
and even state sponsored genocide. These poorly governed states can generate conflicts that spill
across international borders, where transnational criminal and terrorist networks can flourish,
posing threats to international peace and security. 104
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In recent years we have seen, through the Arab Spring uprisings and large revolts against
oppressive leaders, efforts by citizens to gain freedom and democracy and to establish their
human rights. Such efforts have frequently led to further repression and subsequent violence and
questions of intervention. In fact, a clear cut case of the implementation of the doctrine of the
Responsibility to Protect in Libya was prompted by such a revolt and will be presented and
analyzed in Chapter Six as a case study in the Responsibility to Protect.

IV.4

International Legal Personality: The Subjects of International Law

Many international institutions have legal personality and can exercise legal powers on the
international plane, including the UN and specialized agencies of the UN, as well as the
International Labor Organization (ILO), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU).
A subject or person is an entity which possesses international rights and duties and has the
capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims.105 States and organizations are
the normal persons on the international plane. Various entities, including non-self-governing
peoples and the individual, have a certain personality. States and some organizations have legal
personality with respect to making claims for breaches of international law, making treaties and
agreements and privileges from national jurisdictions, but the primary subjects of international
law are states. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its landmark Advisory Opinion in the
Reparations Case defined the criteria for international legal personality as a subject of
international law. 106 The Court stated that a subject of international law is “capable of
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possessing international rights and duties, and…has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing
international claims.”107
Individuals traditionally existed only “as an object, rather than a subject, of international law,”108
with no international legal rights nor legal obligations. However, certain rules of conduct in
times of armed conflict have emerged for the protection of individuals (such as civilians,
combatants, prisoners of war, the sick and wounded, and so on). These codes of conduct are
regarded as directly binding upon individuals and not merely the states. International criminal
law is concerned not only with violations by individuals of the laws of armed conflict but also
other large scale atrocities such as crimes against humanity and genocide. Thus international
criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court have been established to prosecute
individuals accused of large scale atrocities. 109
IV.5

The United Nations

The United Nations came into being with the entry into force on October 24, 1945 of the UN
Charter – a multilateral treaty that serves as the UN ‘constitution.’ At the time of its conception,
it had a membership of 51 states, although there are now many more.110 The UN is an
international organization both in terms of its membership and the purposes it is designed to
advance. It is charged with peacekeeping; developing friendly relations between states; and
international cooperation regarding economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and human rights
concerns.111
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IV.5.1

The Legal Regime of the United Nations Charter

The UN Charter and the Security Council are critical to the development and implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect. The Charter has equipped the UN with organs and tasks and
charged it with the maintenance of peace and security and cooperation in solving problems. It
has international legal personality but it is not a State nor a super state, but rather is a “subject of
international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties.” 112 It has capacity to
maintain its rights by bringing international claims.
In the Advisory Opinion in the Reparation case…The International Court held
unanimously that the UN was a legal person with capacity to bring claims against both
member and non-member state for direct injuries to the Organization.113
Generally parties to a treaty are the only ones bound by it. However, the UN Charter provides an
exception in accordance with the UN responsibility for peace and security.
The Organization shall ensure under general international law that States which are not
members of the UN act in accordance with principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.114

IV.5.2

The Prohibition of Force

The UN Charter’s Prohibition of Force and Customary International Law
Article 2 of the UN Charter binds the members to:
a) settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner the
international peace and security and justice are not endangered;115
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b) “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner
inconsistent with the purposes of the UN.”116
The collective right of self-defence (Article 51 of the Charter) was agreed to in general
international law but it was given express recognition in Article 51 of the Charter. Article 51 of
the Charter provides the right of a Member to self-defence.117 Article 51 reserves the right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occur against a member of the UN until
the Security Council has taken measures to maintain international peace and security. This is
seen as an inherent right.118
The International Court indicated two conditions for the lawful use of self-defence: 1) the victim
state must declare itself as a victim and 2) the second condition is that the wrongful act must
constitute “armed attack.” 119
…when the United States Expeditionary Force began military operations against Iraq in
March 2003, the letter to the Security Council of 20 March relied upon Security Council
resolutions as the putative legal basis of the action, rather than the principles of general
international law.120

Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use of force against any state, not only member states.
The prohibition against the use of force also exists in customary international law in the Friendly
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Relations Declaration, a UN General Assembly resolution adopted in 1970121 which repeats this
prohibition). 122 According to the International Law Commission, the general prohibition on the
use of force, “a universally applicable customary rule, [it] is also a rule of jus cogens, or a
peremptory norm of international law – one from which no derogation is permitted.”123
The Security Council and the General Assembly of the UN make recommendations and
decisions relating to specific issues, which involves the application of general international law.
Such practice “has considerable legal significance.”124 There is no compulsory regulation or
system review required by external bodies to allocate responsibility. General international law,
however, provides criteria to which an international organization may be held to be unlawful.
Also, particular acts may be deemed void if they are contrary to a principle of jus cogens (rules
so fundamental to the legal order they cannot be set aside by treaty; peremptory norms, non
derogable).125
V.

Sources of International Law

The fact that there is no law-making authority at the international level begs the question of what
the sources of international law are. In a sense, normal sources such as a constitution or legislative
enactment, do not exist in international law. As a substitute, the general consent of states creates rules of
general application which become custom in international law. What is necessary is evidence of the
existence of consensus among states concerning particular rules or practice. This being the case, the thesis
will examine certain decisions as material evidence of the attitude of states toward the Responsibility to
121
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Protect, assessing how often it has been recognized and the resulting impact. An accumulation of the
Resolutions (as will be discussed in Chapter Eight) invoking the Responsibility to Protect helps the norm to
gain in uniformity, consistency and custom.
True sources of international law are those sources or rules to which states are willing to subject
their sovereignty. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established in 1945 as the judicial
organization of the UN: Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice covers
the following sources or rules to which states are willing to subject their sovereignty which are
considered to be the most authoritative:
A. International ‘conventions or treaties,’ whether general or particular; certain types of
customary rules (jus cogens) cannot be displaced by treaty;
B. International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
C. The general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
D. Judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of various
nations (scholarly writing) are considered as law finding, but not law making. “This
distinction is frequently referred to as the difference between “formal” (law-creating)
sources and “material” or ‘evidentiary’ (law-finding) sources…”126
Some say Article 38.1 generally supports the positivist theory of consent. Some conclude there
is a hierarchical order; others do not. Most agree, however, that the two principal sources are
treaties and custom and general principles and judicial decisions play only a secondary role.
Law-making treaties, the conclusions of international conferences, resolutions of the UN General
Assembly, and drafts adopted by the International Law Commission as drafts have a direct
126
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influence on the content of the law. What we do have in relation to the Responsibility to Protect
is an ample amount of scholarly writing which seeks to find the law-creating aspect of the
principle. It is in soft law and in these judicial decisions and the scholarly writing and material or
evidentiary sources that we will find evidence of the Responsibility to Protect’s legal nature
along with formal sources which form the basis for international humanitarian law and human
rights law. Let us examine these four sources more closely.
V.1

International Conventions and Treaties

Treaties that create general norms for the future conduct of the parties with the same
requirements for all create law. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, December 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 are examples of
this type of treaty. The widespread ratification of a treaty can bring into existence a rule of
customary international law by which case all states, not only those party to the treaties, become
bound by the rule. “Accompanied by opinio juris and a degree of generality, the treaty can have
the effect of creating a new, corresponding customary international norm.”127 Treaties set out
clear and precise obligations.
For example, Article 1 of the Genocide Convention provides that the “Contracting Parties
confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under
international law.” “Such language is evidence of what a group of states considers customary
international law to be.”128 While the UN Charter is in fact a treaty, the Responsibility to Protect
cannot be considered so.
V.1.1 Customary international law
127
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Customary international law arises from the sustained conduct of states which they themselves
believe (for whatever reason) to be legally required. “…customary international law, unlike
treaties, is with very few exceptions universally binding. It is thus a common basis for
international legal relations among all states.”129 Rapid change in the law does not occur in
customary law and is frequently the object of profound disagreement. Customary international
law involves rules and principles which bind all states whether or not they agreed to them in the
first instance. International Custom may be defined as k“A general recognition among states of a
certain practice as obligatory.”130
Customary international law continues to be widely accepted along with treaties “as one of the
two principal sources of international law.” 131 Customary international law is universally
binding on all states. No particular duration of practice is required and a long practice is not
essential to establish international law. What is most important is uniformity and consistency of
the practice. Complete uniformity is also not required, nor is universality.132 There is also no
threshold number of examples of state practice required to achieve this level of customary law.
Each instance is evaluated independently according to the meaning attributed to it so that
sufficient general practice is on a case to case basis. An issue of interest to a large number of
states such as the use of force requires participation by many states.
Two actions are necessary before a rule of customary international law, however, can be said to
exist: 1) state practice – the material or objective element of customary international law visible
in the general and uniform behavior of states; and 2) opinio juris sive necessitates (or opinio
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juris) – the action of the state is only considered legally significant if it is accompanied by a
belief on the part of the state that it is legally obligatory.133
(a) Opinio juris sive necessitates requires the sense of legal obligation as the basis of evidence of
a general practice or consensus in the literature.as opposed to motives of “courtesy, fairness, or
morality.”134 Opinio juris sive necessitates was coined in 1899 as the subjective element of
custom.135 In the case of Nicaragua v. United States (Merits) the Courts stated that not only must
the acts concerned ‘amount to a settled practice’ but they must be accompanied by the opinio
juris sive necessitates for a new customary rule to be formed.136 The need for such a belief, i.e.
the existence of a subjective element, must be implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
necessitates.”137
Motive being difficult to establish with regard to the opinio juris requirement, the Courts rely on
the express views of states themselves which can often be found in “government press
statements, conferences, summit reports and speeches before UN bodies and government
statements in national legislatures and so on.”138 Such statements and reports as they concern the
Responsibility to Protect are presented in the thesis, particularly in an attempt to establish the
intention behind the use of the norm.
By looking at practice and UN resolutions later in the thesis regarding the Responsibility to
Protect, we will consider its place under international customary law. The Security Council of
the UN was intended for implementation of the Responsibility to Protect rather than
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implementation by means of unilateral activity which would violate the fundamental principle of
the sovereign equality of states and the principle that no state can dictate the law to another.
Custom may be achieved as long as
a sufficient number of states adhere to a given practice and opinio juris is present and
states are acting from a sense of legal obligation (and the other requirements of
customary international law are met). If that is the case, a corresponding rule of
international law can be said to exist that binds all states, not merely those engaging in
the practice.”139
Further, the practice according to the Court need not be in absolute rigorous conformity with the
rule in order to establish customary law. Instances of State conduct may be inconsistent with a
given rule and are generally treated as breaches of that rule, not as a new rule.140
(b) Jus Cogens. Doctrinal and judicial opinion both support the notion that there are certain
overriding principles of international law, forming a body of jus cogens (“rules of customary law
which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the formation of a subsequent
customary rule of contrary effect.”) 141 The least controversial are the prohibition against the use
of force, the law of genocide and crimes against humanity.142 A peremptory norm of general
international law is defined as a “norm accepted and recognized by the international community
of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.”143
The concept of jus cogens (or peremptory norms) first appeared in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (VCLT)144 where it as defined as a ‘norm accepted’ – recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
139
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and which can be modified only by subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.” (Art. 53 VCLT) Today jus cogens is regarded as a general definition in
international law.145
For a norm to be considered jus cogens it must meet the following three conditions:
1. Must be a norm of general international law which makes it binding for a great majority
of states;
2. Must be accepted and recognized as non derogable by the international community of
states. The vast majority of states must bind a minority; and
3. No derogation is permitted from the peremptory norm. Deviation is not generally
accepted.
States cannot undertake actions which go against the norm of jus cogens. Jus cogns comes at the
top of a hierarchy of norms in international law.
For example, in the ICJ Advisory opinion concerning reservations to the Genocide Convention,
the Court emphasized the binding character of the prohibition of genocide, even on a state that
did not subscribe to the Convention. It determined since the peremptory character of an
international norm has important legal consequences, the exact content of the prohibition of
genocide needs to be established. The main aspect of the peremptory prohibition of genocide is
the bar on derogation from it in treaties or customary international law.146
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(c) An obligation erga omnes. The concept of obligations erga omnes first appeared in the
Barcelona Traction Case before the ICJ.147 In the famous obiter dictum the Court held that
“obligations toward the international community as a whole (obligation erga omnes) exist, in
which all states have a legal interest in their protection in light of the importance of the rights
involved.”148
There is some relationship between the norms of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes in the
case law. Wording used in the Barcelona Traction Case refers to Article 53 VCLT. Both refer to
the international community as a whole and in his separate opinion Judge AMMOUN mentioned
jus cogens linked to the concept of obligations erga omnes.149
Also in the Furun Zija Case, “the ICTY held that the prohibition of torture is an obligation erga
omnes and a peremptory norm of general international law.”150 “…while jus cogens deals with
the hierarchy of norms and international public order, obligation erga omnes refer to the
enforcement of these peremptory norms.”151 Violations of peremptory norms and obligations
erga omnes allow states not directly concerned to bring action against the offending state before
the ICJ. “…every State of the international community has an interest in the legal protection of
rights and obligations which by their content are the fundamental rules of the international
community.”152 When such a rule is violated, even if they are not directly affected it endangers
the legal interests of every member. Before countermeasures are taken every avenue provided
under international law should be taken and the measure should be legitimate and proportion to
147
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the original wrong. Also, third states should not be injured. States are usually cautious,
however, not to take illegal counter measures and therefore usually only react in clear cut cases
of breach such as genocide or aggression.153
States that are not directly affected by a breach can bring a case before the ICJ if it can establish
a basis for jurisdiction or though other countermeasures. Part of the ‘weakness’ of soft laws is
the inability to take countermeasures against states not agreeing to the invocation of the
Responsibility to Protect.
A. General Principles of Law: Article 38(1)(c)
According to Brownlie, questions are often raised about whether “general principles” refers to
international or domestic law. He suggests General Principles of international Law refer to
“rules of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38(1) (c)or from judicial
decisions on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.”154 According to
Currie, domestic systems of law are often used for inspiration in formulating international laws
and ‘principles of law’ generally refer to general principles of domestic law rather than general
principles of international law.155
Modern international law relies less on general principles of law as a source of law but they are
still used to fill gaps, primarily for procedural matters.156
V.1.2 Judicial Decisions and Scholarly Writing
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The International Court of Justice or bodies such as the World Trade Organizations or the
International Criminal Court or other international tribunals tend to be relied upon in determining
what law is.157 While judgments and scholarly writings on international law may be relied upon
to understand or even discover the content of international law, they do not in themselves
“create” the law.
The material sources of evidence include diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press
releases, opinions of office legal advisers, official manuals on legal questions, drafts produced by
the International Law Commission, state legislation, judicial decisions (international and
national), patterns of treaties in the same form, the practice of international organizations, and
resolutions relating to legal issues in the UN General Assembly.158 The Writing of Publicists
includes the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations or ‘la
doctrine.’ Such a source only constitutes evidence of the law but can be influential.159 As
suggested, the review of such documents later in the thesis provides a rich source in
understanding the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect.
More recently, resolutions and similar acts of international organizations have acquired “a very
significant status both as sources and as evidence of international law. This is true with regard to
some Security Council resolutions.”160 If a UNGA resolution is adopted unanimously or by an
overwhelming majority, which includes the major powers of the world, and if it is reported in

157

Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 108.
Brownlie 2005 supra note 105 at 6‐7.
159
Brownlie 2005 ibid at 24.
160
Buergental and Murphy 2013 supra note 84 at 37.
158

61

subsequent resolutions over a period of time and relied upon by states in other contexts, it may
well have become declaratory of international law.161
VI.

International Human Rights Law

Some of the features of the Responsibility to Protect are imbedded in contemporary international
human rights law (IHRL).162 Hugo Grotius maintained it would be just to resort to war to
prevent a state from maltreating its own subjects.163 John Locke viewed the relationship between
the state and its citizens as one of “trust.”164 “The most influential modern representatives of this
tradition of ‘conscience’ as the enemy of sovereignty are the international human rights and
criminal law movements.”165 The claim to be representing humanity strengthens the authority of
new actors and justifies the use of force which is one of the reasons the moral or ethical element
of the Responsibility to Protect principle arises frequently in the literature.
International human rights law “is a set of rules established by convention or custom, codified in
international treaties and national bills of rights and focuses on the protection of the
individual.”166 It applies in times of war and peace.167
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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) spells out the right to life, liberty and
security of person and bans torture, cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and slavery. The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) obliges state parties to respect and
ensure the rights to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.
Human rights law sits as a challenge to international laws concerned with the rights of states and
sovereignty. 168 One of the most significant developments in international law since the Peace of
Westphalia has been the growth of human rights along with the prohibition of the unilateral use
of force. The fundamental principles of human rights form part of customary or general
international law.169 Human rights rose mainly in the work of legal philosophers such as John
Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu and others.170 Later on the horrors of the Second
World War of what some states did to their own populations led to the placing of provisions for
human rights in the UN Charter. This placed human rights at the centre of the international
agenda, giving importance to the rights of individuals as well as states.171
1) The first stage was a draft of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was later
adopted.
2) The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in the form of a resolution of
the General Assembly was widely regarded as a first step toward the preparation of a
Covenant that would be in the form of a treaty.” In 1966 the GA adopted the
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which came into legal
force as treaties constituting a detailed codification of human rights.172
The premise of international human rights law is that individuals have basic rights that are
recognized. Implementation and enforcement remains underdeveloped, however, and there is a
lack of robust enforcement mechanisms. 173 In this way lex lata operates more like lex ferenda.
Human rights range from torture and fair trial to the third generation of rights (the right to
economic development and the right to health). The UN Charter provides the baseline for human
rights. Article 55 states that the UN shall promote… “universal respect for and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…” and Article 56 requires all members to pledge
themselves “to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the organization for the
achievement of the purpose as set forth in Article 55.”174
The Security Council began to use its power for peacekeeping and on the basis of Chapter VII of
the Charter to provide humanitarian assistance through such mechanisms as the creation of safe
areas and forceful protection of those areas. There is a lack of enforcement mechanisms,
however, in the UN, although it can recommend sanctions. The lack of enforcement
mechanisms can lead to failure of the intention to protect.
UN efforts to codify human rights led to two International Covenants adopted by the GA on 10
December 1948. The Commission on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights established by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) defines the nature and
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extent of human rights. While not legally binding as such, the Declaration provides evidence of
the acceptance of certain principles as principles of customary or general international law. 175
The main corpus of human rights standards consists of an “accumulated code” of multilateral
standard-setting conventions. One of the four general categories is the conventions dealing with
specific wrongs, such as genocide, torture or racial discrimination.176 The domestic legal
systems of the State Parties to the given convention are the vehicles of implementation which are
monitored in the form of reports.177
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Optional Protocol to
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Optional Protocol)178 allowed for
direct complaints by individuals. In response to apartheid was the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1966,179 the Genocide Convention
(1966) and the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979) 180. These
were followed by the Convention against Torture (1984)181 and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child (1989)182 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities183 and the
International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.184
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A state violates human rights and international law if it practices, condones or encourages any of
the following atrocities: genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment, prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, or a consistent
pattern of gross violation of the internationally recognized human rights.185
VII.

International Humanitarian Law (Laws of War) and Humanitarian Intervention

International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of international law that regulates armed
conflict (jus in bello). The objective of these laws is to limit the effects of armed conflict on and
alleviate the suffering of persons who are not participating in the hostilities or are no longer
involved. It does so through the use of restrictions on the means and methods of warfare. It
includes the Geneva and the Hague Conventions as well as certain treaties, case law and
customary international law. The Geneva Convention186 and the Hague Conventions of 1899
and 1907 were drawn up as treaties relating to war and conflict.187
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Both international humanitarian law and human rights law are intended to protect the life, health
and dignity of human beings. Whereas international humanitarian law applies only in times of
armed conflict, human rights law applies in times of both war and peace.
In the 19th C. war was often represented as a last resort; that is, as a form of dispute settlement.188
This is the view adopted by the League of Nations Covenant drawn up in 1919. The General
Treaty for the Renunciation of War was established (often referred to as the Kellogg-Briand
Pact) in 1928 as a legally binding multi-lateral treaty. The Kellogg-Briand Pact comes into
prominence as the foundation of the State practice and the background to the formation of
customary law. International legal rules governing the use of armed force by states is a twentieth
century development which is closely related to the establishment of the United Nations and the
UN Security Council. Rules such as jus ad bellum (‘right to war’) and jus in bello (‘law in war’)
determine the manner in which armed force may be used. These rules constitute another body of
law.
St. Augustine of the early fifth century has generally been credited with injecting the Roman
“just war” theory into early Christian theological doctrine. For St. Augustine, conquest can be
justified under certain conditions. Saint Augustine purported that an act of war requires a just
cause189 while Thomas Hobbes saw war as a necessary evil for states to protect their citizens.190
St. Thomas Aquinas, eight centuries later, argued that ‘just war’ required an (objective) just
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cause and (subjective) right intention.191 De Vattel in the eighteenth century and other writers
placed ‘just war’ theories in the status of moral, rather than legal considerations.192
Hugo Grotius On the Laws of War and Peace argued war was only to be used in self-defence and
that peace is a natural state for human beings. 193 Pre-1945, Chesterman observes the origins of
humanitarian intervention can be traced to the concept of a just war put forward by the jurist
Hugo Grotius and the emerging legal restraints being placed on states ‘entering into a society of
eq105uals.’ These and others laid the basis for today’s international morality. After the Treaty
of Versailles, sovereign states became the major players in the international arena and national
interests tended to take precedence over broader international concerns. Regulations also
developed, however, for codes of behavior decreeing war; for example the Lieber Code which
helped to found the Red Cross.194
This brings international law into to the realm of international morality.195 With regard to the
writings of Emmerich de Vattel and Christian Wolff, Chesterman argues that by the early
twentieth century the Vattelians and the modern doctrine of non-intervention had won out over
the Grotians.196 In addition peaceful means of resolving conflict were strengthened by the
League of Nations Covenant197 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.198 There are prohibitions against
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the use of armed force in the covenant of the League of Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of
1928. Prosecutions at Nuremburg of German leaders were founded on the principles of UN
Charter article 2(4) which states that “all members shall refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state... ” Article 2(3) requires that members settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.199
Chesterman again asserts there is essentially no coherent body of law200 that can or does exist
for the international system. 201 While he accepts that bodies of international law may develop in
specific issue areas, there is no overall authority that is legitimate; i.e. accepted by the relevant
parties. Not even the rule of sovereignty itself can control the behaviour of states.
Keith claims that international law determines the body of law governing the right of a state to
use armed force against one another – jus ad bellum – and the body of law governing the manner
in which states and individual may engage once armed conflict begins – jus in bello. Keith also
argues “the legality or illegality of the right to use force has no consequence for the application
of international law.” What prevails is international humanitarian law.202 As Chesterman notes,
existing treaty law on the use of force does not permit military intervention for humanitarian
purposes.203 According to Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter, the use of force is illegal.
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Qualifications to this rule, however, are made in the name of self-defence (Article 51) or
collective security (in which case the Security Council may authorize the use of force if it does
so explicitly through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII). Nevertheless, legal analysts
themselves often disagree on the status of the law in particular actions and whether new
exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force have emerged.204 Some legal scholars have
suggested that UN Article 2(4) of the Charter could support the use of force for humanitarian
purposes if it did 195not violate the ‘territorial integrity or political independence’ of the target
state (narrowly defined) or by consideration of the objectives related to human rights and
freedom listed in Article 1(3) . However, this argument does not overcome the UN Charter’s
purpose: “to delegitimize individual acts of war by vesting sole authority for the nondefensive
use of force in the Security Council.” 205
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be
immediately reported by the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any
time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace
and security.206
These provisions are the substance of debates on the question of force for humanitarian purposes
(humanitarian intervention); e.g. Kosovo and the pre-emptive or precautionary use of force as an
act of self-defence and Bush and Iraq. The Kosovo case and other similar situations (Uganda,
Rwanda, and Somalia) led to the Canadian Government’s development of the Commission on
the Responsibility to Protect and introduced the shift from right to responsibility and from
intervention to protection. Kosovo and Iraq will be presented later in this chapter as examples of
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humanitarian intervention which have been labelled wrongly as examples of the Responsibility
to Protect (being in fact neither legal nor legitimate cases of its implementation).
VIII. Soft Law

Up to this point we have been mainly talking about the sources of lex lata or “hard law” and I
have referenced the Responsibility to Protect as ‘soft law’. This is consistent with the many
legal scholars who distinguish between lex lata (“hard law”) and lex ferenda (“soft law”). Lex
lata refers to those laws included in the formal sources (as cited above) of binding international
law which provide
a reservoir of evidence of state practice, opinio juris, or general principles, rather than a
formal source of law in itself. This evidence can then be called upon to support an
argument that some new norm is emerging or has emerged and should therefore be
recognized as lex lata or hard law in accordance with the requirements of the formal
sources of law reviewed above.207
Currie et al describe the concept of “soft law” as “principles with potentially great political,
practical, humanitarian, moral, or other persuasive authority, but which do not strictly speaking
correspond to extant legal obligations or rights.”208
As stated earlier, draft multilateral law-making treaties are generally considered as hard law.
Most important to this discussion, however, is that UN General Assembly resolutions are
generally not seen to have binding force of their own but purport to be “declaratory” of
international law. Codes of conduct prepared by UN organs, reports, official communiqués or
declarations and statements of principles which emerge from the work of non-governmental
organizations, academic institutions, and think tanks such as those already presented in the
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description of the development of the Responsibility to Protect can generally be seen as ‘soft
law’ or lex ferenda. In addition, “the International Law Commission (ILC), an international
commission of jurists established in 1947 by the UN General Assembly, is an important source
of lex ferenda.” 209 In many fields of international law – such as environment, human rights,
trade and arms control –important principles and nonbinding norms are contained in resolutions
or other decisions of states and intergovernmental organizations.”210
Soft law remains controversial because some international practitioners do not accept its
existence. However, for most international practitioners, development of soft law is necessary to
the work of the international legal system. Soft law instruments also hold much potential for
morphing into hard law. In this case non treaty agreements are intended to have a direct
influence on the practice of states and if successful may lead to customary law. Soft law is also
convenient for good faith negotiations. It is also more flexible in avoiding uncompromising
commitments made under treaties. It is also faster than the slow development of customary law.
In addition and of importance to the development of the Responsibility to Protect, soft laws are
useful to NGOs, organizations and courts to influence governments with frequent usage till they
begin to resemble legal norms.211
In principle a breach of a legal obligation gives rise to responsibility in international law,
whether the obligation rests on treaty, custom or some other basis. The responsibility of states
may be identified in the context of resolutions of the General Assembly of the UN and in a
number of judicial settings. “The law may require compensation for the consequences of ‘legal’
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or ‘excusable’ acts as well as illegal acts.”212 Objective tests are usually applied to the breach to
determine responsibility.
In spite of well-developed rules, there are insufficient enforcement measures or institutions to
implement them and controversies remain even in the case of established law, rendering recourse
mostly theoretical.

It is not only soft law such as is the current nature of the Responsibility to

Protect that relies on the will of states. Implementing human rights remains as one of the
greatest challenges to this area of international law, and thus remains at the root of difficulties in
establishing the Responsibility to Protect as a legal norm.213
It is important nevertheless that legal obligations regarding human rights are almost universally
accepted. There is widespread reliance on the Universal Declaration, the covenants and the other
specialized universal human rights treaties. At the same time, serious breaches under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter only are dealt with coercively by the Security Council on a very selective
basis. Ad hoc geopolitics with little regard for human rights often interfere with the ability of
the UN to apply human rights law. 214 These power politics can overshadow the legal standards
of human rights and the matter of enforcement or the agreed-upon Responsibility to Protect
principle which continues to prove critical to the protection of civilians.215
Soft law may evidence the formation of customary law, guide the interpretation of treaties,
authorize the actions of international organizations such as the agreement in the Outcome
Document re the Responsibility to Protect, and give rise to ‘good faith’ duties such as a duty to
consider. Soft laws also have the advantage of testing some rules before concluding a treaty. As

212

Brownlie 2005 supra note 105105 at 435.
Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 442.
214
Brownlie 2005 supra note 105 at 584.
215
Brownlie 2005 ibid at 586.
213

73

indicated, the breach of soft law, however, does not entail the same legal consequences as
binding international law or lex lata.
Although some soft law is relegated to political or moral rules that are abstract and general,
Goldmann makes the point that they often resemble much more a refined legal regime.216 He
suggests soft law can more be seen as a governance instrument which acts as a functioning
equivalent to binding international law.217 Perhaps this is an exaggeration of the force of soft
law, particularly in the case of the Responsibility to Protect which is subject to the Security
Council veto. The continued ambiguity of the Responsibility to Protect as soft law is part of the
need for a recognition of the connection between law and legitimacy when it comes to justifying
the authority of certain actions.
The next chapter discusses the importance of human security to the development of the
Responsibility to Protect after the Cold War and the International Criminal Court (ICC). It also
introduces the controversies that surround the notion of forcible intervention and the Laws of
War and humanitarian intervention. The Chapter also clarifies the legal foundation of the
Responsibility to Protect in the four crimes: war crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic
cleansing. While I have argued the Responsibility to Protect is moving toward hard law,
legitimacy arguments are often important to support its legal status (see Chapter Nine on the
legitimacy of the Libyan intervention). Because of the difficulty in establishing the exact legal
nature of the Responsibility to Protect, the Chapter outlines the peace of legitimacy arguments as
distinct from legal determinations.
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Chapter Three: The Bedrock of the Responsibility
to Protect -- Legality and Legitimacy
I.

Human Peace and Security

In my view, one of the primary and necessary principles at the heart of the Responsibility to
Protect debate is that of ‘human security’ as was referred to in Chapter Two regarding the
creation of the ICISS Report. The principle of human security is not viewed by all in the
international environment in the same way, or with the same degree of importance, however.
One of the confounding issues is that international institutions tend to be intergovernmental with
states that are politically as well as culturally diverse. Nevertheless, the human security
paradigm shift requires a common principle involving cooperation, governance and diplomacy at
the transnational level. In fact, it is within this need for commonality and cooperation that many
of the impediments to the progress of the Responsibility to Protect principle lie. I am adamant,
for instance, that if the Responsibility to Protect principle is to be successfully implemented in
country specific situations, it requires not one nation, or even a group of nations, but broad and
effective global cooperation and institutional governance. Such cooperation cannot be developed
without some form of universality. If states act solely in their self-interest and/or unilaterally, the
threshold for agreement and legitimacy is diminished. Cooperation is essential to protect against
one or a few states taking action outside the confines of the UN Security Council if the action is
to be considered legitimate. The question of legitimacy will be exemplified further when we
look at some unilateral interventions which have taken place outside of the UN umbrella.
The human security discourse has provided a context for the Responsibility to Protect doctrine.
The term “human security” is not new and was used in the first instance by the United Nations
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during the early 1990s. The significance of this concept is its recognition of the importance of
individual rights in addition to the rights of the sovereign state. The concept has been recognized
in the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and various conventions,
including the Genocide Conventions and the Geneva Convention to name a few, and thus is well
established.218 Human security recognizes human beings as distinct from the ‘state.’ Narrower
interpretations of the concept apply to the protection of civilians in conflict zones.219 The most
authoritative expression of the concept of human security appears in the UN Human
Development Report (UNDP, 1994) which refers to “safety from climate threats as hunger,
disease and repression, as well as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns
of daily life.”220 The UNDP Report acknowledges that state-centric analysis is no longer
sufficient to deal with transnational threats. “Famine, disease, pollution, drug trafficking,
terrorism, ethnic disputes, and social disintegration are no longer isolated events that are
confined within national borders. Their consequences travel the globe.”221 It is the tension
between these two concepts (responsibility and sovereignty) that frequently leads to conflicting
positions and acts as an impediment to the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect.
In the Commission’s Report, it specifically states that human security goes beyond state security
to include individual security to civilians within the state. “Human security means the security
of the people – their physical safety, their economic and social wellbeing, respect for their
dignity and worth as human beings, and protection of their human rights and fundamental
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freedoms.”222 One of the issues at the centre of the human security debate and at the core of my
analysis is whether states are still the key agents of response. Although sovereignty has been
central to international law and international relations, new global realities have aroused
concerns in the ‘global community’ about states’ ability to govern their internal and external
affairs. While sovereignty and non-intervention have been inextricably linked, human rights
issues have increasingly gained prominence in decisions regarding intervention in State’s affairs.
The ICISS Report represents changes in international norms where a state’s right to ‘nonintervention’ is contingent to some degree on its ability to protect its citizens from ethnic
cleansing, mass killing and other human atrocities.223
As a result, the shift that occurred from the Cold War’s protection of the territorial integrity of
the state toward the individual as the basic referent of security underlies the Responsibility to
Protect Commission’s Report. The acceptance of the Report was qualified in that it particularly
did not include such human conditions as disease but was instead narrowed to four specific areas.
This acceptance represents a change in values and practice in international society.224 People
become the focus, rather than the State. The intent was to empower people. The Commission on
Human Security Report, Human Security Now, focused on protection and empowerment.225 The
Responsibility to Protect Report suggested that inaction in conflict situations such as Srebenica
and Rwanda renders the rest of the world ‘complicit bystanders in massacre, ethnic cleansing,
and even genocide’ and refers to “gross and systemic violations of human rights that offend
every precept of our common humanity.”226 This is the strength of the conviction needed for
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states to take action to proceed and, while I may not agree with the United States’ willingness to
act alone and to take unilateral military action in the face of the Syrian government’s chemical
attack on its own people, I fully support and understand Obama’s outrage.227 It is just such an
appalling situation that the international community committed itself to ensuring would never be
permitted to happen again.
When we consider in the thesis the need for acceptance of such a principle, one question will be
what motivates states or national and other participants in the international community to move
from self-interest based decisions to perhaps more moral precepts concerning the ‘other’ in the
absence of hard law? One answer may lie in the Commission’s Report itself in its reference to
moral outrage. And then, at what point does that outrage occur and what are the standards or
guidelines that must be used to make a decision to intervene on the basis of reason? I investigate
in the thesis how legitimate decisions are made in the context of the Security Council and the P5
veto.
II.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

In human rights and humanitarian law, people become the focus, rather than the State. At a
conference presented by the Responsibility to Protect Center for International Human Rights at
Northwestern University School of Law in 2008, participants argued that the United States
should more actively participate in the International Criminal Court and in a hybrid legal system.
Whitley, rapporteur on the conference, noted:
As a new and emerging framework in interstate relations, R2P is grounded in the rule of
law that builds on the international legal and judicial systems. It is not, however, a legal
227
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construct that imposes legal responsibility on States or international organizations that
fail to uphold R2P criteria. Rather, it shares with the ICC (International Criminal Court)
a moral commitment to ending atrocity crimes (Italicised words added)228

The International Criminal Court was established by the Rome Statute. Article 1 of Part 1 of the
Rome Statute states:
An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a
permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons
for the most serious crimes of international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and
shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and
functioning of the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this Statute.229

Article 5 of Part 2 of the Rome Statute details which crimes are eligible for investigation and
prosecution by the court:
The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this
Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.230
The ability to link the Responsibility to Protect with strengthening the rule of law through the use
of the International Criminal Court or some sort of hybrid legal system has the potential to
greatly improve the coordination and cohesiveness of international structures. 231 The ability to
build on existing structures to permit individuals to access redress mechanisms on the
228
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international stage through the ICC can significantly improve the international's community's
tools to effectively respond to mass human rights abuses or mass atrocities. (We will see in
Chapter Six on the Libyan 2011 intervention how the Responsibility to Protect and the ICC can
in fact be tied together by Security Council Resolutions and what the impact of such a ruling can
be.) This might be borne in mind when in conflict situations there are arguments made for the
referral of State Heads to the ICC, which may in fact inhibit political solutions. Mechanisms like
the International Criminal Court and the legal system seeking justice for crimes to humanity are
important.232 But making the decision to refer is not yet solely based on any legal precedent,
neither through hard law nor customary law.
III.

Sources of controversy since 1945

Since the adoption of the UN Charter, forcible intervention has been particularly controversial.
Controversy surrounds:
(a) “the alleged right of forcible intervention to protect nationals;”233
(b) Hegemonial intervention by regions without Security Council approval;234 and
(c) “Forcible intervention in the form of assistance to national liberation movements
conducting armed conflict to achieve independence.”235
However, Article 39 of the UN Charter provides for a power of determination of the existence of
a threat to, or breach of the peace or act of aggression and permits the Security Council to
recommend measures to restore peace and security or to decide upon measures to be taken in
accordance with Articles 41 (non-forcible measures) or 42 (forcible measures) to maintain or
232
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restore peace and security.236 In consequence “…the effect of a Security Council
recommendation under Article 39 is to raise a presumption of legality in respect of the actions of
states complying with that recommendation.”237
But there is resistance to decisions in the Security Council regarding “…the ideological divide
between ‘East’ and ‘West’ each represented on the Security Council by permanent members
wielding vetoes over non procedural matters during the Cold War.” 238 This resistance hampers
the Council from fulfilling its collective security responsibilities spelled out in Chapter VII of the
UN Charter. It continues to paralyze the Council’s ability to act. The Security Council is made
up of only fifteen states at any one time, including five permanent members as well as ten
additional members elected on a rotational basis by the UN General Assembly for two-year
terms. Article 27 stipulates that “decisions” of the SC on non-procedural matters require the
“affirmative” vote of nine members, including the “concurring” votes of the five permanent
members. According to the “veto” power, if any one of them votes against a non-procedural
resolution, it cannot be adopted. “Each permanent member, in other words, individually wields
disproportionate power in the UN system of peace and security.”239 The veto will be discussed
further in the thesis as a continued obstacle to the Responsibility to Protect deliberations and
decisions when states act solely in their self-interest on a Responsibility to Protect resolution that
has not yet reached the status of hard law.240

236

Currie 2008 supra note 19 at 488.
Currie 2008 ibid at 491.
238
Currie 2008 ibid at 474.
239
Currie 2008 ibid at 487.
240
Currie 2008 ibid at 492 A Security Council resolution to use “all necessary means” has become synonymous with
an authorization to use force in UN practice.
237

81

IV.

The Four Crimes

As has been stated the Responsibility to Protect is rooted in existing customary and Human
Rights Law (HRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL).241 The Responsibility to Protect
currently sits at the intersection of four different legal regimes: sovereign equality, the use of
force, non-intervention and the protection of civilians. The Responsibility to Protect offers an
opportunity to improve the implementation of existing legal obligations to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. While the ICISS
report threshold was broader, the Outcome Document limits the application to four specific
crimes that already form part of existing international legal instruments.242
Since 1945 there have been a number of international treaties proscribing certain violations of
human rights such as the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (1948), the Genocide Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966),
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1979), the
Convention against Torture (1984) and the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action.243 “It is clear, therefore, that states at least since 1945 have been willing and able to agree
on certain universal human rights laws.”244 Of course, compliance has been erratic so that the
problem is putting them into practice and enforcement. The protection of civilians regime –
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human rights law, humanitarian law, international criminal law and refugee law, evolved through
milestones such as the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); four Geneva
Conventions and two Additional Protocols on international humanitarian law in armed conflict;
the two 1966 International Covenants – on Civil and Political (ICCPR) and Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights (ISECR); the 1998 Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC), and the Ottawa Convention on landmines.245
Under article 1, paragraph 3 of the Charter of the United Nations246 the Organization is mandated
to “achieve international cooperation in …promoting and encouraging respect for human rights
and for fundamental freedoms.” However, fundamental principles of the UN Charter such as
“sovereign equality,” the non-use of force and non-intervention in “domestic jurisdiction” have
been invoked to preclude any action. 247
Most observers conclude that the Responsibility to Protect has not yet become a binding norm of
international law.248 I suggest, however, as does Strauss, that if used for the development of a
continuum of civil and military action to prevent and halt only these exceptional crimes, the
necessary practice and opinio juris might be created over time sufficient to establish the
Responsibility to Protect as a norm of international customary law.249 The universal and
unconditional nature of the legal obligation reflected in the World Summit Outcome Document
of 2005 to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other crimes
against humanity is clear. This obligation is primarily binding on states, but also, if these are
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unable to act, on intergovernmental organizations and other actors exercising control over a
given territory.
In spite of this, as pointed out above, the Security Council cannot be relied upon to uphold these
obligations with regard to the Responsibility to Protect which represents an opportunity to give
force to human rights. We should not conclude, however, that the Responsibility to Protect
principle that emerged from the 2005 World Summit along with subsequent writing and actions
is too weak or insubstantial to be encumbered with legal responsibilities. 250 The scope of the
Responsibility to Protect regarding the four crimes has fairly precise legal meaning grounded in
existing international law. The principle is a product of the “largest ever gathering of heads of
state and government” in the World Summit and carries immense political weight.251
The four crimes, genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, associated
with the Responsibility to Protect fall under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and evoke serious legal consequences. Protection of the individual against atrocities is a
primary responsibility of states.252 Many of today's human rights crimes violate protection
against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. They are defined
under Article 6 (Genocide), Article 7 (Crimes against humanity) and Article 8 (War Crimes) of
the Statute.253
Certain types of wrongdoing are punishable as crimes before both national and international
criminal courts, including:
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Crimes against peace – waging a war, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor,
killing hostages, plunder of public or private property, and wanton destruction; and
Crimes against humanity (Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other
inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or persecution on political, racial or
religious grounds).254

The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was signed on 17 July 1998. The Court’s
jurisdiction (Article 5) extends to the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes
and the crime of aggression.255 “The provisions of the Statute of the Criminal Court constitute
good evidence of the offences forming part of general international law.”256
While the extent of customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts is
less certain, a minimum includes the provisions of Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions – the obligation to treat humanely all persons taking no active part in hostilities.257
Further provisions derive from the Additional Protocol II to the Conventions. According to the
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law by the International Committee of the Red
Cross, many of the customary rules applicable in international armed conflict are also applicable
in non-international armed conflict. As concerns war crimes, the 1949 Geneva Red Cross
Conventions require states to pass legislation to provide penal sanctions for grave breaches of the
convention and to seek out offenders and bring them to justice.258 Individual states may be said
to be burdened with a duty under customary law to enforce the obligation, just as with the
Genocide Convention.259 While the Security Council might not be able to issue binding
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decisions simply on the basis of its duty to implement an obligation in the area of human rights,
it can adopt an active coordinating and recommendatory role that carries long legitimacy.”260
IV.1. War Crimes (Article 8)
War crimes are enumerated in international humanitarian law. The most accepted definition of
war crimes is found in Article 8(2) of the Rome Statute, which reflects customary international
law. According to the Statute, a ‘war crime’ comprises
grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (and their subsequent protocols)
such as willful killing, torture, causing of great suffering or extensive destruction not
justified by military necessity and (b) other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflict, such as attacks on civilians, humanitarians and
peacekeepers, ethnic cleansing, the use of rape as a weapon of war, forced starvation,
and the use of weapons that cause unnecessary suffering.261
The prohibition of ‘grave breaches’ of these rules is a preemptory rule with jus cogens status.
War crimes include serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law such as inhumane
treatment, forced prostitution or forced pregnancy, subjecting detainees to mutilation, medical or
scientific experiments and enlisting and using child soldiers, causing great suffering or serious
injury, willfully extensive destruction and appropriation of property; compelling a prisoner of
war to serve in the forces of a hostile power; depriving a prisoner of war of a fair trial; unlawful
deportation; taking of hostages; and/or Intentionally attacking civilian objects.
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IV.2. Crimes against humanity (Art. 7 of the Rome Statute)
Crimes against humanity are deemed to be part of international jus cogens and as a result
constitute non-derogable rules of international law. This category of crimes has been included in
the statutes of the ICTY, the ICTR and the Special Court of Sierra Leone.262 States are obliged
to ensure that officials do not commit crimes against humanity nor must states assist other states
by supplying weapons that are used in committing such crimes.
Crimes against humanity were first mentioned in the London Charter (Article 6) establishing the
International Tribunal for the prosecution of major war criminals in the aftermath of the Second
World War where it defines crimes against humanity as
[N]amely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds…whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated (Article 6(c)).263
Any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against
any civilian population constitute crimes against humanity: Murder; Extermination;
Enslavement; Deportation; Imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
Torture; Sexual violence: rape, sexual slavery or enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy or
sterilization; Persecution; Enforced disappearance; Apartheid; or Other inhumane acts. 264
IV.3. Genocide (Art. 6 of the Statute)
Provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide oblige
the United Nations to act to prevent genocide. Beyond this, there is an erga omnes obligation (an
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obligation of such importance to the international community that all states have a care towards
its fulfillment by the United Nations to the international community to prevent gross violations
of human rights).265 As a consequence, the United Nations is legally and morally obliged to
address genocide.
For the purpose of the Statute ‘genocide’ means any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy…a national, ethnical, racial, religious group: (a) killing; (b) causing serious bodily
harm (c) inflicting conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction; (d) preventing births
within the group and (e) forcibly transferring children to another group. The legal responsibility
of states in relation to genocide is clearly codified in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and is generally considered to be jus cogens and therefore
part of customary international law. Under the Genocide Convention resolution 96(1) of the
General Assembly Dec. 11th 1946 it was the intention of the UN “to punish genocide as a crime
under international law.” The principles underlying the convention are binding on states.
The Convention prohibits genocide, provides a clear definition of the crime, and articulates the
duty to prevent and punish perpetrators. Article 1 of the Convention prohibits the crime of
genocide, and establishes the duty of states to actively prevent the crime and punish perpetrators.
Article 2 provides the definitive definition of genocide that has been subsequently adopted by the
International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY, ICTR) and Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).266
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The crime of genocide derives from the Advisory Opinion of the International Criminal Court on
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of
1951 in which the Court held that the provisions of the Convention express pre-existing
customary international law and obligations erga omnes. “Furthermore, the Court held that the
norm prohibiting genocide constitutes jus cogens and, thus, was binding upon all States
regardless of their ratification or signature of the Convention.”267
I argue, as Strauss has done, that paragraph 138 in the Summit Outcome Document created an
additional obligation to protect civilians and in this way the Responsibility to Protect is a new
international norm separate from existing legal obligations by configuring a permanent duty to
protect civilians. The onus of protection falls on the international community and all states are
now burdened with the responsibility to take action.268 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Serbia and Montenegro specific obligation of States to prevent and punish genocide were
identified. If there is in fact a collective legal obligation of the international community, “failure
to implement would entail some legal sanctions.”269 The obligation to prevent genocide was a
duty of conduct of States involving positive obligations under international law.270
IV.4. Ethnic Cleansing
While ethnic cleansing has no legal significance, certain actions are understood to constitute the
act of ethnic cleansing such as the “destruction of houses, crops or wells, widespread sexual
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violence or killings.”271 The crimes associated with ethnic cleansing (forced displacement of
civilians) have been prohibited as war crimes and crimes against humanity. There are no
specialised conventions that clarify their scope and established a duty to prevent them and punish
the perpetrators.
V.

'Humanitarian Intervention' and the Legitimacy/Legality Debate

Law itself, however, is not always sufficient. The English School of International Theory
suggests that law is not infinitely malleable and a justification must be plausible to others.272
There are important normative restraints and states do recognize the need for legitimacy.
Governments recognize the importance of accountability and do strive to give reasons for their
action to be defensible within the existing rules rather than saying the rules are irrelevant.273 As
we will see, an action that is considered illegal may still be considered as legitimate by some,
affording the action greater weight and authenticity in spite of its illegality. By looking at
examples of interventions in Kosovo and Iraq prior to the existence of the Responsibility to
Protect, we will see how this works.
As has been described, in the 20th century there was a proliferation of international institutions
with power to intrude into the autonomy of states and individuals which has provided increased
opportunities for the separation of the exercise of power from the will of the state. In the
national context there is often demanding scrutiny given to the systems of law which provide
assurance in democratic countries that the exercise of power is legitimate.274 But at the
international level this is not so much the case and much debate is carried on about what may
271

Strauss 2009 ibid.
The English School was a dominant force in the teaching of international relations in the 1970’s.
273
Chapter Five Macdonald, Patman and Mason-Parker supra note 102.
274
C.A.Thomas, “The Concept of Legitimacy and International Law” LSE Law, Society and Economy Working
Papers 12/2013 London School of Economics and Political Science, Law Department at 2 [Thomas 2013].
272

90

constitute “the legitimate exercise of power beyond the nation state.”275 In addition, more
recently, unlike in the past, philosophers, lawyers and social scientists have recognized the
importance of legitimacy to justify forms of power leading to questions about why people should
comply with international law given its sketchiness, ambiguity and lack of authority.276
The language of legitimacy and of crisis are often linked. Sometimes the crisis can be addressed
by international law and sometimes international law constitutes the crisis.277 As will be shown,
the NATO bombing of Kosovo raised a lot of questions about “the legitimacy of international
actors, international norms and the international legal system as a whole.”278 One of the
concerns of international law is its ability to be used subjectively which renders the application
inconsistent.279 Something may be called legitimate or illegitimate not because they are in
concurrence with a particular normative framework but because of subjective reasons which are
being used authoritatively.280 The concept of legitimacy appeals to international law scholarship
and lawyers to consider how the tools of their trade are being and should be used. Lawyers have
a responsibility to reflect on motivations for their action and on their role as propagators of
power and subjugation.281
The etymology of the term ‘legitimacy’ derives from the Latin legitimus (lawfully, as derived
from lex (law).282 There are generally two main legitimacy categories: legal legitimacy and
moral legitimacy.283 Legal legitimacy assesses actions according to particular normative
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frameworks and provides “an exclusionary reason for compliance even in the face of opposing
moral considerations.”284 Legal validity in international law is not always easy to determine, thus
the focus of the thesis includes moral legitimacy as well as to strict legality. Legal validity, like
positivist law, requires the law to be created in accordance with the correct legal process and is
entirely separate from moral obligation; rather it is established as a perfectly formal fact.285 The
natural law tradition, on the other hand, requires law to be true to the laws of nature and justice.
“Although laws that lack moral legitimacy retain their status as law, they are defective in that
they fail to achieve the quality of moral obligation that should be experienced in relation to
law.”286
Moral legitimacy raises issues about who has the right to rule and how the exercise of power of
one actor over another can be morally justified. Moral legitimacy is therefore central to the
description and evaluation of the exercise of power through law.287 It makes an argument about
why a certain international law is worthy of compliance (although admittedly there are
sometimes competing normative rules that are meant to govern action). A determination of
legitimacy can give cause for a belief in an action independent from coercion or mere selfinterest.288 In the final analysis one may consider arguments for legitimacy, in enforceability and
in compliance.289
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which actors come to believe in the normative legitimacy of an object.”291 “A legitimate order
deserves recognition.”292
Much of the literature regarding legitimacy and international law addresses the legitimacy of the
use of force across state boundaries.293 Legitimacy arguments can show why certain regimes
may or may not be worthy of support and help to explain what may appear to be an inconsistency
in normative decisions. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a tenuous basis in current
international customary law, and, as will be shown, this sometimes renders Security Council
action legally questionable.294
The issue of humanitarian intervention is very complex, not only from the ethical and political
point of view but also (and possibly particularly) from the legal point of view. The issue of the
legitimization of humanitarian intervention with the aim of stopping massive human rights
violations are under scrutiny in the thesis. Those who do not support humanitarian intervention
tend to be cultural pluralists, while those in support of it argue for its legality and legitimization
on the basis of moral universality rather than relativism.295 The debate on the universality of
human rights “... spans civilizations and scientists from the Islamic world, sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Far East take part in it...” and there is no unanimity in thinking even in Western
thought.296 And I would suggest this is also true for the acceptance of the Responsibility to
Protect principle. Decisions that an action in the name of the Responsibility to Protect be
denounced as illegitimate will render it more difficult to be used the next time. This provides a
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challenge for the legal argument alone, and pushes the need for arguments for legitimacy in
action. In addition, the war on terrorism has increased the number of questions and skepticism
about humanitarian intervention with fears that intervention is motivated by strategic national
interests.297 Realpolitik means that it is not just a cultural pluralism/universalism debate but that
there are concerns over resource grabs, ongoing neo-imperialism and other such concerns.
However, while some have argued that intervention is a cover for colonial and religious motives,
I would agree with Wheeler that “present day interventionism is aimed mainly at “saving
strangers.”298 In the doctrine of international law, the definition of humanitarian intervention is
limited to
those actions of military and forced character determined by humanitarian motives and
aims of the intervening states group of states, or international organizations without the
permission of the state within whose territory intervening takes place.299
Interventions at the international level are sometimes interpreted as legitimate actions, but there
is no legal justification given for doing so. In my own definition of legitimacy and its application
in Chapter Nine, I argue that a strong definition of legitimacy for intervention should include at
minimum the soft law of the Responsibility to Protect. Some cases, such as Kosovo below, have
gained some legitimacy through the international community, even though they were illegal at
the time. I am convinced that such decisions undermine the current standing of the
Responsibility to Protect as it was intended, leaving the international community defenceless
again in the face of human atrocities and genocide. Ethics, politics, and law together must be
considered when analyzing humanitarian intervention. “Only a holistic approach makes it
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possible to elaborate a position free of internal considerations.”300 To demonstrate how
important interventions of the past prior to the Responsibility to Protect have been interpreted I
have elaborated on two cases below: Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2003). There is no doubt in my
mind that these two interventions strengthened the international community’s need for a norm
that articulated criteria for intervention.
V.1

Kosovo (1999)

One example of the contest between what has been regarded as legitimate and/or what has been
regarded as legal is illustrated through an analysis of the Kosovo intervention in 1999. Kosovo
was ultimately deemed to be illegal but legitimate. Britain argued it was legal. However, its
legality proved to be questionable in the absence of Security Council approval. George
Robertson, Secretary of State for Defense, (Br.) also argued NATO was acting within
international law.
Legal justification rests upon the accepted principle that force may be used in extreme
circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. The use of force can be justified as an
exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by the UN Security Council but
without the Council’s express authorization when that is the only means to avert an
immediate and overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.301
Britain tried not to make this a precedent by referring to specific Resolutions of the UN (1199
and 1203)302 that Kosovo constituted a threat to peace and security in the region and that there
was a major humanitarian crisis. They referred to Chapter VII resolutions in cases where the use
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of force is acceptable when it is the only means available to prevent or end a humanitarian
catastrophe. NATO had in fact breached the specific UN Charter Provision in Article 2(4) and
51 and Russia, China and India opposed. Russia, China and Namibia tried to stop the bombing.
Their resolution was opposed by the others on the grounds of the need to end humanitarian
crises. In many ways this sets a precedent for the later establishment of the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect and further attempts to clarify and legalize humanitarian intervention
under specific circumstances.
NATO’s intervention in 1999 into Kosovo set a precedent (prior to the Responsibility to Protect)
which prompted numerous discussions regarding legality/illegality and legitimacy versus
illegitimacy.303 NATO launched an airstrike and invoked the “necessity to save the innocents
and to react to atrocities in the FRY’s province of Kosovo.”304 It invoked UN Security Council
Resolution 1199 in September 1998 which expressed grave concern over the fighting in Kosovo
and the excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian Security forces and the Yugoslav
Army which was causing large numbers of civilian casualties.305 Serbia had essentially begun an
act of ethnic cleansing. The key issue in the intervention between the government of the former
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovar Albanian rebels (Kosvo Liberation Army or KLA) in
1998 is that NATO began military action in Kosovo without UN Security Council approval.
The common question asked is whether the military intervention into Kosovo is justified
according to a legal and/or a just war perspective. The legality and the morality of the decision
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to wage the war (jus ad bellum) and the morality of the means used in the war (jus in bello)
needs to be considered in making such an international law determination.306
In legal terms, NATO’s intervention without UN Security Council authorization was technically
“a breach of international law as codified by the 1945 UN Charter.”307 Article 2(4) reads:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.308
NATO’s failure to seek Security Council authorization since agreement was unlikely to have
been obtained and the Responsibility to Protect provision did not exist has received criticism in
spite of the fact it provided three legal justifications for the use of armed force (refugee flows,
inter-ethnic violence, and human rights and minority rights violations, as referred to in the 1948
Declaration of Human Rights and the 1949 Geneva Conventions). 309 The claim of legal
legitimacy has been widely disputed.310
As mentioned, an aid to determining the legitimacy of an action is through just war theory. It
was clear something had to be done and proponents claim that “the humanitarian imperative did
indeed outweigh the legal constraints according to just war criteria.”311 Those in favor of
intervention argue that diplomatic efforts were exhausted and only military action was left.
There was no reasonable alternative. Critics claim the diplomatic efforts were confusing and
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NATO acted too rashly leading to questions about NATO’s credibility. Did NATO have no
alternative but to intervene?312 Supporters of the action argue that the humanitarian imperative
was more compelling than the legal constraints. Critics argue that the level of violence was not
yet severe enough and intervention would set a precedent for future military intervention without
Security Council approval.313 My argument is that the Kosovo intervention mainly served to
stress the need for a new international norm to help clarify the legality and legitimacy of
humanitarian intervention and to help prevent atrocities in the future. In my view the action in
the absence of legal authority and the new norm of the Responsibility to Protect is both illegal
and illegitimate.
V.2

Iraq (2003)

Similarly, the Iraq war occurred prior to the approval in the United Nations in 2005 of the
Responsibility to Protect and has been said to have been illegal but legitimate. The primary
justification for the invasion of Iraq and the use of force was Iraq’s development of weapons of
mass destruction (wmd) in defiance of 12 years of UN resolutions demanding Iraq’s
disarmament. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair also supported regime change in Iraq on
humanitarian grounds and wanted to rid the world of Saddam Hussein. (I will later show in
Chapter Nine how the motive of regime change can also prove to be a strong impediment to
building any sort of nationwide trust in the Responsibility to Protect). The British Prime
Minister disagreed with President Bush who argued the UN was irrelevant.314 In late January
2003 the UK agreed with the US that Iraq was in breach of Resolution 1441 but France, Russia
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and Germany believed inspection should be given more time.315 It must also be recognized that
the war on Iraq was prompted by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on the United States
which brought about a change in US foreign policy in the form of the ‘Bush doctrines.’ The
change, according to the US, allowed for it to take pre-emptive action in anticipatory self defense
rather than simply responding, as called for in the 2005 agreement.
However, Article 51 and the right to self defense does not apply since Iraq did not attack the
United States and there was no proof an attack was imminent.316 UN Security Council
Resolutions also did not provide for the use of force but simply required compliance from
Iraq.317 The US and the UK used Iraq’s noncompliance as a ‘quasi-legal’ justification. The
Security Council Resolution 1483, approved on May 22, 2003, two months after the beginning of
military operations in Iraq, did not condemn the operation. Rather, it verged on providing a
justification for the intervention and providing some legitimacy.318 Security Council Resolution
1511 approved October 16, 2003 came the closest to justifying the intervention ex post facto. It
authorized a “multinational force to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of security and stability in Iraq.”319 In spite of this, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan scolded
the US for attacking Iraq without UN approval.320
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V.3

The Kosovo and Iraq Fall-Out

Wheeler points to the difference between illegal acts that can be legitimate and legal acts that are
also illegitimate in reference to Kosovo and Iraq. While Russia and China argued intervention in
Kosovo breached international law, the Security Council voted 12-3 that “an imminent threat of
genocide amounted to mitigation by virtue of exceptional circumstance.”321 This provided for
legitimacy but not necessarily legality. On the other hand the Security Council voted against
US/British action in Iraq, making it illegal and illegitimate.322 A substantive consideration of the
meaning of legitimacy along with the determination of legitimacy appears in Chapter Nine in the
analysis of the Libyan intervention.
On the one hand, Chesterman argues that the notion of humanitarian intervention which emerged
in the nineteenth century was not necessarily a legal right, but was mainly a matter of politics,
policy, or morality.323 On the other hand, international lawyers such as Fernando Teson and
Christopher Greenwood,324 draw attention to the notion of an intervention which runs parallel to
the Charter, citing cases from the 1990s,325 largely carried out by Western governments as state
practice supportive of a new customary rule which privileges custom over treaty – a
controversial move from the perspective of the Vienna Convention.326 However, this appears to
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favor Western states over those such as China, Russia and India. Divergent views held by China
and Russia and sometimes India are, as we shall see, serious impediments to the implementation
of the Responsibility to Protect. Chesterman’s reading of these alleged cases of humanitarian
intervention lacks “the necessary opinio juris that might transform the exception into the rule.”327
The main point is that the right of humanitarian intervention challenges traditional legal
approaches to sovereignty in international law and brings to the fore the human rights legal
regime.328 Chesterman also raises concerns that humanitarian intervention is likely in practice to
license self-interested interventionism under the guise of humanitarianism; and secondly, could
jeopardize the international rule of law. In my view unilateral intervention or intervention as a
‘coalition of the willing’ in support of the Responsibility to Protect should not be considered as a
legitimate alternative to collective action under the Charter. Some interventions in the post-Cold
War period involved host-state consent and Security Council resolutions that invoked Chapter
VII. This condition may support Pillar Two of the Responsibiliy to Protect but Pillar Three
becomes necessary when the state itself is the perpetrator and the international community
decides it must act to save civilians.
The purpose of the ICISS was to give some legitimacy to the negative views and experiences of
humanitarian intervention without consent through a new principle of responsible sovereignty.
Nicholas Wheeler329 and the ICISS both argue that there is a consensus on humanitarian
intervention and its development in international relations which was reached through a more
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expansive definition of what constitutes a threat to international peace and security. There is an
increasing awareness of conflict and suffering around the world due to an expansion of
communication and information technology as well as human rights norms.330 The growth in
awareness can also be seen in the presence of non-state actors who support the principle. Welsh
suggests the ICISS has three goals: “(1) to develop the debate on humanitarian intervention; (2)
to find a global consensus on how to take action; and (3) to find new ways of reconciling the
principles of intervention and state sovereignty.”331
In Wheeler’s book, Saving Strangers, he makes an argument that pluralism in the international
area has been overcome through the recognition of the norm of humanitarian intervention.332 I
would argue that humanitarian intervention can be a legitimate exception to the rules regarding
non-intervention and the prohibition against the use of force if it follows the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect as it was first created. This supports the larger constructivist claim (see
Chapter Five on theoretical perspectives for further explanation) that state actions will be
constrained if they are not legitimate but new norms, if brought into existence, can enable new
practices to develop.
Both Wheeler and the ICISS support the norm of humanitarian intervention when all other
diplomatic actions have failed. This permits states to legitimately employ military force against
another state in order to protect civilians in danger. As has been substantiated earlier, this
represents a shift in the norms of international relations from the rights of states to claim
sovereignty as authority toward a new moral stance of sovereignty as responsibility. The
problem with the earlier humanitarian interventions is that they were conducted without UN
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approval and no rule or norm was available to allow for a legal decision. State responsibility
obliges the state to assure a minimum standard of human rights, not only internally, but within
other states. The challenge is that both must adopt some sort of universality to be implementable.
As has been suggested, the question of ‘universality’ in the international milieu is disputed by
some.
According to the ICISS, sovereignty implies a dual responsibility:
Externally – to respect the sovereignty of other states, and internally, to respect the
dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human rights
covenants, in UN practice, and in state practice itself, sovereignty is now understood as
embracing this dual responsibility. Sovereignty as responsibility has become the
minimum content of good international citizenship.333
For the ICISS, this moves beyond the ‘right to intervene’ to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and
takes into account the individual or citizens as well as the state. Neither Saving Strangers nor the
Report of the ICISS actually provide a legal argument that overcomes sovereignty of the state.
The ICISS and Teson admit that it is not possible to claim the emergence of a new principle of
customary international law. Rather, they lay claim to ‘an emerging guiding principle.’ 334
However, as the thesis argues this emerging norm may be said to be evolving toward that legal
end.
There is also a connection between the rights of an individual and self-determination.335 When
an individual is so threatened that he or she can no longer be truly self-actualizing, then their
rights have been infringed upon. This is an occasion for the principle of Responsibility to
Protect to be drawn upon, particularly in a case where a population is suffering serious harm as a
result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state involved is either
333
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unwilling or unable to stop the harm. In such a case the principle of non-intervention must yield
to the international responsibility to protect.336 But this does not mean that the protection of
populations must involve or lead to an intention to reshape societies in a Western, liberal
democratic image, as is feared by many states. The concept of regime change, and the actions of
rebuilding and peace building along with the nature of a new government will be discussed in
greater depth in the concluding portion of the thesis.
One of the questions that must be asked in these circumstances as an aspect of the criteria for
legitimacy is whether there is ‘sufficient harm’ to justify action. As Wheeler argues, the
threshold of suffering needs to be high enough for other states to even consider the risk to their
own armies and the reaction of their own citizens. The ICISS Report recommends intervention
“where there is a large-scale loss of life –with or without genocidal intent – that results either
from deliberate state action or the immense failure of state capability, or where there is largescale ‘ethnic cleansing’ which takes place in the form of killing, rape, torture, or mass
expulsion.”337 In the UN Outcome Document this was further refined to the four crimes.
In the transnational nature of today’s security threat and although the potential for interstate war
should be guarded against, it is arguably not the most significant threat to humanitarian values in
modern international society. The ICISS Report notes that most of the threats of war today are
not interstate but rather occur with the killing of civilians and these numbers have increased
dramatically.338 The Report favors the United Nations as the body for managing international
peace and security and this type of contemporary conflict. Wheeler also suggests that in the 21st
century there is a greater degree of agreement on the meaning of moral principles concerning
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sovereignty, human rights and intervention than the pluralists would admit to.339 As I have
suggested, however, skepticism and mistrust of the West still remains a compelling impediment
to unified action – Syria in 2012 and onward being a tragic example. Several Security Council
Resolutions to intervene in Syria have been blocked by Russia and China.
Both Wheeler and the ICISS rely on the traditional ‘just war’ framework for their arguments in
favor of humanitarian intervention. While Wheeler suggests adherence to universally applicable
moral rules is more acceptable than the ‘particularist, case-based’ reasoning that provided the
groundwork for early modern just war tradition, Welsh suggests the just war reasoning is still the
most useful approach for deciding what is the moral way to deter a war and when humanitarian
intervention is required. As such, it remains a vital resource for those who wish to legitimate the
use of force for humanitarian purposes. 340 The manner in which Just War Theory can be applied
to an intervention is explored in Chapter Nine as a methodology for determining the legitimacy
of the Libyan intervention in 2011 with regard to the Responsibility to Protect.
The Security Council authorization of Kosovo after the fact suggests to some that ad hoc
‘coalitions of the willing’ acting without UN endorsement can be deemed legitimate 341 but the
ICISS, Chesterman (2001) and myself agree that developing a consensus on military
intervention involves the full collective mechanisms of the UN. While this is a very difficult
task and perhaps one of the major impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to
Protect, I feel strongly that it is advisable. The objective becomes not to find alternatives to the
Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work much better
than it has. The historical basis of the veto as well as some ways in which the Council could be
339
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improved is considered in the thesis along with the concern that unilateral actions can threaten
the legitimacy of international law itself.
Although the veto exists for valid historical reasons, the fact that the Permanent Five have veto
power and can block intervention and other UN actions for narrow political reasons is obviously
a prohibiting factor in cases of possible implementation of the responsibility principle.342 Today,
of course, the Security Council is viewed by some states as unrepresentative and a poor proxy for
‘international will.’ 343 A ‘code of conduct’ for the use of the veto could possibly help to resolve
the problem.
Welsh suggests one of the important alternatives would be unilateral action, based on the
expectation that it can be more timely and effective, especially if undertaken by a regional
power with the right mix of knowledge and capability. Interventions from the Cold War period –
Tanzania in Uganda, India in East Pakistan, and Vietnam in Cambodia – would support this
view. Even where UN Security Council authorization has been given, it is clear in these cases
that UN action would have been unlikely without the strong nation taking the lead.344 It is
unlikely, however, in my view that unilateral action is a satisfactory solution, given the concerns
of some states who are already extremely wary of the Responsibility to Protect and of
imperialism and/or colonialism. Such action, without the consent of the state concerned, will
only exacerbate the tensions.

The next chapter addresses moral behaviour and moral philosophy as underlying values and
ethical principle among nations, cultures and religions. It emphasizes the necessity for common
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moral principles as opposed to actions in the international community taken by states in their
own self-interest which emphasize their sovereignty rights as opposed to their responsibilities. It
suggests that the achievement of a coherent system of conventions has in some ways already
been accomplished in the human rights legal framework and provides examples of foreign policy
where such ideals can be found.
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Chapter Four: The Place of Morality
Humanitarian intervention has become “perhaps the most dramatic
example of the new power of morality in international affairs.”345
This chapter focusses on what can be unpinned as universal or common principles in human
rights and the Responsibility to Protect, and what lies beneath these principles in the way of
moral values and ethical principles. The thesis itself seeks to uncover shared values across the
globe. Rather than pluralist arguments focussing on our differences it focuses on common moral
principles and lays the groundwork for what can be shared by states. It suggests that only
common expectations about appropriate behavior can bring about shared actions at the
international level. It further looks at some common elements of foreign policy as an example of
shared principles. One of the roots of moral values lie in religious belief and this chapter
comments on the commonalities between world religions. It also takes the opportunity to
introduce NGOs as another set of players beyond the state and how they support the moral
principles which engage those in favor of the Responsibility to Protect.
With the Responsibility to Protect in place, it is my intention to look more closely at how
morality influences the way that actors respond to the prospect of the application of the principle
to a crisis situation. In the absence of hard law, the perspectives, constructs, values and/or
interest of the actors play a significant role in the decisions that are being made to protect
civilians in crimes against humanity. One of the more influential legal and moral drivers are the
NGOs and civil society which will be discussed in Chapter Eight with regard to the history and
development of the Responsibility to Protect. Individuals and organizations are pursued in
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greater depth through individual interviews with major founders along with testimonies of
members of Nongovernmental Organizations. The important point is that Canadian and other
NGO groups have been playing an important role through soft power, moral suasion and norm
entrepreneurship and constructing and popularizing the moral and legal premises of new
international norms regarding human security.346
In terms of expanding on the norms and enhancing the dialogue around the Responsibility to
Protect, Canadian Nongovernmental Organizations have promoted several initiatives, policies
and strategies to incorporate the foundations of the Responsibility to Protect into their doctrines
and practices. Included in their work are the numerous workshops and papers that have been
done since the release of the original report. We will see more of their efforts and views in the
analysis of the interviews in Chapter Eight. Before delving into these interviews, it is useful to
explore further the moral system that supports the tenets of the Responsibility to Protect.
I.

Morality, values, ethics, universal principles

Moral concerns have often been referred to in this document as an ‘alternative to state selfinterest’ and I would like at this point to expand on what is meant by ‘moral concerns’. The
following section addresses the dichotomy between state interest and moral principles as it is
often seen in the literature and as it plays out in political action. The distinction between
morality and self-interest is an important one since my argument is that for the Responsibility to
Protect to be successful in intervention decisions as soft law, moral objectives must pay a greater
role than the self-interest of states. While some of the literature attempts to tie the two together -
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moral values and self-interest – from my point of view these efforts are generally weak and
unconvincing.
After WWII human rights, as well as the sovereignty of nations, became a central concern when
human beings began to be considered in their own right and not just as citizens of a state. The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which was approved by the General Assembly
of the UN in 1948, was concerned with people everywhere. Article 1 of UDHR declares that:
"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” This moral position is
reflected clearly in the recent Report of Secretary General’s High Level Panel on Threat,
Challenges and Change (2004).347
The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia, Herzgovina, Rwanda, Kosovo
and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign
governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and the wider
international community. 348
There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the ‘right to non-intervention’ of any state,
but the moral and legal responsibility to protect in every state when it comes to people suffering
from catastrophe.
And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign governments have the primary
responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable
or unwilling to do so their responsibility should be taken up by the wider international
community – with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if
necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies.349
Possible use of collective action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter suggests it is in our
interest to act ethically, and to account to ourselves and others. Here self-interest and ethics can
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be made to coincide, but where states are perceived to be acting in their self-interest only (as
historically has been the priority) human rights can easily be trampled upon.
Notwithstanding the different views across countries over what constitutes ethical behavior, the
question then becomes whether ethical norms can come to be shared by states. The logic of
appropriateness, constructivism and structuralism, which will be explored in Chapter Five, say
they can. This would represent a set of “shared expectations about appropriate social behavior
that is held by some communities of actors.”350 A further question is whether ethical views can
be shared at the international level and my argument is that universal norms have been
established in the past by the international community and the Responsibility to Protect has been
designed to further such norms in an ethical system built on individual human rights.
There needs to be a better understanding of the role ethics can and should play in deliberations
about policy choices, and especially about the impact of foreign policies ultimately decided upon
in the case of human crises. 351 Ethics may be defined as:
a complete and coherent system of convictions, values and ideas that provides a grid
within which certain sorts of actions can be classified as evil, and so to be avoided, while
other sorts of actions can be classified as good, and so to be tolerated or even pursued.352
The achievement of such a coherent system of convictions at the world level is immensely
challenging due to cultural differences, however, but not necessarily impossible. Even ancient
laws and treaties have been designed to impede or bring aggression to an end. There are also
laws that support peace, cooperation and justice between states (jus gentium) and laws that
protect the rights of the individual.
350
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However, there are those who disagree with the possibility of the development of universal
norms or rules in the international environment; e.g. Krasner (2009). According to Krasner, the
norms and rules of any international institutional system, including the sovereign state system,
will always be subject to challenge and controversy because of certain logical contradictions; e.g.
the lack of institutional authority for resolving conflicts, unequal power among principal actors,
and differing incentives confronting individual actors, notably states. He argues that in the
international environment actions will not closely conform to any given set of norms.353 In terms
of theory, then, this places him very much into the realist school which suggests the
improbability, if not the impossibility, of uniformity and/or universal agreements.
What does this mean for the principle of the Responsibility to Protect? Will sovereignty issues
always conflict with humanitarian purpose and are there other aspects of states that also
contribute to this conflict? This represents a key question of the thesis: Do we conclude, as
Krasner does, that the lack of an authoritative structure, the power imbalance, and differing state
incentives make it 'impossible' for the Responsibility to Protect principle to be firmly upheld? I
have acknowledged there are impediments to its development as a legal norm, and indeed the
objective of the thesis is to explore these impediments, but ultimately I argue that there are
countervailing possibilities for cooperation and universal norms, some of which have already
been established in the domain of human rights (in spite of the continuing controversy over some
of them). In other words, while there are serious challenges to the Responsibility to Protect’s
implementation in its soft law form, these challenges are not insurmountable. The norm follows
a universal theme in accordance with human rights principles which have already become law.
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Nongovernmental organizations, as referred to above, have capitalized upon this as the norm
evolves.
In the introduction to their book, Macdonald, Parker and Patman define foreign policy as “the
area of politics that seeks to bridge the boundary between the nation state and its international
environment:” 354 It consists of independent actors (usually the state) and other actors in the
international arena where they have limited control, as opposed to the domestic arena. Foreign
policy also can mean ‘no action,’ such as in the case of Rwanda, which provided a strong
incentive to develop a mechanism for states to respond to situations of human atrocity.
Phil Goff refers to moral principles as "... soft thinking which has no place in the real world.”355
Other arguments are made by realists who argue that ethics and the behaviour of nations have not
much in common since the business of the nation is to defend itself and maximize its power. In
addition, differences in culture, religion and other hurdles are too great to be shared in such a
way that could lead to a single set of ethics strong enough to maintain or manage the world’s
order which is needed for the Responsibility to Protect to be enacted.356 On the other hand,
Robin Cook, British Foreign Secretary, 12 May 1997, like myself, places the ethical dimension
of foreign policy in the human rights context.357
In the first instance, the role of the sovereign state is to provide for the wellbeing and security of
its people. I believe we can all agree that genocide and human rights atrocities must not be
allowed to develop. Fortunately, there have been leaders with a vision beyond their own
including but not restricted to Lloyd Axworthy. For example, Roosevelt in the US Congress on
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1 March 1945 states that “The structure of World Peace cannot be the work of one man, or one
party, or one nation. It must be a peace which rests on the cooperative effort of the whole
world.”358 Such norms in fact lie beneath the development of the principles of human rights.
Other substantive agreements include: the six core Human Rights International Treaties; the
Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change; arms control treaties; the War Crimes tribunal; and, the
International Criminal Court (ICC).359 This would suggest, in favour of those who argue for a
universal norm (or norms), the possibilities that may arise from strong efforts to conquer the
obstacle of ‘difference.’ Success may include long term interest. New Zealand Foreign policy
states, for example, that long term security lies in a world of ethically-based rules. A
commitment to resolve conflicts can indeed be worth striving for.pr360
While some argue politics is morally neutral, it seems that the era of globalization is bringing
ethics to the forefront of our minds and its influence in foreign policy agendas is increasingly
apparent. As we are faced with disparities between worlds as well as extreme situations of
human suffering at the hands of others, moral suasion becomes particularly important. We are
seriously challenged by a globalized world where many still try to reach state-centric solutions to
its problems. The concept of national security is still present in foreign policy, but it may be
anticipated that as the world in some ways becomes smaller, the notion of national interest will
have to be altered to address the moral concerns or norms of an increasingly interconnected
world.361
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Lepard and Hoffman have studied the role of religion in international law and principles, and
claim that the ethical framework for humanitarian intervention can be found in the world’s
religious traditions, and not only in those of the West.362 Lepard categorizes the ethical principles
from a number of world religions, including Christianity, Bahai faith, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism,
Confucianism and Chinese ‘folk’ religions and illustrates how these principles and the law that
exists in the UN Charter and international law have some congruence. He shows how some of
the principles of human rights can be found in religious texts such as the Bhagavad Gita,
Buddhist scriptures, Confucius, the Qur’an, Baha’i writing, as well as the Declaration of Human
Rights and the UN Charter.363 This suggests that some of these texts share common principles
in terms of ethics and human rights and that these worlds are not necessarily so far apart.
In Lepard’s view there are signs, such as an increasing acceptance of ethics in international
relations, of interdependence, of the positive role religion can play in influencing international
law, and of the promotion of moral education and democratic leadership that suggests that
humanitarian intervention is being rethought.364 States do sometimes behave in ways contrary to
human rights principles, commit war crimes and promulgate human atrocities and other states are
often unwilling to commit resources to their responsibility to protect civilians in these
circumstances. The purpose of the Responsibility to Protect is to eradicate this type of
behaviour.
Lepard ultimately expresses the need for ethical principles in the policies of government leaders.
The difference (according to Hoffman) in Lepard’s approach from the ICISS is that Lepard looks
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to ethical and religious principles for answers, whereas the ICISS looks at the possible political
compromises that may be achieved.365 I would suggest that both as well as its political legality
must be considered in any attempt to endorse the Responsibility to Protect which in itself
involves a moral principle but also requires political cooperation. In the long run, negotiations
take place. Unfortunately, in an examination of the history of the Responsibility to Protect, one
discovers it was just as the Commission’s work on the Responsibility to Protect was coming
forward that the terrorist attacks of September 11 took place and attention was drawn away from
the ICISS’s efforts to develop a new consensus on humanitarian intervention. In fact, the
Commission itself tried to draw distinctions between two different kinds of military action: one
that may be regarded as an act of self-defence designed to respond to terrorist attacks in one’s
own state; while the other is military action in another state for humanitarian protection
purposes.366
Hoffman (2006) suggests that the post 9/11 climate left little room for ethical grounding in
humanitarian intervention, and it is evident that much of the focus in contemporary security
policy is on the threat of terrorism. Nevertheless, there are situations and will continue to be
situations where mass murder and war crimes scream out for attention and a legal and moral
principle to counteract such a situation is essential.
II.

States' Perspectives

States in fact do frequently include in their foreign policies some form of moral imperative - at
the minimum responsibility to their own citizens. Examples of policy are offered below of how
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moral principles sometimes do enter into foreign policy. The examples also show, unfortunately,
how such policies are sometimes perceived by outsiders. For example, while the US purports to
be a ‘good’ or moral country, this by no means is accepted whole heartedly by others. David
Macdonald tells us that American policies are often based on their notion of America as a ‘good
country’ with good values, which leads them to the conclusion that their policies must be good.
States like the United States, however, are capable of creating a heightened positive illusion of
themselves. Joseph Nye cautions that moral values and ideas are good, but they can be used to
mislead. Recent claims of exceptionalism with respect to moral values in the West since 9/11
demonstrate for some the existence of American self-righteousness and a sense of moral
superiority.367

Japan provides an example of one of the Asian countries where it has been suggested their values
do not necessarily correspond with those of the West.368 In 1993, the ASEAN Ministers met in
Singapore and discussed their approaches to human rights standards. The overall feeling was
that they differed from those of the West. According to the ASEAN Ministers, human rights,
environmental protection and humanitarian intervention were of less importance than economic
and security concerns. According to Simon Tay, “Ethical concerns regarding foreign affairs took
second place to realist and state-centred concerns.” 369 This type of divergence can be an
important reason for states to be unable to come to a universal agreement in the Security Council
when a Responsibility to Protect motion is put forward for a country where extreme human
367
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rights atrocities are taking place. In such cases, the role of the international community must be
to speak forcefully in support of human protection obligations and duties already agreed to and
for Security Council members to act accordingly (something that is critically needed in the
Syrian conflict with close to 200,000 deaths).
On the more encouraging side, Tay tells us that members of the Asia-Pacific region are working
to integrate highly diverse cultures into one coherent voice.370 Nevertheless, both are influenced
by their domestic and regional security policies and the ASEAN does have a historical tendency
to perceive ‘interdependence’ as a euphemism for ‘interference.’371 But states are not the only
players in this arena. As noted earlier there are other important players – the norm entrepreneurs
and nongovernmental actors - that must be recognized and understood and who have become
increasingly important in furthering ethical and legal principles such as and including the
Responsibility to Protect.
III.

Making Moral Decisions

This bring us again to the question of the ability of international actors, whether they are states or
non-states or a cooperative of both, to come to moral decisions at the international or
transnational levels. Decisions at those levels are influenced, I would argue, by certain moral
and legal issues such as trust, justice, peace, and liberty as well as sovereignty, selfdetermination and identity. Fear and mistrust among states with relative power and political and
cultural differences interfere with attempts by the international community to come to a
consensus on the humanitarian principle of protection, seen to some as ‘interference.’ The key to
success of the Responsibility to Protect lies partly in the development of trust between the parties
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and with powerful states who are prepared to work at it. However, powerful states may have
their own factions within that favor one side or the other, making it difficult for them to come to
any agreements. Agreements must be acceptable not only to the parties involved but to the
society at large.372 This is where we will see that nongovernmental actors in the transnational
environment have become an important driving force for universal principles. We shall also see
the need for strengthening the Responsibility to Protect legal status.
Buchanan’s work supports my own argument in that it articulates a systematic vision of an
international legal system grounded in the commitment to justice for all persons.373 My thesis
asks about the desirability as well as the feasibility of such a system and whether the vision may
be more of a utopian one than one of any political substance. It concludes that actors in the
international milieu can make decisions on the basis of moral principles and soft law that exists
and have been agreed upon rather than solely on the basis of self-interest. It provides an example
in the case of Libya in Chapter Nine where in fact they have done so. Furthermore, for the
Responsibility to Protect to be effective and to evolve further they must continue to do so. I
come back to Buchanan who provides a probing exploration of the moral issues involved in
disputes about secession, ethno-national conflict, and the right of self-determination, human
rights, and the legitimacy of the international legal system itself and argues that the international
legal system should make justice, not simply peace, among states a primary goal. Buchanan
ultimately rejects the view that it is permissible for a state to conduct its foreign policies
exclusively according to what is in the ‘national interest.’
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The next chapter, Chapter Five, offers a look at the Responsibility to Protect from a theoretical
perspective, particularly focussing on the place of morality, ethics, universal principles and
idealism as opposed to realist notions of the state as acting in its own self-interest. In an
environment of humanitarian principles, actions of states taken in their own self-interest as well
as fears of neocolonialist and imperial motivations serve to stultify international cooperation
geared toward the protection of civilians and frustrate the needed cooperation between nations.
Along with realists who see actors as only acting in their self-interest are those who support
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). Their basic mistrust of international
law and its colonial underpinnings lead some to reject the Responsibility to Protect altogether.
Other theoretical perspectives are discussed from international relations (institutional and liberal
theorists), political science, and law perspectives as they reflect on the way in which the
principle is approached and understood and serve to either support or undermine the application
of the principle.
The negative views bring us back to the global context and historical precedents and how
realpolitik has served to allow millions to die in Bosnia, Rwanda and the Congo while the world
sat by. This opens the door to consideration of governance and the change in relations between
government networks and transnational networks as they have been evolving and the tensions
arising between state sovereignty and collaborative nongovernmental systems in ‘a new world
order.’
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Chapter Five: Discussion and Critique of Theoretical
Perspectives Underlying the Implementation
of the Responsibility to Protect

I.

Introduction

Given the depth of the ethical support for the Responsibility to Protect, and the range of NGOs
that have gathered around its banner, what are the theoretical perspectives that influence the way
in which we may analyse the Responsibility to Protect situations, and how do these perspectives
stand up to critical analysis? Because international law is largely created by the actions of states
and their organizations, there is inevitably a strong relationship between international relations
and international law. One sees the development of theories based on social policy and
international relations/politics, theories of critical legal studies as well as theories developed in
response to oppressed aspects of international law. All of these theories raise important voices,
while only a few will be discussed here briefly to provide an understanding of the international
law landscape. What is important is the extent to which theory becomes crucial not only in
dictating the direction of the law but the set of politics that is intrinsic to it. In part this is due to
the fact that “the ideology adhered to by a state or group of states influence their approach to
international relations in turn or ‘state practice,’ [and] assists in the development of custom,
which itself leads to the creation of international law.’374
The theoretical perspectives considered here include actor-oriented approaches such as realism
and the logic of consequences and structuralist or institutionalist approaches such as idealism,
liberalism, the logic of appropriateness and constructivism. The differences between these
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theories are based on two fundamental approaches: an actor-oriented approach, as in the case of
realism and the logic of consequences; and, institutional or structural approaches as in the case of
idealism, liberalism, constructivism and the logic of appropriateness. The critique will
comment on the arguments of actor-oriented approaches which view the current international
system as anarchic with individual states acting as sovereigns in their own self-interest, and
structuralists who view the structure to have been built by social practice and social action. 375
Structuralist approaches are therefore not only more helpful in supporting universal principles,
including the Responsibility to Protect, they are the most compelling. It is these structuralist
approaches that bear the most weight in the analysis of the Responsibility to Protect and its focus
on values, morality and ethics in the form of universal principles rather than power politics and
the self-interest of states.
To clarify these differences, I have included a diagram in Figure 1 that distinguishes between the
two basic schools of thought; i.e. individual actor oriented versus structurally or socially oriented
theories. Aspects of both, however, can in fact be seen in the behaviour of those involved in the
Responsibility to Protect discussions. As a result, both are described in some detail.
Nevertheless, I will show how the structural approaches are more likely to support universal
principles at the international level and provide better explanations for how the Responsibility to
Protect has emerged and ought to be applied. I do not accept that actor-oriented approaches are
the only possible explanations for action at the international level, and this will be demonstrated
in Chapter Nine when we see the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in the case of
Libya.
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Table 1: Relevant Theoretical Approaches
Actor Oriented Approaches

Institutional or Structuralist Approaches

Realism, neorealism

Constructivism, liberalism, idealism

Power politics and state self-interest

Universal principles and moral and ethical
value systems
Logic of appropriateness

Logic of consequences

II.

Theoretical Perspectives

II.1

Realism

Realists treat states as the principal actors in international politics. These actors interact in the
absence of any central government which is expected to keep peace or enforce agreements.
Power or power differences are usually identified as the main explanatory factors and realists
concentrate on interactions among major powers and on matters of war and peace rather than on
related, secondary issues such as human rights. 376 While they do not ignore the place of
international cooperation and international law, they assume states will cooperate of their own
volition solely when it is in their interest to do so. Quite frequently the interests of more
powerful states dictate the way in which cooperation takes place. In fact, from their viewpoint,
international rules and institutions have little effect on state behavior.377 Realism became the
dominant framework during the Cold War and realists were skeptical about any idea of world
peace. The ‘Will for power’ dominated the ‘Will for good.’ The world was seen as an
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anarchical international system driven by self-interested nations.378 Realism holds that states
live in an anarchical system without a central governing authority. War, conflict and competition
are natural outcomes to this state. While cooperation is rare and likely to give way to the
exigencies of national interest, self-help and self-interest dominate and so it is necessary to
maintain a balance of power between states.379 If all states act according to these interests we
are left with a troubling view of international law. The likelihood of cooperation and positivesum actions becomes very low.380
Neorealism and neoliberalism deploy a logic of consequences, with states conceptualized as
rational, autonomous actors. E.H. Carr and the realists reject values, morality and ethics in favor
of facts, power and politics. (In Canada, the following politicians may be considered as realists:
Brian Mulroney, Mike Harris, Ralph Klein, Steven Harper; and in Britain, Margaret Thatcher).
According to MacDonald, Parker and Patman, “The UN at its core was based far more on great
power politics than on universal principles.”381 This position is supported by Krasner who favors
actor-oriented theories, and realism based on power and interest governing the interactions
among states as opposed to institutional, structuralist or constructivist approaches.
How far should we go with this realist perspective? There is no doubt states do act in their selfinterest – but does this dominate all actions at the international level? Realists are skeptical of
humanitarian action, seeing the self-interest and imperialism of the Western World in the
Responsibility to Protect norm. If we take this position to its logical conclusion, the international
community will never act in the face of humanitarian crises unless the action concurs strictly
378
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with the self-interest of independent states. Krasner, unlike myself, is not persuaded by
constructivist arguments and does not agree that there is a set of norms and values that is shared
by all participants in the international sphere.382 However, Krasner does recognize that with the
EU, for example, member states have used their international legal sovereignty, which gives
them the right to voluntarily enter into any agreement they choose, to forego their domestic
autonomy and create supranational institutions such as the European Court of Justice and the
European Central Bank. As a result, member states can be bound by a decision such as the
Responsibility to Protect with which they do not agree. In doing so, the state has permitted itself
to be subjected to an external authority where certain norms and rules, such as those of the UN,
will predominate without the power of enforcement. I suggest it is these rules - based on
altruistic principles beyond the self-interest of states - that have allowed states to develop laws in
the protection of human rights at home and abroad.
Nevertheless, in spite of the creation of these institutions, Krasner argues disagreements about
norms are determined by the power and interest of actors, rather than through discourse. In
addition, in the international system actors differ on their understanding of appropriate norms
and there is no authoritative structure to resolve these differences. This permits power and
material interests to become the most important determinants of action. Norms in the
international system are weaker than domestic ones and therefore domestic norms and interests
dominate. One exception might occur in post conflict situations where states are often highly
dependent on international assistance.383 While the thesis shows how the self-interest of states
can act as an impediment to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, there is no
evidence that this must be the case in the face of atrocities. I am much more in favor of
382
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arguments such as those posed by liberals and constructivists who reject realism and states as
solely acting in their own self-interest with an over reliance on power dynamics.
II.2

Liberalism

Liberal theorists hope to transcend anarchy and conflict in the international arena, arguing that
“human nature is manageable and that order, justice and freedom can be achieved through the
creation of the right economic conditions and institutional mechanisms.”384 They hold a postCold War belief in the ability of democracy to prevail. Along with other interdependencies,
“Liberal institutionalism” suggests institutions, regimes and norms of conduct and regulation
create stability. Therefore, the liberal tradition fosters the creation of ethical norms and
regulation.
“Transnational liberals” highlight the activities of private individuals and groups across national
boundaries and presume interest groups independently help to develop international rules and
institutions. Transnational liberals therefore disagree that law creation is limited to states.385
Transnational liberals would therefore see the non-state actors or advocacy groups involved with
the Responsibility to Protect as instrumental in developing new norms and new laws, either
independently or in correspondence with states. In my view, Transnational liberalism provides a
persuasive explanation of the way in which a norm such as the Responsibility to Protect is
created, grows and is given recognition by social actors.
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II.3

Constructivism and International Society

Key tenets of constructivism can be found in the work of mainstream international political
science theorists in the 1950s.386 “Constructivist” theorists also reject rationalist explanations
that claim that states or other actors have independent interests and use strategies to achieve their
goals, but rather consider that these actors operate within a social context of shared
understandings and norms. These norms become the source of their identities and roles and
define appropriate forms of conduct. The meaning of actions are contingent on the context. 387
For example, Dirk Nabers takes a constructivist perspective, focusing on norms, morality and
expectations of foreign policy.388 He considers as an example Germany and Japan who pride
themselves in being moral actors, renouncing the use of force and promoting multilateralism and
equality.389
Constructivists, such as Hedley Bull and Alexander Wendt see sovereignty as constitutive of the
system as a whole. Constructivists have in fact allowed that some norms have been contested
and in some case differences have been resolved through normative discourse, even without the
aid of an authoritative arbiter. Actors must make choices even though it is within the boundaries
of their normative viewpoints.
II.4

Idealists

Critical from my point of view to the debate and to the success of the Responsibility to Protect
are the idealists. Woodrow Wilson and the idealists believed that internationalism rooted in
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moral values and legal norms “was the key to a more peaceful world order.”390 Idealist theory
supports a belief in a global community or international society. The world is not anarchical and
states are constrained by expectations of good behaviour. (Hugo Grotius, Leslie H. Gelb,
Michael Walzer).
II.5

The Logic of Appropriateness and the Logic of Consequences

These theoretical perspectives (the logic of consequences versus the logic of appropriateness)
exemplify the actor-oriented approach versus the structuralist approach. The logic of
appropriateness supports the notion that ‘good’ humanitarian principles can prevail and argues in
favour of morality and norm conformity and the nature of normative agreements based on moral
values. Norms are rooted in a specific culture (“the sum of beliefs, norms, and identities of a
group of social actors in a particular place and time”).391 This is very much part of the challenge
which determines what is valued as ‘good’ and what is considered ‘bad’. Culture serves as the
background for shared interpretations.392
Beliefs and attitudes about one’s own nation, and about other nations, and about the relationship
between the self and other actors in the international arena “influence important decisions on the
international agenda.” 393 Here we find culture, identity, norms and moral beliefs inextricably
linked to one another. Culture helps to form both the individual and collective identity that is
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imbedded in the individual as a morally conscious human being.394 Culture influences an
individual’s thoughts or behaviour as well as that of a nation.
According to Nils Brunsson (1989) and the ‘logics of appropriateness,’ the rules and norms
associated with a specific institution may be inconsistent with the ‘logics of consequences’,
which recognizes what actors must do to maximize what they understand to be their utility.
When sovereignty rules are violated, these violations are always justified by an appeal to other
principles and norms, “such as the right to protect or the need to further freedom.”395 The logics
of consequences perceives political action as rational, calculating behavior designed to
maximize preferences, (Classical game theory and neoclassical economies are well known
examples) whereas the logic of appropriateness understands political action as a product of rules,
roles and identities that stipulate appropriate behavior in a given situation, much as
constructionists do.
March and Olsen claim that when there is a contradiction a logic of consequences will prevail.396
Neorealists and neoliberalists deploy a logic of consequences, conceptualized as rational,
autonomous actors. A logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, understates the importance of
power and gives more emphasis to international roles and rules as opposed to domestic ones.
While it is understood, in my view, that constructivism, like the logic of appropriateness, does
not wholly explain how different states have responded in the international system as a whole, it
goes a long way toward explaining the development of human rights norms and the influence
that common norms may have on state behaviour. It also helps to explain why NGOs may be
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freer to act according to a social conscience.397 It discounts Krasner’s view that actor-oriented
arguments, realism and liberal institutionalism provide the most powerful insights.
March and Olsen describe the two logics of action: the logics of expected consequences and the
logics of appropriateness.398 According to those upholding the logics of consequences, there is
no authority structure in the international system to adjudicate controversy. In most cases
domestic interests will be more compelling than international ones and power asymmetries in the
international system create an imbalance and raise fears for developing countries regarding
imperialism or colonialism.399 The logics of appropriateness determines action as a product of
rules, roles and identities. The identity of the individual represents the state. The question is not:
“How can I maximize my self-interest?” but rather, given my role, “How should I act in this
particular circumstance?”400
According to those supporting the logic of appropriateness, on the other hand, because norms in
the international system are less constraining than in the domestic setting, the need to adhere to
the logics of appropriateness and competing rules becomes even stronger since rulers are easily
encouraged to break the rules in their own interest. Confounding elements to the logic of
appropriateness do exist, however, in the form of: 1) power imbalance 2) fear of colonialism 3)
domestic interests; and 4) self-determination. Such self-interested decisions can impede moral
action so that institutional norms such as the Responsibility to Protect must be developed and
strengthened to overcome them.
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An actor-oriented approach, as in the logic of consequences, must make some assumptions about
the underlying preferences of actors. “Rulers want to stay in power and, being in power, they
want to promote the security, prosperity, and values of their constituents. The ways in which
they accomplish these objectives will vary from one state to another.”401
These arguments help to explain why the basic rule of international sovereignty is so important.
Sovereignty can be used to support human rights arguments but it can also be used to block
action in the UN and by doing so can provide a rationale which ignores human atrocities.
However, we do know that agreements have been reached in the international humanitarian arena
and that Westphalian sovereignty can and has been violated through both intervention and
invitation. Even in the absence of international hard law, the more powerful states, or groups of
states, have found it necessary or desirable to intervene, coercing weaker states to accept external
authority. Sometimes it is done at their own invitation, for example, by signing human rights
accords or entering into international agreements. In the case of intervention without invitation
the norm of autonomy, the core of Westphalian sovereignty, has been overridden on the basis of
a concern for international peace and security and the logic of appropriateness. In these cases,
justifications in the form of alternative principles or rules have been offered, leading to a
determination of legitimacy if not legality.
But the problem remains that in the international system the logic of consequences and the logic
of appropriateness often come into conflict with each other (Krasner calls this organized
hypocrisy) and there is no clear authoritative structure to resolve this or to enforce principles. It
is true that the logic of appropriateness can be overpowered by rulers from different
constituencies holding different values and material interests. Both international legal and
401
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Westphalian sovereignty are best conceptualized as examples of organized hypocrisy. According
to Krasner both have clear logics of appropriateness, but these logics are sometimes inconsistent
with a logic of consequences. Given the absence of authoritative institutions and power
asymmetries, rulers can follow a logic of consequences and reject a logic of appropriateness.
Principles, though enduring, are still violated.402 He regards coercion and imposition as examples
of violations of Westphalian sovereignty through intervention rather than invitation.
Ideally, one could have a situation where doing the ‘right’ or ‘ethical’ thing is consistent with an
actor’s self-interest. According to Krasner, however, this is unlikely to happen in the
international system. Organized hypocrisy, when saying one thing but doing another, and while
acting in ways consistent with a logic of consequences, prevails. The lack of an authority
structure to resolve the conflict among competing norms, (the admonition against intervening in
the internal affairs of other states, on the one hand, and sovereign rule and the promotion of
human rights, a principle endorsed in many international conventions on the other), have no
authority mechanism for resolution.403
What we can see in relationship to the Responsibility to Protect is the need to strive for ways in
which realist concepts of the national interest – power, security, independence – can be
overcome by broader ideals in an extension of universal liberal norms. Here I would refer to
Andrew Linklater who argues “governments should put the welfare of international society
ahead of the relentless pursuit of [their] own national interests.” 404

On the other side, Barr

Cooper suggests that national interest lies in state survival and security and to think otherwise is
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utopianism. Politics are conducted in an amoral world and the state is founded in violence.405
For consequentialists, sovereign states are unlikely to agree on general principles and hence are
unlikely to agree when interventions to change societies would be justified.406 This bleak picture
of international politics in my view discounts much of the developments toward peace and
security that have become part of our international climate since the end of the Cold War and the
Responsibility to Prevent provides a modern example of efforts to deal with illegal actors.
II.6 The TWAIL Critique
After the 2nd World War, human rights and later the ICC were seen to be major advances in
humanitarian law. International institutions and civil society have been working together to
prosecute offenders who contravene international humanitarian law.407 These advances
demonstrate the superiority of the structural arguments. In spite of this advance, critiques
emerged in the 1980s who questioned the legitimacy of international law and pointed out the
need for cross-cultural dialogue as well as common principles. Such critics from the Global
South frequently point out binaries such as Civilised/Barbarian, Believer/Infidel, White/Black or
Advanced/Primitive that under pinned international law during and after colonisation.
According to this view, these binaries are still in operation under the contemporary labels
Developed/Developing, Centre/Periphery, Advanced/Emerging or Rich/Poor. These dualities
were intended to reveal the larger Eurocentric ethos of international law.
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TWAIL scholars represent a variety of perspectives and theoretical strands. Some were more
moderate than others and did not deny the relevance of international law as it had developed.408
Others, like David Kennedy and Martti Koskenniemi, emphasized the internal inconsistency of
mainstream international law, and the “ideological and political bias of supposedly ‘Neutral’
legal rules.”409 Feminist and international race theory also criticized the gendered and racist bias
of what is considered as the ‘objective’ legal categories and instead advocate for an approach
which includes social and gendered conditions.410
The acronym TWAIL (Third World Approaches to International Law) first came from the New
Approaches to International Law (NAIL) movement in the mid-1990s in the United States.
TWAIL was then developed by some of the NAIL scholars who wanted to support Third World
interests411 and marginalized states or people who “lag behind in terms of economic growth and
prosperity as well as political power and influence.”412 In particular, TWAIL scholars emphasize
the Eurocentric origins of mainstream rules and institutions which they claim marginalize nonEuropean experiences and practice. This in some ways supports realist theory which argues that
states act only with respect to their own interests.
TWAIL, therefore, focuses on the boundaries between the colonized and colonizer countries and
between the Third World and the West and works to eliminate these boundaries. During the
initial stages, TWAIL scholars wanted to make a contribution to international law and global
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order413 and therefore participated in the law-making process by emphasizing the state’s right to
self-determination, and by eliminating apartheid and racism in modern international law.414
Efforts of the Third World states to make some changes through resolutions in the UN General
Assembly to address the UN Charter, however, were not very successful415 which led some to
conclude that reform within the existing international law framework was impossible. They came
to the view that the system itself “is complicit in the subjugation of formerly colonized
peoples.”416 The principles of non-intervention and sovereignty were considered to bear greater
prospects for empowering Third World states. Proponents believe the struggle for sovereignty
over natural resources is responsible for the problems including oil which seriously affects
military intervention, military and financial aid, foreign direct investment, sanctions, embargoes,
and other such foreign policy issues. 417
Thus, TWAIL represents “an attempt to understand the history, structure and process of
international law from the perspective of third world states.” 418 A critical third world approach
goes further and “gives meaning to international law in the context of the lived experiences of
the ordinary peoples of the third world in order to transform it into an international law of
emancipation.”419 What brings these disparate views together is the “alienation of international
law from the peoples of the third world.”420
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TWAIL looks at the past to help formulate the future. The historical critique of international law
and humanitarian laws, a recent instance being the criticisms of the attack on Iraq, sees the
Western world as representative of a divisive universalism.421 Anghie in “Sovereignty,
Imperialism and the Making of International Law” considers colonialism to be at the base of
international law along with the ‘civilized/barbarian separation’422 and suggests unless these
constraints are understood the problem with international law cannot be fully addressed. In the
TWAIL approach the colonial origins bring about the alienation of third world peoples from the
present world order. Slaughter admits that even international human rights law is constrained by
the global economy which may allow an imperialist global law to prevail.423
TWAIL advocates suggest international lawyers need to learn “the grammar of global justice.”424
It is time that the abstractions of international law are rooted in the empirical world of ordinary
life and its travails.425 The lawyers in the TWAIL stream are encouraged to take on the role of a
conscious social actors and to seek acceptable solutions for third world social problems.426
TWAIL scholars also theoreticize that the problem with contemporary international law is that it
does not address the everyday divisions of wealth and poverty. In this way the lawyer would be
changed from a rule maker to a policy maker to facilitate interstate/intercultural dialogue.

“The

role of the critical lawyer is to make the oppressive character of international law the weapon of
the oppressed instead of that of the oppressor.”427 Third World Theory “is a framework within
which legal scholars argue for the need for international law to reflect a consensus amongst the
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international community, including newly emerged states.”428 While the Outcome Document
may not address all of the TWAIL concerns, the original ICISS report was in fact broader in its
intention to deal with such social justice issues. This view was ultimately narrowed and
deepened by the 2005 agreement.
Overall, the TWAIL historical work contributes to our understanding of the “culture” of
international law and enhances our appreciation of the relationship between law and culture, law
and history and law and society as well as drawing our attention to Third World voices.429

I

would argue, however, that the analysis of culture and history does not necessarily provide by
itself resolutions to contemporary problems which requires not only an understanding of nonwestern culture but aspirations in the third world to gain human rights and human dignity in
what is often an oppressive and murderous government.430 I suggest international law can still
be a positive force in an international order that is attempting to deal with terrorism, religious
intolerance, social injustice, numerous violations of human rights and humanitarian law, and
poverty.431
The rules and principles that have been developed, if they are acted upon for the values they
were meant to exhibit makes every sovereign state subject to the same rules it consented to. The
Third World countries must demand from powerful states equal respect for their sovereignty, but
also need to continue to ensure they aspire to standards of human rights that have been accepted
and are worth being accountable to.432 We do not necessarily need to reach a ‘deep’ universality
on cultural, religious or ideological factors, but we do need a political consensus on some
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minimum substantive rules that encourage respect for the ‘other,’ across cultures, religions, and
genders.”433 In effect, let us recognize diversity but let it not result in the end of international
law. Minimum rules can be a source of inter-cultural debate. The major objective is not to
‘throw out the baby with the bathwater’ but to continuously strive for a cross cultural
understanding of atrocity in the area of human rights.434 Norms provide reasons for action and
the norm of the Responsibility to Protect, if used as it is intended, holds the possibility of saving
millions of lives and protecting the rights of oppressed and threatened members of society
exposed to human atrocities.
The intention of the thesis is to give consideration to how the international structure needs to
function in the future and to the kinds of governance and humanitarian values that are necessary
to support the Responsibility to Protect. One way however to achieve agreement to act is with a
preponderance of states in agreement in the international community. States that agree on the
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for humanitarian intervention do so when the
violations of human rights are of an order that the principles of sovereignty and non intervention
need be trumped. Support for interventions may include the following: (1) the antiinterventionist regime is out of sync with modern notions of justice (2) without air strikes there
would have been a large refugee movement that threatened the peace and security of other
regions (3) all peaceful means had been tried (4) better to uphold basic principles selectively than
not at all (5) the policy was norm driven (according to international humanitarian law) rather
than interest driven.435 The decision, however, must include active consultation with key Third
World States, must be transparent and the international community must be involved and
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decisions must be made on a case by case basis. In Chapter 10, B.S. Chimni suggests the
promotion of human right matters less in terms of a critique of the doctrine of sovereignty but on
the “elimination of neo-imperial economic policies and practices.”436 He says the conflict
between sovereignty and the commitment of the international community to prevent gross human
rights abuses can be resolved by adhering to a legitimate non-unilateral intervention within the
UN.437
The next chapter focuses on how the responsibility to protect has evolved in the global
governance context, with a particular focus on the role of Non-governmental organizations. The
chapter introduces Nongovernmental Organizations that have taken hold of the Responsibility to
Protect principle along with the rights of the individual and that call on governments of the world
to adopt the moral choice and protect civilians in violent conflict. These organizations tend to be
freer to adopt the moral high ground which has enabled them to advocate for the Responsibility
to Protect with less reservation. The cooperation of NGOs and international organizations and
states suggest the consideration in greater depth of transnational or supranational forms of
governance and of what form of governance is best suited (either from a practical or idealist
vision) to address some of these issues.
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Chapter Six: Sovereignty, NGOs,
Globalization and Governance
I.

Introduction

Up until the 1990’s the possibility that any action could be taken against sovereign states through
intervention in order to address massive bloodshed (call it genocide or ethnic cleansing) was
nearly inconceivable.438 When the 'Cold War' ended in 1991, military confrontations between
states became less of a threat. The U.S. emerged as the main superpower and open financial
transactions flowed along with worldwide communication under the umbrella of globalization.
Keohane and Nye define globalization as a “state of the world involving networks of
interdependence at multicultural distances.”439 Falk describes ‘globalization’ as transnational
social forces concerned with environmental protection, human rights and peace and human
security from below.”440
One type of globalization is social/cultural and others are economic, military and
environmental.441 Increased community interdependencies, new threats and weakened states as a
result of globalization prompted consideration of the need for ethical action. One of the main
ways in which ethical concerns have been brought to the fore is through humanitarian
intervention and human rights. The UN concern for human rights increased, and steps were
taken to protect the rights of people through humanitarian intervention in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti,
Bosnia and Kosovo (although not all interventions were legal). This increased attention to
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human rights illustrates how the world can in fact respond to moral and ethical issues. Along
with this was the promotion of democracy.
In 1994 the Clinton Administration in its Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 had stated it
would only participate in peacekeeping operations if they were in the national interest.442 This
adherence to realpolitik of the West permitted millions to die in Bosnia, Rwanda and the Congo
while the world sat by. Later, however, Clinton realized the new wars could cause international
security problems and could indeed affect their domestic interests which helped to bring idealism
and realpolitik together.443
The approval of the Responsibility to Protect in 2005 to address human atrocities and the
tensions regarding the self-interest of autonomous states was aided by changing governance
structures. The current system of governance in which the Responsibility is important to its
continued evolution.
II.

Governance

For such a challenge as the acceptance or implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, where
there is a great deal of disagreement, there needs to be some form of governance that can ensure
the fairest distribution of the burdens imposed, as well as a means for making a collective
decision that all persons and states who are members will regard as binding upon them. This
means that such an institution will have legitimacy – the right to rule over this issue, with
morally binding force on the decision for even those who disagree and must sacrifice. And this,
of course, is the crux of the problem. While we have those who facilitate achievement of this
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goal, there are those who definitely detract from and impede its success. The successful
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect norm will require the legitimacy of the UN to be
strengthened and defended against actions that lead to skepticism and mistrust.
Kahler defines governance simply as ‘a set of authority relationships’ but argues that the scope
of governance has expanded from being concentrated in national governments to the increasing
influence of organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).444 Rhodes suggests governance pertains to a
new process or method for governing.445 Policy is not determined by central government and is
not imposed from above, and no one actor has all the information or the complete overview –
rather, there is an interdependency. Governance is more encompassing than government because
not only governmental organizations are involved but so are informal, Nongovernmental
Organizations.446 According to my definition, governance is about networks which are selforganizing, autonomous and not accountable to the state but in some ways interdependent.
Governance is ultimately a system of social and political authority relationships in the exercise of
power and policy. The new governance is presumably working to dissolve the distinction
between state and civil society and is empowering citizens.
Slaughter, for example, has a vision, in fact a grand vision, of ‘a New World Order which can
provide for broader, more cohesive decision making.'447 The building blocks for this new world
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order would not be states but parts of states: e.g. courts, regulatory agencies, ministries, and
legislatures. The new world would still include traditional international organizations such as the
UN and WTO, and states would continue to interact as unitary states on important issues such as
security. Slaughter then speculates, with a kind of ‘governance idealism’ that seems to include
no enforcement mechanism, that the new world order of government networks would be more
effective and more just. The primary political authority would remain with states, except where
they delegate their authority to supranational institutions. National government officials would
be operating at both the domestic and the international level to implement their international
obligations while representing the interests of their country. They would ideally work with their
foreign and supranational counterparts to disseminate and distill information, cooperate in
enforcing national and international laws, harmonize national laws and regulations, and address
common problems. Cooperation is obviously essential, and the mechanisms for obtaining
adherence or for enforcement unclear.
Slaughter refers to the globalization paradox identified by Robert Keohane - that while
international institutions are regarded as outdated and inadequate, world government is not
desirable. The EU, she suggests presents an alternative ‘transnational option’ – rather than a
‘World Government.’ To many, of course, world government is a frightening concept. Global
governance is championed as a much looser and less threatening conception of collective
organization and regulation, without coercion. A major element of global governance, in turn,
has been the rise of global policy networks.
Slaughter also introduces the concept of the ‘disaggregated state’ which she explains differs from
the unitary state which performs unitary actions by independent nations. In an international legal
system premised on unitary states, cooperation is negotiated over many years and eventually
143

signed and ratified through the establishment of an international secretariat. The states
participating in these negotiations are presumed to speak with one voice. Slaughter writes that
“Looking at the international system through the lens of unitary states leads us to focus on
traditional international organizations and institutions created by and composed of formal state
delegations.” 448 A disaggregated world order would have numerous government networks.
They would be bilateral, plurilateral, regional or global. Taken together, they would provide the
basis for global governance. Regulation would occur by networks at the global level represented
by citizens rather than the state. And it is among these networks that NGOs gain their voice.
Those with links between counterpart national officials across borders are labeled as ‘horizontal
government networks.’ ‘Vertical government networks’ are those between national government
officials and their supranational counterparts where the rare decision has been made by states to
delegate their sovereignty to an institution above them with real power – a court or a regulatory
commission. More traditional international organizations would also exist alongside government
networks. Slaughter confines the use of the term network to government units and defines
networks as a “pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working
across the borders that divide countries from one another and that demarcate the ‘domestic’ from
the ‘international’ sphere.”449 She does not really take into account the wide range of NGOs,
civic and corporate entities, which to my mind, are essential to any transnational governance
arrangement and in particular instrumental in supporting the principle. As such, I would include
them in any notion of global governance.
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Slaughter’s new world order has a utopian vision – it would present “a system of global
governance based on cooperation that would sufficiently contain conflict that the world might
achieve greater peace and prosperity, and reach minimum standards of human dignity.”450
While the goals are laudable, the mechanisms for governance might not be sufficient. Another
alternative is to give more consideration to the structure and function of the UN and international
organizations which will be discussed later in the thesis. In addition, states will continue to
evolve mechanisms for reaggregation and continue to act with each other as unitary actors.
But what is the power behind international networks, and what sort of enforcement mechanism
might that be for their involvement in decision-making? How does Slaughter imagine these
various networks can actually influence political, economic, and social outcomes to achieve
substantive results? It is commonly understood that much of the work of horizontal government
networks, for example, depends on soft power – the power of information, socialization,
persuasion and discussion. She suggests that government networks, both as they exist now and
as they could exist, nevertheless have access to traditional hard or coercive power, since the
power to implement already exists at the national level. But some fear that that the informality
and flexibility of networks is a way to avoid the formal constraints of representation, rules and
negotiating procedures of traditional international organizations. A major question occurs about
how accountability, legitimacy, and/or democracy is achieved. Who would be the watchdog?
There is a perceptual concern that powerful nations may overpower weaker ones, which already
happens. Slaughter proposes, particularly in response to these concerns, that government
officials be held accountable for their activities, not only to specific national constitutions but to
a hypothetical global polity.
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This brings us back to the importance of the logic of appropriateness and constructionist
arguments. Five basic principles are proposed by Slaughter to ensure an inclusive, tolerant,
respectful and decentralized world order. I agree that these principles are indeed important and
need to be honoured in any transnational system that includes international organizations and
civil society:
1)

Global deliberative equality is to be achieved by the principle of inclusion and the
maximization of the possibilities of participation, both by individual and groups at the level
of national and transnational society and by nations of all kinds at the level of the state;

2)

Ministers, heads of state, courts, legislators and bureaucrats from distinct cultural
traditions, and demographic and geographic entities must recognize the validity of each
other’s approach - the notion of legitimate difference and the principle of pluralism;

3)

Positive comity and the principle of affirmative cooperation;

4)

Through the implementation of checks and balances whereby the distribution of power is
always fluid on both horizontal and vertical axes; and

5)

Subsidiarity and the principles of locating governance at the lowest possible level, whether
local, regional national or supranational.451

Such values would represent a ‘Just World Order.’ The state is not disappearing, it is
disaggregating. Regulators, judges and legislators are finding their domestic jobs have a
growing international dimension where they encounter their foreign counterparts.
In summary, part of Slaughter’s blueprint for the future addresses sovereignty, which she
suggests could be disaggregated and attached to specific institutions such as courts, regulatory
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agencies and legislators. The core characteristic of sovereignty would shift from autonomy from
outside interference to the capacity to participate in transgovernmental networks of all types.
This would strengthen the government institutions and in return they could help rebuild states
ravaged by conflict, weakened by poverty, disease and privatization or stalled in transition from
dictatorship to democracy. This theoretical position may be seen as a ‘solution’ or ‘response’ in
many ways to Krasner’s organized hypocrisy where agreement means that sovereign, diverse and
independent entities are bound to remain beyond reach.
While the intent of my thesis is not to imagine or conceptualize a new world order, it is
concerned with analyzing the current system of governance in which the Responsibility to
Protect exists and is operationalized and to draw out the strengths and weaknesses of the system
in relation to its evolution. Edgar Grande’s and Louis W. Pauly’s work entitled Complex
Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty first Century tackles two central
issues of the thesis (those of sovereignty and international and transnational governance).452 In
Chapter I Reconstituting Political Authority: Sovereignty, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy in a
Transnational Order three basic concepts are introduced: political authority, statehood, and
sovereignty.

The main thrust of the book is directed toward the tension between the reassertion

of political authority by sovereign states and the emergence of dilemmas that cannot be resolved
by radically decentralized decision-making structures.
The weakness in Slaughter’s model is that it involves a concept of disaggregation which in my
opinion goes too far away from the central unity of the UN (at least in theory if not always in
practice). What are the consequences of this type of tension for Grande and Pauly? For Grande
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and Pauly, this tension leads to a consideration of new forms of governance, and to the key
question of whether there are any new instruments for coordinating political activities that may
cross traditional territories and functional borders. They emphasize, nevertheless, that states
seem to be more important than ever for the production of public goods such as security and
welfare and are therefore not a thing of the past. They use as an example the attack by Bin
Laden on the World Trade Center and the ensuing war against the Taliban and the invasion of
Iraq as evidence that the security state has re-emerged. In doing so, they conclude that
sovereignty still exists as a relevant attribute of states. It certainly has raised its head in Russia
and Syria’s fight against any external intervention in the prolonged and unfortunate civil war and
now in the battle over the Ukraine.
In spite of the continuing importance of states, they suggest the conceptualizations and practices
of sovereignty are undergoing a period of transformation and the internal and external
dimensions of the sovereignty of the state are emerging. This leads to a transnational polity that
is based on a high degree of coordination, both internal and external. We might note, however,
that they do not go so far as to call this ‘a new world order,’ or even a transformed world order,
but they do see the change as a “significant deepening in the complexity of sovereignty.”453
They also note new modes of cooperation between public and private actors (policy networks
and public private partnerships) although they do not spend a lot of time illustrating the role of
private actors, which to my mind is a gap in the work.
While authority until recently tended to be centred in the state, the shift that is occurring affects
the basic institutions, principles, norms and procedures of contemporary policy making, public
authority and power across territorial levels. Grande and Pauly note that although there are new
453
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types of governing arrangements evolving, the key locus of political authority remains the state.
A key feature of the modern state is its monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force which
excludes individuals, groups and organizations from actively participating in legitimate means of
exercising coercion. This is delineated through four principles (which in fact are essential parts
of Weber’s conception): the principle of sovereignty, implied by the ‘monopoly of legitimate
coercion; the principle of territoriality, which keeps the exercise of authority within the
territorial boundaries of the state (except in self defense); the principle of rational legitimacy,
which requires that political authority must necessarily (although not exclusively) be based on
formal rules and a consistent, codified legal order, rather than on traditions of charisma; and, the
principle of bureaucratic institutionalization that “guarantees that sovereign powers are
exercised permanently, reliably and uniformly within a given territory.”454
A key argument for them is that if a fundamental transformation of the modern state is taking
place, one would expect these principles to be significantly affected. They accept that the state
and sovereignty is highly contested, but their argument is that sovereignty and the state are two
sides of the same coin. Sovereignty is what distinguishes the modern state from its feudal
predecessor. The real change can be described in more complex terms. They criticize recent
analyses of the modern state where sovereignty and governance have tended to be
conceptualized in zero sum terms (i.e. as fully present or entirely absent from a given political
structure). Any evidence of change must be associated with state decline. They view the
practice, expression and theoretical conceptualization of sovereignty as an evolving, changing or
more flexible concept which is subject to change.455 It seems reasonable to view the statesovereignty versus transnational polity dichotomy as a continuum with shifts in balance rather
454
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than a complete split. Rather than tying sovereignty to the state alone, we might broaden it to
include the state and other forms of governance as discussed earlier in this chapter.
It is important for the reader to keep in mind that the Responsibility to Protect only comes into
relevance when the State is “unwilling or unable” to protect its own citizens. The state in that
situation is failing in its sovereign duty. Of course, when a decision re the Responsibility to
Protect is required in the Security Council, states may be less concerned with the case at hand
than they are about future cases which might infringe on their own sovereignty. Grande and
Pauly develop a more refined concept of sovereignty that is based on the following propositions:
1)

Internal and external sovereignty must be distinguished. The internal relationship lies
between state and society (i.e. the state’s autonomy from society) and the external
dimension refers to the state’s external relations in the international system (i.e. the
state’s independence from other states). Internal sovereignty relies on domestic
consensus, while external sovereignty is premised on recognition by other states. In
summary, sovereignty can be divided and transformed without losing its substance. (This
is reminiscent of Krasner).

2)

The two dimensions of sovereignty, internal and external – can develop separately from
one another, and can have separate trajectories of development. In the matter of
transition of governance, we are more concerned with the external rights of the state and
its internal performance of its duties.456

In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, external sovereignty must predominate when internal
sovereignty has failed. The three essential elements of the doctrine of external sovereignty,
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beginning in the 19th C. are as follows: states are defined as the basic units of the international
system; all states are considered to be legally equal; and, state sovereignty is understood to mean
freedom from external interference. The separation of state powers into external and internal
sovereignty is important when we contemplate the question of intervention. States are concerned
with external sovereignty when they look at situations of crisis in other states and decide the
appropriate action. Grande and Pauly note there is already the emergence of a transnational
human rights regime that has gradually been superseding the legitimacy of states and their
insistence on non-interference. The developing paradigm of a ‘Responsibility to Protect
vulnerable human beings, regardless of any resistance put forward by local government
authorities,’ is part of what they see as a shift toward ‘transnational sovereignty.’ This type of
sovereignty differs in at least two respects: 1) In principle it weakens the role of traditional
states in international relations; and 2) It qualifies, at times even suspends, the immunity of states
from external influence.
This in fact provides a good description of the transnational sovereignty as it exists, or needs to
exist, for the Responsibility to Protect to be implemented. Are Grande and Pauly in fact positing
a third type of ‘sovereignty,’ which transcends the internal and the external and moves to the
transnational level and sustains a third level of hierarchical authority or power? Among scholars
of international relations, the observation and analysis of such developments is central to key
debates within the field and to our comprehension of the principle of the Responsibility to
Protect as the fundamental principle of the thesis.
Certain dimensions of what is taking place at the international level depends on a framework that
goes beyond the usual internal-external understanding of sovereignty as a multi-dimensional
phenomenon that comprises territorial, functional, and political aspects of the contemporary
151

experience of governance. This reconstitution occurs because "The Nation state has lost its
monopoly on collectively binding decision-making in the production of public goods”457 -- that
is, private actors now play a greater role in the production of public goods; there is a continuous
reassessment and redefinition of public functions leading to a functional reconstruction of public
authority; and, there are new and unique issues of democratic legitimacy in governance due to
shortcomings in participation, representation and control.
The significance of this to my own work is in Grande and Pauly’s attention to the increasing
importance of regional and transnational levels of governance; the increased significance and
influence of private actors along with an increasing reliance on non-hierarchical and majoritarian
methods of conflict resolution at the national, regional and international levels. As a
qualification, however, they do suggest that the emergence of new forms of governance does not
necessarily mean that they will become the dominant or exclusive forms in the 21st C, nor does
this emergence imply that they will be stable, effective and ultimately legitimate. At the
moment, the state remains the key locus of authority and international law holds the authority.
The persistence of the idea of sovereignty is historical and serves as a construct that permits
weaker states to protect themselves from more powerful ones. But we do need to recognize the
changes in and alternatives of power nodules that are taking place.
In certain situations polities are conquered and occupied and the occupying power attempts to set
up a new governing structure. (Contemporary Afghanistan and Iraq are cases in point.)
Transitional administration and foreign assistance to improve governance are presumably based
on the principle that states will ultimately function effectively on their own, once local
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authorities are empowered to assume the responsibility for their own sovereignty. 458
Occasionally such interventions are touted as examples of the Responsibility to Protect at work;
they are not – and I will show why they are not, particularly in Chapter Seven of the thesis which
sets out the criteria for the legitimacy of the Libyan intervention. The Iraq war, for example
rested on the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self defense (PESD) and the assumption that there
were weapons of mass destruction (wmd) in Iraq. Bush’s doctrine was tied to democratic
sovereignty and international peace and stability. Nineteenth century international law allowed
for the sovereign state recourse to force and emphasized a distinction between civilized and
uncivilized states. Uncivilized states were therefore not sovereign and lacked rights and thus
could be legally attacked and conquered in an effort to civilize them.459 “Bush’s PESD doctrine
attempted to expand the legal use of force and is intimately connected to the concept of illegal or
rogue state against which such force may be directed.” 460
As suggested, when we look more closely at processes or methods for governing the
interdependent relationships between the multitude of players in the national, international and
transnational level we find new forms of governance which function in self-organizing,
autonomous and interdependent networks using soft principles such as negotiation, cooperation
and alliance formation as opposed to coercion, command and control. What Anne-Marie
Slaughter adds to this debate is the importance of not only states in the matter of international
decision making regarding rules and norms, but of other key governmental players in the
network and of their role in decision making. This analysis encourages us to look at how the
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networks of nongovernmental or non-state actors may function to make the Responsibility to
Protect principle as a soft law more effective as part of a new form of governance.
In A New World Order (2004), while Slaughter primarily speaks of networks involving
governments, officials, national regulators, judges and legislators as well as terrorists, arms and
drug dealers, she points out they all operate through global networks, through the exchange of
information and the coordination of activity. She adds that these government networks are
underappreciated, under supported, and underused to address the central problems of global
governance, as we may say are NGOs and civil society generally. This is one of the grounds for
the thesis’ focus on the role of NGOs and civil society as actors in governance networks; that is
to show how NGOs have had a significant role in its development and any decisions toward
implementation as they currently may occur. Evan if the Responsibility to Protect does evolve
into common law I suggest these networks will still remain important.
While aims and subject areas may differ, Slaughter suggests there are certain functions common
to them all: they expand regulatory reach; build trust, establish relationships and are motivated
to establish a good reputation – the conditions necessary for long-term cooperation - and,
exchange information, and build databases. The networks of nongovernmental actors are also
expanding their soft power (the power of persuasion and information) –the kind of soft power
that Joseph Nye has been exhorting the United States to use along with their hard power.461
Pauly speaks to the transnational cooperation state or the network state.462 He, like the others,
attributes part of this change to the human rights regime and the Responsibility to Protect which
are superseding the legitimacy of the state, resulting in a shift toward transnational sovereignty.
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As a consequence, there may be a new historical cluster of power. Where the nation state has
lost its monopoly in the production of public goods, international organizations have gained
strength. If the world is to accept the responsibility to act in a cohesive manner when it comes to
international crises these networks must be instrumental at the global level.
The value of these three authors’ work (Slaughter, Krasner and Pauly) to the thesis is the focus
on the tension between the political authority of the state and centralized decision making at the
transnational or international level; e.g. a form of global governance or transnational polity
based on cooperation - or is it coercion? - With questions about its authority, stability and
legitimacy. Indeed, cooperation and coordination is an essential aspect of the transition to global
governance. According to Pauly, states are not a thing of the past, but are transforming. This
leads to a new transnational polity based on coordination representing a new model of
cooperation between public and private actors; i.e. a new form of governance. But he stresses
that the new form of governance does not replace the state. All three envisage the future of the
international regime. Pauly perceives the possibility of a transnational cooperative state with the
state remaining the locus of authority. Krasner also predicts that the state will remain the key
locus of authority. Slaughter has the grandest vision, however - A New World Order – leading
to peace and prosperity.
My own work and its prospect for the future of the Responsibility to Protect governance requires
a form of cooperation in which the Responsibility to Protect can function in all three aspects preventing, reacting and rebuilding - and concentrates on the tension between cooperative forms
of governance at the international or transnational level and competition or conflict between
states which still goes on. My overall concern is the need for the Responsibility to Protect to be
successful - without a high level of cooperation and/or a supranational authority structure it is
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subject to failure in the current political structure. With changes in global values and global
governance away from the sovereignty of the state as a primary principle (which assures the right
of self-determination, state autonomy and protection from intervention), toward the public good
of responsibility of the global system to protect human life and the citizens of the world,
however, there exist tremendous possibilities. We need to continue to understand, however,
more fully the impediments and the drivers to the challenge of cooperation when it comes to the
acceptance of any form of “humanitarian responsibility.” Ultimately we need to continue to
emphasize the critical importance of the humanitarian principles we have established.
The next portion of this Chapter takes us deeper into the changing relationship between the state,
sovereignty and global governance by exploring in greater depth the role of civil society actors
and NGOs in the development of the Responsibility to Protect. As we track the norm in more
detail, its evolution and those impediments that have stood in its way, the thesis provides a ‘thick
description’ from key actors and civil society organizations which facilitate better understanding
of the evolution of the norm and its complexity.
III.

International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) as Nonstate Actors (NSAs)

International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGOs) as Non-States Actors includes a variety
of entities. In this thesis NGO refers to the group of private transnational actors with both
private and public purposes. The Acronym NGO is most widely used. The term actor is part of
international legal terminology. The inclusion of the state as subjects of international law did not
include the development of a legal theory pertaining to ‘transnational actors.’ However,
International Relations and Political Science are more generally receptive to transnational actors
and in the 1980s multi-actor models expanded the State-centric one. This led to the “policy
network approach” which operates on the assumption that policies are not formulated or
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implemented or enforced by governmental actors only. Interaction occurs between state, market
and civil society, although state-centric views of the relative importance of states and NSAs such
as Realism and Neo-realism continue to exist.463 The recognition of NSAs has led to an
increased dialogue between NSAs, international law and international relations and any analyses
of the dialogue tend to be interdisciplinary.
Distinguishing INGOs from other NSAs focuses the legal discourse on ‘international legal
personality’; their role in international law-making processes; and their institutional
arrangements with international governmental organizations (IGOs).464 Michael Byers focuses
in the role of INGOs on the development of customary international law, especially in the field
of human rights, although he refers to it as an ‘indirect’ or ‘secondary’ role.465
III.1

Conceptual frameworks outside personality

Some scholars, for practical and doctrinal reasons do not focus on recognized formal legal status
when considering transnational actors. They deal with ‘international actors’ instead of ‘legal
persons.’ Byers argues that NGOs do not have legal personality, however which enables states
to consider each other as equal sovereigns. I am interested in NGOs as actors in the international
and transnational legal framework. This does not wholly avoid the question of state sovereignty
but the standpoint is outside the existing doctrinal law scheme of state-centered international
law.466
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Nye refers to the soft power and the political and moral influence that ‘global civil society’may
gain in formulating evolving norms and institutions of law.467 Another approach examines the
limits of international personality and assesses the possibilities for its expansion.468
Discussions of the normative position of INGOs whether de lege lata (regarding existing law) or
de lege ferenda (regarding soft law) are entwined with the general debate on the scope of state
sovereignty in an increasingly interdependent world. It is often legitimacy rather than legality
that may be the defining factor and “the legitimacy in turn may be based on the capacity for
effective [rather] than the possession of a decisive legal case.”469
There is a range of legal capacity for subjects of international law including those recognized by
international customary law and secondly those entities that are dependent on the agreement of
the former. The first category includes states while the second category includes international
organizations and institutions.470
Prior to the First World War, sovereign states were the sole members of the international legal
order which was categorized as “European, Christian, mercantilist and imperialist.”471 The
promotion of the right of peoples to self-determination was intended to allow for an increasingly
universal regime which reinforced the relationship between the State and individual.472 The new
order included three agents: the State, the Community of Nations and transnational civil society.
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International law was intended to become the law of a world community which in some ways
undermined the sovereignty of these states.”473
…Globalization has created new forces, new non-territorial actors whose influence
partially deterritorializes the notion of state sovereignty. Globalization brings a concept
no longer limited to to territorial control, but which extends to participating functions in
an overriding, non-territory-based system.” 474
Higgins rejects the traditional concept of subjects in international law and suggests adopting the
concept of ‘international legal participants’ which includes individuals, corporations and
INGOs.475 The notion of international legal personality implies that the entity has an “active
position in international relations and takes part in the law-making process.” 476
Investigation of what INGOs actually do and how they do it is indeed important in order to
properly evaluate their status of legal capacity – both de lege lata and de lege ferenda.” 477
III.2

Defining INGOs

Charnovitz defines NGOs as
groups of individuals organized for the myriad of reasons that engage human imagination
and aspiration, which can be set up to advocate a particular cause, such as human rights,
or to carry out programs on the ground, such as disaster relief, and who can have
membership ranging from local to global.478
The UN system describes the INGO as non-profit entities whose members are citizens or
associations of one or more countries and who activities are determined by the collective will of
473
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its members in response to the needs of the members of one or more communities with which the
NGO cooperates.”479
IV.

Role and Relevance of INGOs

It is difficult to quantify or measure the activity of INGOs. Therefore evaluations must draw on
subjective assumptions. Kofi Annan suggests loose coalitions of international institutions, civil
society, and private sector organizations and national governments merge together “in pursuit of
common goals.”480 One way to see this movement towards ‘commonality’ can be seen through
their efforts toward cooperation and collaboration.
Slaughter uses a paradigm of international relations to analyze the role of INGOs in international
law-making. She suggests NGOs take part in “international law making by providing political,
technical, and informational benefits to States.”481 INGOs constitute transnational society
according to this model. Preuss argues “Mankind is evolving into a social community that
provides the moral community with the means to protect its moral principles” i.e., through INGO
activity. He suggests these transnational actors may play a key role in the protection of human
rights.”482
For Otto, too, INGOs “not only play a dominant constructive role, but also a moral one.483
Mertus acknowledges the role of non-State actors in the development of international norms and
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identity formation and explains that “by using the language of international human rights treaties
and other governmental documents,” INGOs become ‘interpretive communities’ for norms that
may not have gained the same level as the status of law.484 Mertus does not claim NGOs are at
the same level as States in customary law formation, but does conclude they play a significant
role in how laws and norms develop. 485 “Their interpretation and behavior accord meaning to
legal norms, and also contribute to the “legitimacy of the principles and rules which are
adopted.”486
Gamble and Kim recognize the role of INGOs in international law-making487 through “judicial
decisions and the teachings of the most legally qualified publicists.” (e.g. scholars and
experts).488 NGOs also submit information and arguments to the Court (the ICJ) which can lead
to the long-term development of international law.”489 Overall, Ben Ari concludes that INGOs
have mastered so-called soft law instruments as part of contemporary international law.490 I am
interested in their participation in international law-making and proponents of emerging soft and
hard law.
One of the problems of INGOs is the prospect of their remaining neutral which may be
jeopardized by the receipt of government and private funds. It has also been argued that many
INGOs are Western-based.491 On the positive side INGOs may provide links between the global
and local participation and provides alternate channels to the government for excluded minority
484
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groups. More transparency is recommended which would reveal and discourage the exercise of
influence by national governments.
V.

The Legal Status of INGOs

A point of reference to the current legal status of INGOs under public international law appears
in Article 71 of the UN Charter, regional mechanisms and Treaties.492 The relationship between
the UN and NGOs is formalized through Articles 63 and 64 of the UN Charter which specify that
the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) “is responsible for consulting with international
and, where appropriate, national organizations.” The only official mention of ‘NGO’ comes in
Article 71, where it states ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with
Nongovernmental Organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence’.”493
NGOs have been granted ‘consultative status’ in the United Nations and other IGOs such as
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe have
incorporated NGOs into their frameworks and established guidelines for cooperation.494 Article
71 of the UN Charter 1945 introduced a new standardized form of cooperation between actors in
an international society.495 In accordance with Article 71 certain resolutions define how the
relationship should work. (See for example Resolution 1996/31, the Consultative relationship
between the United Nations and Nongovernmental Organizations, sections 9 to 13).496 Martens
suggests there is no codified legal status nor widely adopted international convention on the law
492
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of NGOs.497

“As a result, NGOs are obliged to accept the national legislation of the state in

which they have been established and where they are based.”498

Since national laws differ,

their status also varies from country to country. The only recognized agreement on NGOs is the
European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International
Nongovernmental Organizations which provides for the general recognition of the legal
personality of an NGO in any state that is party to the convention.499
When we consider patterns of governance in transnational NGOs their significance becomes
clear as a purposive activity which I have chosen to illustrate by conducting interviews with
transnational NGO individuals and coalitions. The empirically-based portion of the research
shows that a number of NGOs have formed coalitions with other NGOs in order to be more
influential in global politics. The amount of state cooperation with NGOs and the devolution of
responsibility to NGOs is considerable and growing.500 NGOs try to influence political actors
through the way they frame and steer issues.
A consideration of norms is particularly relevant in situations of power asymmetries,
such as those between NGOs and IFIs, where framing and steering can to some degree be
facilitated by normative appeals by the less powerful to influence the more powerful.501
Nevertheless, governance is not backed by formal authority in the manner in which governments
are.502
Rosenau refers to governance as post internationalist, contending that governance “encompasses
the activities of government, but it also includes the many other channels through which
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commands flow in the form of goals framed, directives issued and policies pursued.”503
Governance includes the state, non-state or intergovernmental actors. The literature on
transnational relations (regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is
a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental
organization)504 has been used to explain the enhanced standing of non-state actors. Both
transnational relations literature and governance literature discuss how a principle commenced at
the transnational level can have a major impact on the global diffusion of values, norms and
ideas.
Cognitive framing is a necessary component in the political strategies of networks. The way in
which issues are framed affects governance activity.505

NGOs tend to bring perspectives that

differ from other actors and present evidence and arguments that offer alternate perspectives
which states sometimes adopt.506 We can see this as steering which is a fundamental aspect of
governance.507 NGOs therefore influence through steering or persuasion and by offering added
value. Because governance is of a voluntary nature, norm structures provide legitimacy and
political support.
Civil society is increasingly defined as a field populated by political subjects whose
autonomy, expertise and ability to responsibly channel political will-formation has
become crucial to the tasks of governing.508
Civil society is altered from a passive object of government to an entity that is both an object and
subject of government.509 Civil society actors can in this way be seen to hold both power and
503
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autonomy. The regulation of landmines is cited as an example of “how nonstate actors have
assumed a more powerful role in global governance” and civil society is seen as a key asset for
the “formulation of new policies.”510 Neumann discusses the history of the landmines
convention when certain Norwegian NGOs allied with other NGOs and over time persuaded or
‘shamed’ or in some other way made the Norwegian government support both politically and in
a financial way the advocacy on behalf of the landmines ban.511
Of course the relationship between state and civil society varies from country to country. In
some cases the state may control civil society and be unreceptive to their views. In the
landmines case, on the other hand, states and NGOs interacted as a “technology of agency” by
which “non-state actors perform[ed] governance functions by virtue of their technical expertise,
advocacy and capacity for political will-formation.”512 The Norwegian People’s Aid [NPA],
and the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC) were key players in a process that resulted in
a large activism movement at the international level against antipersonnel land-mines. The NPA
acted therefore not only as an object of the state, but also as a subject and the NAC was a central
actor in shaping official Norwegian policy.513 The Norwegian government drew on the practical
knowledge and expertise of the NGOs. Here civil society represented a variety of actors who
bound together to advocate for a humanitarian principle as opposed to a state or a UN based
disarmament process.514
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Abeles refers to ‘global politics’ as a system which undermines the traditional view of
government, and includes Nongovernmental Organizations which exert great influence on the
power and actions of nation states, making nation states not the only actors in the system. He
conducted anthropological fieldwork in transnational institutions including the NGO Oxfam. He
notes transnational organizations have partly taken charge of some of the key elements of
governance.515 His main question is about the legitimacy of NGOs, particularly since they are
not elected representatives. He refers to them as “self-proclaimed spokespeople of ‘civil
society.’”516 NGOs, in response, defend their position by arguing that they are close to the
ground and see through their own eyes humanitarian crises because of their work in the field.517
Other arguments in support of NGOs include their lack of political motivation plus their
technical expertise. 518 These characteristics can be perceived as ‘virtues’ of NGOs as opposed
to the State. NGOs have been said to operate as ‘moral watchdogs’ on the activities of states.”519
This leaves the image of NGOs as charitable and altruistic organizations, although this is
certainly countered by some critics.520
The next Chapter, Chapter seven, discusses the theory of norm entrepreneurship as a framework
for taking a deeper look at International Nongovernmental Organizations (INGO) activities and
programs. It provides a description of the role of INGOs as well as early influential
entrepreneurs such as Lloyd Axworthy, Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff as a testimony to
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their own involvement. Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the
principle have been posed in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed.
The responses have been considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it
influences the evolution of the norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the
principle.
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Chapter Seven: A “Thick Description” of a Principle
On 21 April 1994 at the height of the genocide, UN force commander, General
Romeo Dallaire had declared that he could bring the genocide to an end if they
would give him 5000 men. The UN Security Council responded the same day by
reducing his contingent from 2,548 to 270 men.521

In the face of such disasters and lack of response, the international community has since that
time, at least in principle, accepted its responsibility to protect civilians and to even move in with
force if necessary to stop massive human rights violations. A soft, and sometimes inconsistent,
“consensus now exists on the need to do something more.”522 The starting point in support of the
principle is that humanitarian tragedies and massive human rights violations, where the
government fails or is unable to protect civilians, cannot simply be left to resolve themselves.
But is it being implemented when situations call for it and, if it is, how is it being perceived?
I.

Introduction

This Chapter, through the assistance of policy interviews, critically examines impediments as
well as supports for the Responsibility to Protect, with a particular emphasis on International
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), the role of International Governmental Organizations
(IGOs) and early influential individual entrepreneurs as an aspect of global governance. The
representatives of NGOs and influential individuals have been systematically sought out and
their responses to questions analyzed.523 This work advances a novel set of arguments which
illustrate from a legal and moral perspective why the Responsibility to Protect is perceived as a
needed principle to halt or prevent mass atrocities.
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The impediments as viewed by the community confronting the implementation of this agreedupon principle are addressed as well as the factors that work to support and enhance it.
Interviews and the review of documents, reports and articles help to determine which issues are
the most inhibiting or supportive and what the future likely holds for the Responsibility to
Protect principle. While I am interested in a study of the principle itself, its evolution and
implementation, by examining the life of the Responsibility to Protect we will also be able to
understand further how international norms and laws can and do develop.
Questions pertaining to the sociopolitical issues of significance to the principle have been posed
in the field work to those interviewed and their responses analyzed. The responses have been
considered in order to gauge the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of the
norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle. The outcome serves as an
empirical illustration of how a fundamental and controversial international norm can be created,
supported, accepted and ultimately implemented in a transnational environment. The responses
and research findings can be grouped under a series of headings including the steps that led up to
the Commission; the mandate and work of the Commission; the relevance of moral principles
and moral imperatives; the legality and legitimacy of the norm; the role of NGOs; the role of the
UN; and finally the interviewees’ perception of the development of the principle.
Methodologically, the chapter expands on the knowledge regarding the Responsibility to Protect
by posing a predetermined set of questions (while at the same time allowing for unanticipated
findings) to key players who have been or are in a position to influence the evolution of the
norm. The research will show that one of the most significant and influential revelations of the
interviews is the role of nongovernmental actors as a positive force in norm entrepreneurship in
the global governance structure. It also shows that the tension between state responsibility and
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state sovereignty continues to persist in international law and impedes decisions in the Security
Council. Realpolitik and state interest often impede the efforts on the part of states and non-state
actors to make humanitarian decisions based on a universal principle. Prevention measures also
tend to be a low priority.
Using analytic tools of inquiry, the analysis delves deeper into these factors to achieve a
Geertzian ‘thick description’ that shows how the Responsibility to Protect norm has evolved and
been nurtured from its inception to its acceptance and implementation in the transnational
environment through the assistance of key norm entrepreneurs.524 Also discussed are (1) the
basic ideas and principles that are constitutive of the Responsibility to Protect; (2) the processes
(legal or otherwise) that have helped to produce and develop it; (3) the relationships and agencies
that have brought the Responsibility to Protect norm to institutionalization within the UN and the
Security Council; and (4) the perceptions, theories and actions that constitute the most
substantive impediments and enhancers.
While NGOs do not have the same authority in law formation as states, their influence is not
insignificant. While they do not make customary law, they are able to give meaning to affect
norms and international law.
II.

The Theory of Norm Entrepreneurship and the Evolution of the Norm

The theory of norm entrepreneurship provides a framework in which to imbed the evolution of
the Responsibility to Protect norm. The analysis outlines the way in which the norm has moved
from the international level to the local level and back again on the basis of historical
information and personal accounts of key norm entrepreneurs who have become part of decisions
being made for or against the Responsibility to Protect. It will show how norm entrepreneurs in
524
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social, political and legal thought and their organizations, sometimes collectively and sometimes
independently, help to formalize the principle. The sovereign equality of states makes the
international system what it is. Mertus suggests “Those that break or seek to change the
sovereignty norms can be viewed as norm entrepreneurs or “international law breakers.”525
Application of the three phases of the theory of norm entrepreneurship (norm creation, norm
institutionalisation and norm interpretation) 526 and its relationship to the Responsibility to
Protect is represented in the following table:
Table 2: Stages of Norm Entrepreneurship527
Stage 1
Norm Emergence

Actors

Motives
Dominant mechanisms

The Responsibility to
Protect

Norm entrepreneurs
With organized
platforms
Altruism, empathy,
ideational, commitment
Persuasion

ICISS and NGOs

Stage 2
Tipping or threshold
point
Norm Cascade
States, international
organizations, networks

Stage 3
Internalization

Legitimacy, reputation,
esteem
Socialization,
institutionalization,
demonstration
Summit Outcome
document

Conformity

Law, professions,
bureaucracy

Habit,
institutionalization
Cases as they arise in
the Security Council

Stage 1 or norm emergence is the circumstances and activities that led up to the ICISS Report;
Stage 2 indicates the process by which the report of the Secretary General, his presentation at the
Summit Outcome, and the vote at the General Assembly led to an agreement as expressed in
Article 138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome document; and, Stage 3 or internalization is
demonstrated by the cases that are introduced in the Security Council calling upon the principle
525
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of the Responsibility to Protect. These instances of the institutionalization of the norm are
represented later in the Chapter through an examination of the Security Council resolutions
references and strengthening the Responsibility to Protect. It is through such an internalization
or institutionalization process that the norm moves from the soft law area to that of lex lata.
In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, the first stage of norm entrepreneurship involved the
development of the thinking in terms of the need for a legal mechanism to deal with
humanitarian crises that was not tainted by humanitarian interventions of the past. This occurred
with the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)
sponsored by the Government of Canada and its report in 2001. Persuasion by norm
entrepreneurs is characteristic of the first stage and I consider the authors of this Report as
‘founding entrepreneurs.’ They are introduced in this Chapter and their views and experience
explored. They include well known Canadian actors such as Lloyd Axworthy, Michael Ignatieff
and William Graham.
In the second phase, norms become institutionalized in organizations (domestic and
international) and in new bureaucratic units whose function “is to advance the norm.”528 The
second stage of the Responsibility to Protect in practical terms occurred with the presentation of
the Report to the United Nations on 14th September 2005. On that date Secretary General Kofi
Annan addressed the General Assembly of the United Nations at the UN Headquarters in New
York and opened the three day meeting of the 2005 World Summit, as follows:
For the first time, you will accept, clearly and unambiguously, that you have a collective
responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity. You will make clear your willingness to take the timely and
528
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decisive collective action through the Security Council, when peaceful means prove
inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their own
populations. Excellences, you will be pledged to act if another Rwanda looms.529
A number of drafts had been presented prior to this date contributing to its acceptance as a soft
law norm. For example, the earlier draft outcome document included the responsibility to
protect in a section on human rights and the rule of law together with human security. The main
concern was related to the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention as well as unilateral
action. While Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Iran and Jamaica voiced their opposition, the
African Union broadly supported the idea and noted similar provisions in the Charter of the
African Union. (The contribution of the African Union was significant.)
It is important to note that in 2000, African nations formed the African Union (AU), and in its
Constitution Act included principles later known as ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ transferred
from the AU founding document, which recognized a significant change from ‘non-interference’
toward ‘non-indifference’. The Constitutive Act included the following articles, while continuing
to recognize the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of its Member States. The
Act states that
Art. 4 (h) - the “Union has the right to intervene in a Member State (MS) pursuant a
decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances namely, genocide, war crimes
and crimes against humanity;”
Art. 4 (j) “a MS has the right to request intervention from the Union for the restoration of
peace and security.”530

The consent of the state is not necessary for external intervention under such circumstances. To
deal with this very controversial issue the Organization of African Unity operated on consensus

529

UN Summit Outcome document 2005. http://www.un.org/summit
The Responsibility to Protect Toolkit, ICR2P 4718-icrtop-launches-new-toolkit-on-the-responsibility-to-protect.
[R2P Toolkit].
530

173

and stipulated that “military intervention without the consent of the state must be a last resort.”531
These principles clearly helped to form the basis of the ICISS report. An amended document
regarding the Responsibility to Protect was produced in July, 2005.532 After much discussion, on
5 August Jean Ping533 presented another revised draft outcome document. After further revisions
the Draft Negotiated Outcome document distributed on 12 September 2005 was approved by the
UN General Assembly unanimously. The consensus was approved as Article 138 and 139 of the
Summit Outcome Document as outlined earlier in Chapter One.534
The third stage of norm entrepreneurship is that of internalization where the norm is no longer a
matter of broad public debate. In the third phase, according to the theory, ‘interpretation’ could
be explicit in judicial opinions by authoritative bodies or may be implicit in the form of political
and operational activities of governments or international institutions.535 In the case of the
Responsibility to Protect, legitimate interpretation occurs in the United Nations Security Council
and General Assembly in its operations in the form of discussion and the subsequent potential for
resolutions implementing a range of the Responsibility to Protect tools. It also occurs among
INGOs and persuasive volunteers. Although the Responsibility to Protect norm has been
internalized to some extent, I would hesitate to say that it has yet achieved “a taken for granted
quality” or became customary law.536 While the norm has been formally accepted and is
established within the United Nations, it is still subject to much debate. A great deal of
criticism, on the one hand, and persuasion on the other, still goes on. Even calls for sanctions
531
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are controversial and there is no mechanism for enforcement within the Security Council which
is one of the factors to be considered as crucial to successful implementation.
The Secretary General plays an instrumental entrepreneurial role and can be effective when
building on existing interpretations of international law. The United Nations is used as an
institution to further those understandings of an evolving normative trend or idea and this is
demonstrated by the strong and persuasive words of the Secretary General as he spoke in favor
of the norm in his address to the General Assembly in 2005. While the Responsibility to Protect
has followed this path successfully, problems remain. The Special Advisor to the Secretary
General on the Prevention of Genocide537 also plays an important role in the development and
movement of the norm.538 The purpose of the Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide is
to raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, and to provide warnings and to
advocate and mobilize for appropriate action when there is a risk of genocide. There is also a
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. The purpose of the Special Adviser is to lead
the conceptual, political, institutional and operational development of the Responsibility to
Protect. The advice is required to alert the UN to the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity, enhancing the capacity of the organization to prevent
these crimes.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed Juan Méndez, an Argentinian, as
Special Adviser in 2004, following the genocidal violence in Rwanda and the Balkans. (The
international system had virtually allowed these tragedies to go unchecked.) In 2007, Francis M.
Deng, a Sudanese Scholar, was appointed to succeed Juan Mendez with a new title of
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Undersecretary- General with ‘Mass Atrocities’ added to the title (the new title was eventually
dropped, however).539 Ban Ki-moon also appointed Edward Luck, an international scholar, in
December 2007 as the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect. Both Special Advisers
Francis Deng and Edward Luck ended their assignments with the Office in July 2012 and Adama
Dieng of Senegal was appointed as UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.540 A
recent step in 2013 is the appointment of Jennifer Welsh to the position to UN Special Adviser
for the Responsibility to Protect.
III.

Background to the Formation of the Commission

Throughout the 1990s, controversy raged between those who supported a right to intervene to
protect populations (i.e. humanitarian intervention) and those who argued that state sovereignty,
as recognized by the UN Charter, precluded any intervention in internal matters.541 Rwanda was
cited as an example of failure to address atrocity crimes while Kosovo, where the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) launched a military operation that was unauthorized by the UNSC,
was regarded as an illegal intervention.542 Clearly an international consensus on when and how
to take action to prevent and end mass atrocities was needed to protect the security of the
community and the individual, as well as the state.
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The debate that took place during that period regarding the protection of civilians in armed
conflict began with the help of the media. The public had begun to pay more attention to
humanitarian situations than before. With the emergence of the so-called CNN effect, voters
worldwide became more rapidly aware of war and humanitarian crises, making an international
political response more urgently needed. 543 A critical moment in the debate occurred when
NATO intervened in Kosovo without authorization from the UN Security Council as a result of
Russia and China’s threat to veto which prevented a UN-backed intervention. In the 1999 UN
General Assembly debate, Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika expressed concerns and even
defined sovereignty as “the last defence against the rules of an unjust world.”544 The Kosovo
intervention constituted a clear violation of the basic principle of state sovereignty, and the right
to intervene represented “a neo-colonial threat to the poorest defenceless countries.”545 In spite
of the fact that the Kosovo crisis meant a significant setback with regards to public support, the
debate on humanitarian intervention, energized by the media, was adopted by NGOs and in
academic circles and was pursued sufficiently to lead to the endorsement of the Responsibility to
Protect. 546

The Kosovo report, when produced, recommended further steps on the question of humanitarian
intervention:
Experience from the NATO intervention in Kosovo suggests the need to close the gap
between legality and legitimacy. The Commission believes that the time is now ripe for
the presentation of a principled framework for humanitarian intervention which could be
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used to guide future responses to imminent humanitarian catastrophes and which could be
used to assess claims for humanitarian intervention.547

Expectations began to increase for action and new standards of conduct in national and
international affairs as well as many new international institutions. There were new actors who
brought their views to the table, many of whom were in the areas of human rights and human
security. It is those new actors that this thesis brings to light through its “thick description” of
their views, work, action and thoughts. As the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (ICISS) Report states, the presence of these new non-state actors in
international affairs helped to push the debate about intervention for human protection purposes
to the front of the agenda. 548 International organizations, civil society activists and NGOs began
to use “the international human rights norms and instruments as the concrete point of reference
against which to judge state conduct.”549

NGOs influenced the development of a new regime of national laws and international laws using
the most recent advances in the development of international humanitarian law. The agreement
reached in the Ottawa Convention on Landmines provides another excellent example of their
influence as NGOs brought domestic and foreign public opinion to problems of security.550
Relief and development NGOs, national and international human rights groups, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), faith groups, academics, and the media also began to tackle
early warnings of deadly conflict, aided by grass-roots organizations in different countries.
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Organizations such as the International Crisis Group (ICG) “monitored and reported on areas of
the world where conflict appeared to be emerging and could result in violations of human rights
or genocide." 551 The ICG during the late 1990s worked in Kosovo and brought attention to the
crisis.552
With the drafting of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1945 came the recognition
in international law of the concept of “crimes against humanity” which could be
committed by a government against its own people and not necessarily just during
wartime. Then came the Genocide Convention of 1948, with its apparently explicit
override of the non-intervention principle for the most extreme of all crimes against
humanity. ‘553
It was in this context and according to the need to address this emotional, intellectual and legal
tension, that the Government of Canada promoted the creation of the ICISS. While the ICISS
Report recognized that political leaders are crucial in this respect, they recognized the
importance of other actors as well. Political leaders are forced to be responsive to the demands
and pressures placed upon them by their constituents and the media. Because of the external
pressures, NGOs have become increasingly needed to contribute to the decision-making process.

IV.

Foundations and Philanthropic Organizations

If we consider foundations and philanthropic organizations as nongovernmental actors, or as
supporters of NGOs, we can see how they too have been very influential at the early stages of the
Responsibility to Protect movement. For example, “The Carnegie Corporation, William and
Flora Hewlett Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Simons Foundation, all supported the
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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).”554 The new doctrine
shared a similar pattern to other achievements engineered by the human rights lobby. The first
achievement was the Rome Statute in 1998, which created the International Criminal Court, and
the second success, also supported by foundations and a coalition of Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGOs), was the agreement for the Mine Ban Convention as mentioned earlier.
The article by Simmons and Donnellan outlines what civil society groups and philanthropic
associations can do, especially when governments lack the political will to act.555 Philanthropic
associations have special tools they can employ with methods that differ from governments,
including resources and influence, the possibilities of quick action and independence. The
Responsibility to Protect, the Mine Ban Treaty and the ICC provide important examples of the
establishment of human rights norms with the aid of civil society groups.556 In fact, most of the
attention to genocide since Rwanda has been brought about by NGOs funded by foundations; for
example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International receive their funding from
foundations and not from government. It was in response to the challenge from Kofi Annan that
the Government of Canada, together with a group of major foundations, announced at the
General Assembly in September 2000 the establishment of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).

V.

The Contribution of Founding Entrepreneurs

A number of important individuals can be attributed with a significant contribution to the
founding and articulation of the Responsibility to Protect norm. Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd
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Axworthy, for example, initiated the Commission and chaired the Advisory Board, and his
successor John Manley carried it through.557 The Commission consisted of a group of
international experts (not all from the West) led by two co-chairs, Gareth Evans and Mohamed
Sahnoun. Other members included renowned academics and politicians: Gisèle Côté-Harper, Lee
Hamilton, Michael Ignatieff, Vladimir Lukin, Klaus Naumann, Cyril Ramaphosa, Fidel Ramos,
Cornelio Sommaruga, Eduardo Stein, and Ramesh Thakur.558

A strategy for carrying out the mandate and an agreement that the work process should be
transparent, inclusive, and global was agreed to by the Government of Canada. A research
directorate was established with the support of other governments and major foundations. The
first meeting of the Commission took place on 5–6 November 2000, in Ottawa. A series of
regional roundtables and national consultations were held in order that the Commission might
hear a wide range of views. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to ensure that the views
of affected populations were heard and taken into account, in addition to the views of
Governments, IGOs and NGOs, and civil society representatives.559 The Commission’s plan was
to consult as widely as possible and within a year they had visited around the world, including
the countries of all five permanent members of the Security Council. The Commission also
reached out to academics with a wide range of expertise. Individual Commissioners and
members of the research team were also invited to many conferences and seminars.
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Eleven regional roundtables and national consultations were held around the world between
January and July 2001.
In date order, they were held in Ottawa on 15 January, Geneva on 30–31 January,
London on 3 February, Maputo on 10 March, Washington, DC on 2 May, Santiago on 4
May, Cairo on 21 May, Paris on 23 May, New Delhi on 10 June, Beijing on 14 June and
St Petersburg on 16 July.560

Usually both of the Co-Chairs attended with some other Commissioners as well. In order to
obtain the broadest range of views of national and regional officials, representatives of civil
society, NGOs, academic institutions and think-tanks were invited to each of the meetings.
Discussions took place on the basis of a paper prepared by the Commission. Certain participants
were also asked to prepare papers on specific aspects of the issue. Each roundtable was selected
to produce a summary report of the proceedings and outcomes of each of the discussions.
The key Canadian domestic entrepreneurs in the early stages of the work of the Commission and
the preparation of the ICISS Report were Bill Graham, Michael Ignatieff and Lloyd Axworthy.
Efforts to gain an interview with Lloyd Axworthy have not been successful to date. I did,
however, have the opportunity to hear Bill Graham and Michael Ignatieff speak in public about
their role in the conception and birth of the Responsibility to Protect.
V.1

Lloyd Axworthy

During his time as Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy launched the ICISS on 14 September
2000, stating that the goal was to begin a comprehensive debate on the issues, and to foster
global political consensus on how to move from polemics, and often paralysis, towards action
within the international system, particularly through the United Nations. He noted in an address
in 2000 that during the time he had been Canada's Foreign Affairs Minister (for five years) the
560
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meaning of security had changed. This also meant a shift in the international affairs language
from the discussions of states' rights and national sovereignty to the protection of civilians, waraffected children, and language surrounding the threat of “ terrorism and of drugs, open borders
and infectious diseases.”561 This made the rights of individuals the primary concern and
influenced the government’s human security agenda. It was this shift in thinking that paved the
way for the Commission on the Responsibility to Protect.
As evidenced in his notes, Lloyd Axworthy was interested in the new way in which
governments, civil society and Nongovernmental Organizations worked together in making
changes in human security. He confirmed that the government of Canada actively sought a
partnership with civil society. Axworthy expressed the concern that sovereignty had protected
the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, mass displacement in East Timor and Kosovo, and
genocide in Rwanda. “These crimes engage our conscience and responsibility,” he wrote.562 He
suggested civilians had become the primary target and foreign policy needed to change. This
was reflected in the UN Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the Rome Statute of the International Court. He noted that the shift to human security
did not mean the end of the state as it was the state that still held the authority over rules and
regulations.563
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V.2

Bill Graham

In his political career, Bill Graham served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of National
Defence, and Leader of the Opposition and Interim Leader of the Liberal Party of Canada.564
Bill Graham described the development of the norm in a presentation at the Munk Centre at the
University of Toronto from his own experience as a norm entrepreneur.565 He stressed the need
to reflect and recognize that the concept is part of a larger human security agenda that emerged
after the end of the Cold War with changes in international law, diplomacy, and international
relations. He described the process whereby they had to think about how to “recast their
defence” and the concept of humanitarian intervention in that broader context.566 He pointed out
that other changes were also taking place in security with the creation of the ICC, the Rome
Statute and the Anti-personnel Landmines Convention. He referred to these as the three pillars
in the human security agenda.567 He further described how all moved together away from the
idea of the Westphalian notion of state towards recognizing ordinary citizens as the ones that
suffer the most in wars. While mainly soldiers in the First World War were killed, in the Second
World War it was mainly civilians and there was a recognition that the international community
must come up with legal concepts and military tools to respond.568

Bill Graham suggested that the Responsibility to Protect grew out of a specific conflict – the
Kosovo conflict and the genocide by Milosevic. “We tried to intervene with UN authority but
Russia threatened to veto. NATO decided to intervene any way, even though it was understood
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this was illegal.”569 What developed was a notion of legitimacy instead of simple legality or
illegality. There was therefore a perceived need to develop a concept that would allow
intervention that was both legal and legitimate.570 He noted the Commission was set up with a
broad representation of the international community to give it legitimacy, and when he became
Foreign Minister as Lloyd Axworthy’s successor he was asked by Kofi Annan “to sell it.” He
recalled there was considerable resistance to the fundamental idea of intervention. He advised
that at every international meeting he went to he distributed the Report. There were quite a few
foreign ministers who were former professors like himself who thought this was a good
principle. Over time, it evolved into a doctrine that contributed significantly to the human
security agenda along with the Landmines Convention and the International Criminal Court.571
V.3

Michael Ignatieff

Another key leader in the second phase of the development of the norm; i.e., the creation of the
ICISS report involving the shift from state sovereignty to state responsibility, was Michael
Ignatieff.572 I had the opportunity to hear him speak on the Responsibility to Protect at an event
sponsored by Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights.573 He relayed to the audience
his role in the evolution of the principle and informed the audience that in 2001 he was a member
of the ICISS which released its report on the Responsibility to Protect.574 In recalling his
participation, he reminded the audience that Canada has had a strong role in international
569
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lawmaking and there are many distinguished Canadians in this area who have been especially
influential. He referred to the Responsibility to Protect as an example of “Canadian norm
entrepreneurship.”575 He explained that law often starts as a norm, moves forward to become a
principle and evolves from customary international law to statutory law. There is often a gap
between legality and legitimacy, however, and the Commission wrote a report that tried to put
legitimacy and legality back together. He also mentioned that the Landmines Treaty was another
example of imaginative leadership where efforts to prohibit the use of landmines were made by
NGOs.
Michael Ignatieff indicated that Kofi Annan said he would be glad to have a report and the
Secretariat side was set up in Canada. The Commission included Mohamed Sahnoun,576 Gareth
Evans,577 Ramesh Thakur,578 and others. They toured the world since they recognized the
entrepreneurship of the norm had to not only affect the global north, but India and Rwanda and
other countries in the South. They wanted a global consensus that on the one hand reinforced
sovereignty as a moral value, but on the other hand enforced sovereignty as responsibility for the
states’ population. They also wanted to be sure not to create an “interventionist” charter.579 He
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remarked that they achieved harmony in Quebec in August 2001 when they came to agreement
on the report. For a Canadian this was an emotional moment. Ten days later the planes went
into the World Trade Center and the Responsibility to Protect disappeared off the political
agenda. Then there was Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect could not be legitimately used to
show that there were weapons of mass destruction or that there were not. There were indeed
horrible human rights issues in Iraq but this was not the primary reason for the attack on Iraq.580

VI.

The Participation of NGOs and Non-state Actors

The following section of this chapter is devoted to the role of NGOs and actors in the
development and implementation of the norm. In the selection of organizations and/or persons
to interview, I determined that the term NGOs or human rights advocates, while excluding
government bodies, includes a wide range of national and international organizations as well as
the media, scholars and advocates. A clear distinction between them and other entities, however,
is that the term NGO excludes government bodies. To narrow the field, I chose to focus on
NGOs that have declared some interest in the Responsibility to Protect, or more generally in
humanitarian intervention. (See Appendix B and Appendix C for sample letters to interviewees).
While these NGOs have played a role in Phases II and III of the entrepreneur framework, they
are also an important and necessary part of the current transnational governance system. NGOs
work outside of and formally within the UN constellation of relations. NGOs are represented in
large part by individuals who support and advocate for the ideal of the Responsibility to Protect
principle itself, since they generally do not represent the state but rather push or shame the state
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into action. Some of the most prominent examples of NGO involvement are found in the fields
of human rights.
The data I have collected will help highlight the web of actors involved, their personal views,
their written work and the institutions, where appropriate, that they are involved with. In
summarizing the interview data, the findings provide insight into the following areas: evolution
of the norm, its legal versus moral states motives, goals or objectives, state or government
relations, and priorities and concerns. The purpose of the pursuit of these questions is to gain a
sense of their understanding of and their relationship with the Responsibility to Protect norm.
A table follows with a description of the organizations and individuals approached or reviewed
and a categorization of institutions according to my own classification system. A number of
different organizations were approached, including advocacy groups for the Responsibility to
Protect, research think tanks, humanitarian organizations, human rights groups and academic
institutions along with prominent individuals who have been or are involved in the
Responsibility to Protect. A description of the most influential organizations (most often
referred to in the literature and by other groups) which were approached and proved to be open
to further inquiry follows. (See Appendix D for details with regard to non-governmental
organizations).
We will see to what extent the aims of these NGOs are humanitarian in nature and gain a deeper
understanding of how they perceive the norm – its purpose and intent and how it functions in a
transnational environment. We will also see how they work independently from governments
but at the same time work to influence governments in their decision-making. The practice of
‘responsible advocacy’ obliges NGOs to have the responsibility to remain independent from
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governments and this gives them more freedom to express views that may differ from current
government policy and renders their influence significant in its development and interpretation.
In a recent book entitled “Paved with Good Intentions” Nikolas Barry-Shaw and Dru Oja Jay
criticize development NGOs for their closeness to state political positions.581 It is inevitable that
NGOs, in addition to being altruistic, will also have interests to satisfy supporters, often because
of the need to generate income and raise the profile of the group and enhance staff skills. This
may lead them to focus on more high profile cases or even to become closer to their respective
governments. This is the reason why international NGOs should use their resources to
strengthen local NGOs whenever possible in order to aid them in their efforts to maintain a
distance from government.

They can also assist, where appropriate, in the lobbying of the UN

and other international organizations. I remain convinced, however, that overall NGOs whose
mandate it is to support the Responsibility to Protect are in a stronger position to advocate for a
moral value than the state which suffers from too many conflicting interests, including from its
own domestic population.
We can also look to Canada where NGOs support the Responsibility to Protect in spite of the
Canadian governments’ negative position. I have often heard it said it is difficult to contest after
reviewing the history that without NGOs or civil society the Responsibility to Protect would
never have come into fruition. This being the case, I wanted to gain as much information as I
could first hand of their role in its development, implementation and evolution to customary
international law. Have NGOs, I asked, virtually co-opted the Responsibility to Protect? While
their original influence may be debated, there is little question of their importance to its
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continued survival today. Although some NGOs wish to remain neutral and objective regarding
military intervention and coercive measures, there are others who openly advocate on behalf of
the Responsibility to Protect. These activist groups are my main interest. Interviews that I
conducted with NGOs were illuminating in response to my request to describe their role in the
development of the Responsibility to Protect. The interviews not only show the role of
individual organizations but of numerous collaborative efforts as well.
The following table lists the Nongovernmental Organizations who participated in the study, by
name of individual, category, location and date. A brief description of these organizations and
their purpose is interwoven within the narrative stemming from the interviews, although one or
two mentioned that they spoke only for themselves and that their view did not necessarily reflect
the views of the organization with which they were affiliated.
As will be evidenced from the table below I have categorized the information according to the
organization, the interview and/or the individual within the following five categories as follows:
key persons, advocacy groups, applied conflict resolution, research thinktanks, conference
proceedings, human rights and the federal government.
Table 3: NGO Representatives and Other Key Players Interviewed
Type of
Organization
Key
Persons

Name of
Organization

Advocacy
Group

Global Centre for the
Responsibility to
Protect at the City
University of New
York
International
Coalition on the
Responsibility to

Persons
Interviewed
Loyd Axworthy
Bill Graham
Carolyn McAskie
Michael Ignatieff
Naomi Kikoler

Date

Interview
Method

Place

12/11/2011
8/12/ 2011
26/10/2011
9/11/2011

Conference
Skype
Conference
Face to
Face (F2F)

Toronto

Marion Arnaud

5/12/ 2011

F2F

New York,
New York
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Toronto
New York,
New York

Applied Conflict
Resolution

Research
Thinktanks

Conference
Proceedings
Human
Rights

Federal
Government

Protect (ICRTOP)
Montreal Institute for
Genocide and
Human Rights
Studies
International Crisis
Group

Kyle Matthews

12/11/2011
and
Conferences

F2F
Skype

Montreal,
Quebec

Heather Sonner

5/12/2011

F2F

New York,
New York

Global Action to
Prevent War
Berghof Conflict
Research Centre
Centre for
International
Governance and
Innovation and
Balsillie School of
International Affairs

Bob Zuber

4/11/ 2011

Skype

Veronique
Dudouet
David Dewitt
David Welch
Louise Frechette
Lucie Edwards
Mark Sedra
Andrew
Thompson
Evan Cinq-mars

31/10/2011

Email

2/11/2011
2/11/ 2011
21/6/ 2011
31/10/ 2012
2/11/ 2011
2/11/ 2011

F2F
F2F
Skype
Skype
F2F
F2F

New York,
New York
Berlin,
Germany
Waterloo
Waterloo
Quebec
Ontario
Waterloo
Waterloo

NATO Watch

Ian Davis

10/11/ 2011

Skype

The Geneva Centre
for Security Policy
Ten Years After –
The Munk Centre
Canadian Lawyers
for International
Human Rights
(CLAIHR)
Canadian UN
Ambassador

Khalid Koser

21/2/ 2012

F2F

Bill Graham

12/11/2011

Speaker

Jillian Siskind
Michael Ignatieff

26/10/2011
23/11/2011
26/10/ 2011

Speaker
F2F
Speaker

Elissa Goldberg

20/2/2012

F2F

Ross Shire,
Scotland
Geneva
Switzerland
Toronto,
Ontario
Toronto,
Ontario
Toronto,
Ontario
Geneva,
Switzerland

Certain human rights organizations approached are not included in the analysis because their
interests did not coincide. Some found it to be a very worthwhile concept but explained it
addresses military intervention while their work focuses more on the transformation of armed
conflicts through negotiation, or nonviolent conflicts through unarmed resistance, or post-war
peace building.582
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As stated earlier, the spreading of information and knowledge is essential to the development of
soft law norms. One of the primary functions of these non-governmental organization is the
dissemination of information regarding the norm of the Responsibility to Protect through reports,
conferences, studies, research analysis, op-eds, papers, and debates. Also, as I have stated
earlier, collaboration is an important aspect of transnational governance and of the operations of
INGOs. One important strategy for the promotion of the Responsibility to Protect is through
collaboration efforts and cooperation with other organizations. Collaboration with other partners
facilitate their objectives. One of the themes that comes through in these accounts is the
importance of collaboration and of cooperation.

VI.1

Dissemination of the Norm. Cooperation and Collaboration

The first NGO I sought to approach was the International Crisis Group (ICG). While I was
unable to obtain an interview with the organization, I am providing a description of the ICG New
York and their operation which does have corresponding interests with the Responsibility to
Protect. The ICG is an applied conflict resolution group according to my classification. They
describe themselves as an independent, non-profit, Nongovernmental Organization committed to
preventing and resolving deadly conflict.583 They provide a nonpartisan source of analysis and
advice to governments, and intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations, European Union
and World Bank, on the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Its mission is to act as an
indispensable source of information for governments and a wide range of institutions actively
working towards peace and conflict resolution. “Crisis Group was founded in 1995 as an
international Nongovernmental Organization on the initiative of a group of well-known
transatlantic figures. The idea was to create a new organization that would act as the world’s
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eyes and ears for impending conflicts, and with an influential board that could mobilize effective
action from the world’s policymakers.”584
The Crisis Group “currently employs worldwide some 130 permanent staff, representing
between them 49 nationalities and speaking 47 different languages, plus at any given time
around 20 consultants and 40 interns.”585 It publishes reports and briefing papers, as well as the
Crisis Watch bulletin assessing every month the current state of play in some 70 countries or
areas of actual or potential conflict. Publications are distributed widely by email.586 They
conduct field-based analysis, policy prescription and advocacy, with key experienced-ingovernment staff and an active Board of Trustees. Louise Arbour, former UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals
for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda became Crisis Group’s President and CEO in July
2009. She succeeded Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia (1988-96) who served
as President of the organization between January 2000 and July 2009.
Crisis Group claims to play a major role by ringing early warning bells in scores of conflicts or
potential conflict situations around the world, helping policymakers in the UN Security Council,
regional organizations, donor countries and others with major influence, and in the countries at
risk themselves, to do better in preventing, managing and resolving conflict, and in rebuilding as
well as offering new strategic thinking on some of the world’s most intractable conflicts and
crises.587
In my first interview with Kyle Matthews who works with The Montreal Institute for Genocide
and Human Rights Studies (MIGS), alerted me to the existence of a strong collaborative network
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on the Responsibility to Protect. 588 "We work and train with the UN Office of Genocide,
training diplomats from national governments. These are ways we share our knowledge and
authority."589 They carry out the work through networking, high profile events, coalitions, and
civil society. He added they want to build a larger network of people working on the issue. “We
want to become a hub,” he said. 590
Mr. Matthews also advised MIGS promotes the Responsibility to Protect through education and
advocacy. The Will to Intervene Project (W2I) is a research initiative that focuses on the
prevention of genocide and other mass atrocity crimes. Mr. Matthews regards it as an advocacy
organization. Genocide experts “seek to understand how to pressure political leaders to act in a
preventive manner to halt massive human rights abuses before they escalate into genocide.”591
Consistent with the way in which norms evolve, the W2I team disseminates its research findings
on genocide prevention amongst politicians, policy makers, global think tanks, scholars, the
media, and the wider public. It promotes research findings through presentations, municipal
outreach, policy briefings and training, new studies and conferences.
The W2I Project seeks to understand how to operationalize the principles of the
International Commission on Intervention and States Sovereignty on the Responsibility to
Protect. Research focused originally on how to mobilize the will to intervene in Canada
and the United States. Scholarly research and interviews highlight the cases of the United
Kingdom and South Africa. The project’s fundamental goal is to identify strategic and
practical steps to raise the capacity of government officials, legislators, civil servants,
Nongovernmental Organizations, advocacy groups, journalists, and media owners and
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managers so they can effectively pressure governments to take action to prevent future
genocides.”592
MIGS authored the report Mobilizing the Will to Intervene: Leadership & Action to Prevent
Mass Atrocities (W2I) in 2009. The rationale of the report was to 'operationalize the
Responsibility to Protect principles in Canada and the United States to parallel efforts being
made in the international realm.593 Among the suggestions listed by the W2I report was a call on
the government of Canada to create an interdepartmental Coordinating Office for the Prevention
of Mass Atrocities, the creation of a Canadian prevention corps, and a call on parliamentarians to
exercise their initiative to bring to the public's attention specific instances in which the
Responsibility to Protect could be implemented.594 The authors of W2I argued
The combined impact of poverty and inequality, rapid demographic growth, ethnic
nationalism, and climate change on international peace and security make it strategically
imperative to operationalize the principles of the Responsibility to Protect report. These
underlying structural factors increase the risks of mass atrocities perpetrated against
civilians and pose a credible danger to Canadian and American national interests, ...595
Canadian Senator Roméo Dallaire created the All Party Parliamentary Group for the Prevention
of Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity. Although the group provides a means by
which Canadian parliamentarians can discuss matters pertaining to genocide and mass atrocities,
it is not a formal, regular parliamentary committee. As a result, the authors of W2I argued that it
is imperative for this informal committee to be formally recognized as a parliamentary
committee, with all of the rights, privileges and resources attached to regular committees.596
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Jillian Siskind also reported that her organization Canadian Lawyers for International Human
Rights (CLAIHR), conducts symposiums and raises awareness. They also talk to students and
lawyers, speak at conferences, publish articles as well as relying on other forms of
communication. “We get people talking about it and understanding it. We are concerned with
the protection of international human rights for people.”597

The mandate of Canadian Lawyers

for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) is to raise awareness and promote human rights
within Canada and abroad. 598 A roundtable report called “Engaging the Responsibility to
Protect civil society” was produced in 2008. 599
After the world summit they looked at how they could consolidate the network; moving the
loosely affiliated groups to create a stronger group of NGOs who work actively in support of the
Responsibility to Protect. CLAIHR is also working to increase its collaboration with other
advocates engaged in human rights activities. The purpose of this approach is to allow them to
have a direct impact on policy and lawmaking and to help Canada regain its position as a
forerunner in the area of human rights. In this context, “CLAIHR strongly supports and
promotes the use of the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect.” 600
Evan Cinq-Mars, speaking at a Conference on the Responsibility to Protect, suggested his
organization (not identified) has a mandate to collaborate by bringing together NGOs from all
around the world and mobilizing them to push for action in countries like Sudan.
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We are creating global centres for R2P and attempting to establish a coalition of NGOs.
The strategy to build a coalition requires extensive work on the part of numerous players.
We need to raise awareness and support and develop partners. We are fighting to make
sure consensus is maintained and political will mobilized. We work at the national level
and at the regional level.601
Lucie Edwards of the Centre of International Governance (CIGI) advised
starting in 2007 the World Federation Movement held eight round tables in key regional
places and had regional discussions of the Responsibility to Protect in places like
Bangladesh, taking the opportunity to tap into regional philosophy and regional
organizations.602
NGOs also influence through publications, op-eds, social media, twitter, parliamentary groups,
graduate students, TV, training for journalists on the Responsibility to Protect, and work with the
UN Office. NGOs jointly strategize and co-convene events. They also pursue other avenues
such as winning the support of mayors, and the Office of Genocide and influence how decisions
are made.603
CIGI is a research centre/think tank located in Waterloo, Ontario, and is associated with the
University of Waterloo. CIGI produces “Policy briefs to develop information and analysis,
followed by recommendations on policy-oriented topics” for the use of “policy makers, policy
specialists, the media and interested scholars.”604 CIGI commentaries are designed to advance
public understanding and influence public debate through providing expert analysis of current
international governance topics, written in the style of newspaper op-eds. CIGI papers present
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policy positions and/or research findings, insights or data relevant to policy debates and decision
making. This category includes papers in series linked to particular projects or topic areas.

The organization also holds conferences and produces reports that summarize and synthesize the
main ideas, conclusions and recommendations from those conferences or meetings. It also
produces Special Reports which “include multi-author studies arising from CIGI projects and
research conducted in collaboration with think tank partners.”605 “Op-eds showcase the expertise
of CIGI researchers on a range of relevant global governance issues and are published in
newspapers and websites. Such op-eds reveal how their experts “interpret current trends in
world affairs.”606 In addition, interviews with CIGI experts appear weekly on line and address
time-sensitive topics and world events in international governance. CIGI also produces books
which result from CIGI-sponsored projects or the work of CIGI fellows and scholars.

In an interview with Marion Arnaud from the International Coalition on the Responsibility to
Protect (ICRtoP) she spoke about how civil society was instrumental in taking the Commission’s
work beyond the UN approval. “In 2001, when the ICISS report was put together on the
Responsibility to Protect, the government of Canada was one of the ones really supportive of
these initiatives. They approached World Federalist Movement (WFM) and asked if they could
help them see if there was any appetite for this norm.” 607 (Which it did, of course). In New
York there was a group of five to six NGOs who started really pushing for its acceptance. This
group included Oxfam, Human Rights Watch, Refugees International, WFM and some other
groups. They started by talking about what it would take for the Responsibility to Protect to
605
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become more than just an idea. They really believed that without a bottom up process, and
without strong civil society input, it would not succeed. In that way it was similar to the
Landmines Treaty, where it needed a strong network or organization and thereby acted
accordingly.608
The ICRtoP and the World Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, New York is an
advocacy group that
brings together NGOs from all regions of the world to strengthen
for the Responsibility to Protect, further the understanding of
strengthened capacities to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity and mobilize NGOs to push for action
Responsibility to Protect country-specific situations.609

normative consensus
the norm, push for
ethnic cleansing and
to save lives in the

ICRtoP is important in its focus on the norm and the dissemination of information surrounding
the norm – its implementation and its potential use, including the three pillar approach. It has
produced multiple documents and advises on events as they occur in the United Nations, regional
groups, other NGOs as well as think tank activities concerned with the Responsibility to Protect.
Marion Arnaud (ICRtoP) suggested there was a two-pronged approach – relationship building to
create a coalition and the creation of a more research-oriented and high level advocacy center.
She explained that is why they have the global center which incorporates many more groups.
WFM encouraged groups who worked on similar missions to push the idea of the Responsibility
to Protect forward. NGO colleagues worked to be sure the Responsibility to Protect would be
supported in the outcome document. Governments from southern countries, such as South
Africa and Mexico also influenced the General Assembly to adopt the world summit document.
This was not a small accomplishment. In fact, it was a historical achievement reached after
608
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many weeks of negotiation. Unfortunately, however, now it has become a partisan issue in
Canada.610
Marion Arnaud talked about their project on UN reform and UN elections. She suggested it is
beneficial in terms of looking at how civil society can lobby for better accountability,
transparency and information.611 Reinforcing the idea that the Responsibility to Protect is not
just ‘a Western idea.’ Ms. Arnaud also indicated that in West Africa it was very easy to
introduce the concept because they already had been considering it but just did not have the right
words to formulate it:
The African Union had endorsed the concept of R2P. The culture of response is
different everywhere, however, which is a major question when it comes to the
universality of the concept. We essentially tried to make the language part of the UN.
We think it is crucial to engage NGOs because they are the ones talking to the region.
We tried to have a consultative method of working with five goals for the coalition:
increase awareness of R2P among governments, NGOs and the public; push for
international, regional and sub-regional and national endorsements of R2P; encourage
governments, regional and subregional organizations and the UN to build the capacity to
prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
help build and strengthen global support from governments for RtoP; and, push for action
to save lives in RtoP country-specific situations.612
Now there are 40 organizations with very different mandates.

Some of ICRtoPs closest

partners from civil society include the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect,
Global Action to Prevent War, United Nations – Sweden, World Federation of United Nations
Association, and Human Rights Watch, among others. Although they have a variety of different
mandates, these groups are embracing the Responsibility to Protect as a framework and linking
their mandates to it.613 Naomi Kikoler of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at
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the City University of New York spoke of the co-convening of events and the regular back and
forth interaction.614 Having shared goals helps them to maximize their impact. They also
educate other NGOs on the Responsibility to Protect so they can be supportive of it.615
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect was founded in 2008 by a number of
supportive governments, as well as leaders who come from the human rights community. Some
of the main organizations involved include the International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch,
Oxfam International, Refugees International, and WFM-Institute for Global Policy.616 The
mission of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect is to create the principle of the
Responsibility to Protect into a practical guide for action in the face of human atrocities. The
Centre approaches its goal through the use of advocacy in the case of specific humanitarian
crises, engages in research regarding the Responsibility to Protect, and helps states build
capacity. It works closely with other NGOs, governments and regional bodies whose goals are
to implement the Responsibility to Protect. The Global Centre serves as a resource and a forum
for governments, international organizations and NGOs.
With regard to his organization, Ian Davis of NATO Watch referred to mechanisms such as
‘shadow summits’ to NATO’s own summit.617 NATO Watch Ross-shire UK is an independent,
not-for-profit ‘virtual’ think tank which examines the role of NATO in public life and advocates
for more openness, transparency and accountability within the Alliance. NATO Watch was
614
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founded by Dr. Davis in 2009 and was launched at an inaugural Shadow NATO Summit in
Brussels in the spring of 2009. NATO Watch engages in research and analysis of policy
questions, provides a news briefing service, distributes a monthly e-journal of media stories on
NATO policy and activities, provides opinions, sponsors conferences and events, including an
annual shadow NATO Summit and provides consultancy and workshops. Its mission is to
increase transparency, to stimulate engagement and increase participation in NATO’s policy
making. By creating networks of individuals and institutions it aspires to reform NATO in ways
that include shared democratic and humanitarian values, including human rights and civil
liberties, the Responsibility to Protect, transparency and the promotion of peace and cooperative
security approaches as well as strengthening international law.618
The vision for NATO Watch states that “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [is] at
the heart of a new ‘moral, muscular multilateralism,’ a cooperative approach to world problems
that uses international organizations and law to the fullest.”619 NATO Watch relies on voluntary
associates and partners. It receives no large-scale or government funding and depends on
donations. Its work includes policy input to strengthen NATO’s approaches to conflict
prevention, crisis management, peace building, arms control and disarmament and cooperation
with non-members (particularly Russia).

Bob Zuber, Global Action to Prevent Wars, discussed how his organization interacted with every
part of the UN system on a daily basis.
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The interaction we have is informal. We have off-the-record briefings and so on. Clearly
they do not give us credit for what we do but there are ways we can see a concrete impact
from our work, whether it is in delegations or UN staffers.620
Global Action to Prevent War is an emerging transnational network (according to my
classification, an applied conflict resolution centre) dedicated to practical measures for reducing
global levels of conflict and to removing the institutional and ideological impediments to ending
armed violence and severe human rights violations. A few years ago they held a four day event
on the ‘third pillar’ of the Responsibility to Protect, in part as preparation for an upcoming
General Assembly Debate on that same topic. Global Action has been working to create
collaborative activities in national capitals, and also occasionally co-organizes events in New
York that “help diplomats to clarify responsibilities and allow fresh voices from diverse regions
to address UN officials and diplomatic missions on their security concerns and interests.”621
Their focus tends to be on both complementary (regional and secretariat) mandates for atrocity
crime prevention as well as specific capacity requirements for the ‘early and decisive response’
to the threat of such atrocities. Two events they held focused on peace building strategies and the
linkages between the gender and Responsibility to Protect communities. New York partners
include the World Federation of UN Associations, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the ICRtoP,
the WFM as well as overseas participants from Armenia, Belgium, Brazil, Cote d’Ivoire,
Nigeria, the UK and Venezuela.622 They have also produced an ‘E Book’ entitled
“Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach.”
The book features essays by Melina Lito and Robert Zuber with contributions from Daniel Fiott
of Madariaga College of Europe Foundation and Joachim Koops of the Global Governance
Institute.
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VI.2

Difference between the Responsibility to Protect and Humanitarian Intervention

Louise Frechette, also of CIGI, suggested one of the key distinctions between the Responsibility
to Protect as a formal principle and humanitarian intervention is that human intervention started
long before the term was coined with early interventions after the Cold War. Somalia and
Bosnia were two examples of the decision to deploy international forces - not to take control of a
territory but to provide assistance to civilians in civil conflict. Somalia was threatened and
Bosnia attempted to provide humanitarian relief and protect citizens. “Therefore, she notes, the
notion of protection predates the concept itself.”623
Kyle Matthews of the Montreal Institute for Genocidal Studies (MIGS) expressed some caution
regarding the influence of academics regarding the Responsibility to Protect.
We have spent time looking at the academic field of inquiry. We have found academic
input to be pretty general. They are much more categorical than the situation permits.
Their careers are about talking to other academics. Most academics are at arm’s length
while our job is to get into the nuance of things. We make that disclaimer to all the
academics who call us.624
VI.3

NGOs and the UN

While NGOs appeal to their own governments as well as governments of different nations, a
very important part of their influence is with regard to the UN as a key international
organization. It is this relationship that is instrumental in furthering the doctrine and in rounding
out the governance relations between civil society, state and international institutions.
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Lucie Edwards (CIGI) spoke of a specific instance where NGOs influenced the UN.
In Nepal during the Maoist insurgency a state of emergency was declared. Political
parties were suspended. All of the NGOs systematically set up a large operation in Nepal
and NGOs became their eyes and ears.625

VI.4

NGOs and Global Governance

What is interesting is that in the Commission Report there was some criticism of the place of
NGOs in the development of the norm. The Report, in reference to NGOs, states
.”..they are seen often as lacking in policy making experience, frequently as unhelpfully
divided...and sometimes reluctant publicly (as distinct from privately) to endorse coercive
measures which may be necessary.”626
In my view the authors failed in some ways to see the increasingly important role that
nongovernmental actors would play, both then and now. My own experience with the
individuals I interviewed and their organizations and research on NGOs as norm entrepreneurs
generally presents a different perspective of professionalism and cooperation along with an
understanding of the need for coercive action under certain circumstances. They have shown
their strong support for a principle of great significance in a world that has now agreed to end
genocide and other human atrocities.
Because of the growth of civil society, international and global governance is no longer restricted
to government or intergovernmental institutions like the UN and the EU. Many institutions
function in between individual citizens and family and government.627 The shift is from
government to governance, or global governance and states. Intergovernmental organizations no
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longer hold all the political power and NGO capabilities are growing rapidly. Not only do they
carry out traditional advocacy and humanitarian activities they also are involved in observing
governmental institutions, lobbying, standard setting and monitoring. Over 2700 NGOs are
registered with ECOSOC.628
Mertus explores the potential for “bottom up” democracy that means the participation of social
movements in the development, articulation and application of international norms.629 According
to this view, state structures are not the only organizational form in transformative social change.
Transnational and non-state entities do wield influence over the development of new legal norms
and participate in their acceptance as legitimate and authoritative. These “interpretive
communities create law and give law meaning through their own narratives and precepts...not
only do they have access to discourse over changing norms, but also to some extent they are the
discourse.”630 The transnational activities and networks they are involved in are used
strategically to support their own goals.631 Certain human rights treaties and other governmental
documents form the basis of their advocacy and provide authority for international norms that
may be conceived of as law.632
While the Responsibility to Protect focuses on the obligations of states to provide meaningful
human security, much of the concept and policy development, as well as the actual application of
the concepts (prevention, reacting, rebuilding) is being carried out by these Nongovernmental
Organizations and their coalitions. It is becoming apparent that the provision of human security
has expanded beyond the borders of the state and has contributed to the improvement of the
international community’s ability to prevent mass human rights abuses and genocide.
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Because of their participation in governance, Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) have the
potential to create a more democratic global government. Ironically, however, states that could
benefit most from the presence of NGOs are those that suppress them. The son of Omar
Gaddafi, for example, wrote in his PhD thesis that authoritarian governments do not represent
their people’s interest because they exclude them from the decision-making process.633 Obiora
Okafor (2004) reminds us that some NGOs are struggling under repressive governments making
it harder for their influence to be heard or seen. This does not mean that these governments are
totally impervious to social pressure. As a result of accessibility issues, however, such
organizations have not been approached, leaving a gap in the research possibly to be filled later
if the government situation changes as it has in Libya, for example.
It is clear from the above that NGOs have taken their role of norm entrepreneurs in support of the
Responsibility to Protect seriously and have been and continue to be critical in the understanding
and evolution of the norm. Let us then take a longer look at the responses from those being
interviewed with regard to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal
entity, a fundamental question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary
international law. It is the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect
that I sought to get that helps us to deconstruct the evolution of the principle from an idea or
concept to a legal norm.
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Chapter Eight continues the analysis of the responses from those being interviewed with regard
to whether they see the Responsibility to Protect as a moral or a legal entity, a fundamental
question with regard to its status as lex ferenda or lex lata and customary international law. It is
the perception of those experts working with the Responsibility to Protect that I sought to assist
in the purpose of deconstructing the evolution of the principle from an idea or concept to a legal
norm. It also seeks the views of those interviewed on the UN and its role as either a facilitator or
an obstruction to the implantation of the Responsibility to Protect.
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Chapter Eight: Is the Responsibility to Protect a
Legal or a Moral Entity?
I.

Addressing the Main Question

This Chapter focuses on the outcome of interviews with individuals and representatives of
organizations regarding the legal status of the responsibility to protect. The principle clearly has
a legal formulation as well as a social and moral one as it evolves from an ‘idea or concept’ to a
legal norm. The objective of the thesis is to trace its evolution.. The research was designed to
explore more fully the nature of the legality of the Responsibility to Protect by sounding out the
interviewees on the basis of their knowledge and expertise. I was particularly interested to
discover how they perceived its development. Do they see it as having achieved legal status or
as a principle that relies upon moral values and ‘soft law.’ Also, I was interested to hear how it
had evolved from their perspective. What factors drive it closer to customary law.
My question of whether the Responsibility to Protect is a moral or a legal entity solicited a
number of different responses. Respondents tended to consider the question in different ways. I
interpret this difference in part to the way the question was phrased. It might have been better
posed as “Is it a moral or a legal entity, or both?” since to many, it was neither moral nor legal,
but was a combination of aspects of both. I see this as illustrative of the ambiguity resulting from
its soft law status. For some the definition of legality rests on the signing of treaties, or on
customary international law. Others consider if a resolution is passed which involves the
authorization of the Security Council and the UN Charter this gives it sufficient legal validation.
While interviewees were certainly pragmatic when it comes to the interests of states and highly
aware of realpolitik, most hesitated to suggest this was the sole driving force behind the
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Responsibility to Protect which stands, they felt, ultimately upon a ‘universal moral principle’.
This emphasized in their mind it has not yet reached a strictly legal status.
One of the consistent responses was that while there had been interventions that infringed on the
sovereign authority of the state, with the introduction of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect
the principle of a universal right of a state to sovereignty was formally challenged. The problem,
however, is that the Responsibility to Protect has developed baggage because of connotations
associated with military and humanitarian intervention (for example Iraq in 1991; UNAMIR in
Rwanda, 1994; and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999). The Responsibility to Protect, in
some persons’ minds, legitimates the idea of the militarization of human rights. From this
perspective, there is a lot of moral ambiguity, making any advance to legal status difficult. Ian
Davis (NATO Watch) noted that “in the south a lot of people see the Responsibility to Protect as
a Trojan Horse which gives the colonial powers the right to intervene in their sovereign
affairs.”634
Kyle Matthews responded that he sees the Responsibility to Protect as a political concept or a
policy, rather than a legal doctrine, although the responsibility to prevent or react is partially
imbedded in the Genocide Convention.635 When genocide is taking place there is clearly a
responsibility to act. The ICISS report in 2001 is much more of a policy dealing with
sovereignty in a responsible manner. It is also tied to the ICC and the prosecution of perpetrators
which places it in a legal framework.636 Jillian Siskind (CLAIHR) maintained a similar
perspective. There is law and politics, rules and realities. The Responsibility to Protect is at the
very early stages of international law. “In order for anything to be recognized as international
634
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law it has to be based in convention or custom and you have to see how widely a practice is
implemented.”637
Bill Graham, speaking at the Ten Years After Conference, referred to the legal status of the
Responsibility to Protect. He suggested the question in the Kosovo conflict was how they could
justify what they were doing in terms of the legal status of the intervention. It was said what
they were doing was illegal. What became more important, however, was a notion of
legality/illegality versus legitimacy. The illegality of a decision emphasized the necessity of
Security Council approval. Some think the elasticity of the Responsibility to Protect makes it
merely a principle, but one can argue it is one tool in the legal toolbox along with the ICC. On
the other hand, “R2P as a moral concept includes the concept of prevention, development aid and
capacity building in relation to R2P.”638

Louise Frechette (CIGI) pointed out when the Security Council takes a decision under Chapter
VII it becomes mandatory but this does not mean it is mandatory on every member state. A
Chapter VII decision of the Security Council that authorizes an action taking all necessary means
creates a legal directive but does not force on each member state the need to send soldiers. The
decision to participate in the military action is up to each individual state.639
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On the other hand, Khalid Koser, the Geneva Center for Security Policy Studies (GCSPS)
commented “You cannot have purely ethical motives for intervening. There must be more.
Motivations will always be mixed.”640 The GCSPS is a research think tank founded in 1995 as an
international organization primarily for the purpose of promoting peace, security and stability
through training, research and dialogue. The Centre trains diplomats, military officials,
international civil servants and NGO staff in the fields of security and peace making. Through
research. Publications, conferences and workshops, the GCSPS provides an international forum
for dialogue for policy decision making.641
GCSPS participants come from Foundation Council members, including countries in transition,
in post conflict transition or at risk. Faculty and staff are composed of both academics and
practitioners who come from a wide range of countries, disciplines and interests. Their work
includes a wide range of book publications, peer-reviewed journals and other specialised
publications. Faculty members also act as commentators and analysts in the media.
Naomi Kikoler described the Responsibility to Protect “as a political concept that has a moral
basis and in the future might have a legal status but it does not to date. There is no enforcement
mechanism.”642 She considered the treaty aspect of international law and expressed doubt that
the Responsibility to Protect would ever be treaty-based. She added that it would have to
become customary international humanitarian law which would require a consistent invocation

640

Khalid Koser interview, The Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva Switzerland, February 21, 2011 Dr.
Khalid Koser is Deputy Director and Academic Dean at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy. He is also NonResident Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution, Associate Fellow at Chatham House,
Research Associate at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, and Non-Resident
Fellow at the Lowy Institute in Sydney.
641
The Geneva Centre for Security Studies. http://www.gcsp.ch/About-Us/Contact
642
Interview with Naomi Kikoler, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the City University of New
York, New York, November 9, 2011.

212

of the language in situations where populations are at risk along with action taken to protect
civilians as opposed to one-off situations.643
As can be read from the responses, the legal status of the Responsibility to Protect may be said to
be ‘open to interpretation.’ Nevertheless, the study of the principle of the Responsibility to
Protect must consider its legal validity. As outlined earlier, according to Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice, the sources of international law are “limited to international
treaties, custom and general principles of law. Customary international law requires a general
practice of States accompanied by opinio juris.644 Resolutions of the General Assembly such as
that applying the Responsibility to Protect in Article 138 and 139 do not create new rules of
customary international law as such but rather function as a starting point, frame or concept for
the establishment or creation of international law. As I have stated, the responsibility
framework is yet to be considered as customary law but may become so if it can be said to have
been applied according to its fundamental principles of acceptance by the UN often enough. The
review of Security Council resolutions which follows and the case study of its application to be
conducted in the next chapter helps us to see more clearly how far it has come.
The legal status of the Responsibility to Protect, while not necessarily imbedded in international
public law as yet, is clearly an aspect of norm development and soft law transnationally. Over
and above international law, an example of state practice, especially as evidenced by some of the
actions taken by the UN Security Council since 2005 and the reaffirmation of the principle
illustrates the growing recognition that humanitarian crises, even if confined to one state, can be
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considered threats to international peace and security. These threats justify the involvement of
the international community and the need for legal measures.645
II.

Security Council Resolutions

The following resolutions since 2005 provide examples of actions taken by the international
community concerning the protection of civilians and the Responsibility to Protect, commencing
in 2006 and subsequent to its approval in the UN Outcome Document in 2005. While there is no
‘threshold number’ to identify when a norm becomes law, these resolutions do demonstrate that
the Responsibility to Protect is not yet an empty vessel, negated and forgotten by the
international community.
Table 4: Responsibility to Protect Security Council Resolutions
DATE

DOCUMENT #

SITUATION OR ISSUE

TEXT

27 January
2006

S/RES/1653

DRC or Burunch

28 April 2006

S/RES/1674

POC

31 August
2006

S/RES/1706

Sudan(Darfur)

11 November
2009

S/RES/1894

POC

“Underscores that the governments in the region
have a primary responsibility to protect their
populations”
“Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome
Document regarding the responsibility to protect
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity”
“Recalling also its previous resolutions 1325
(2000) on women, peace and security, 1502
(2003) on the protection of humanitarian and
United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on
children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on
the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which
reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs
138 and 139 of the of the 2005 United Nations
World Summit outcome document”
“Reaffirming the relevant provisions of the 2005
World Summit Outcome Document regarding the
protection of civilians in armed conflict, including
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26 February
S/RES/1970
2011
17 March 2011 S/RES/1973

30 March 2011 S/RES/1975

8 July 2011

S/RES/1996

21 October
2011
27 October
2011

S/RES/2014
S/RES/2016

12 March 2012 S/RES/2040

19 December
2012
6 March 2013

S/RES/2085
S/RES/2093

12 March 2013 S/RES/2095

25 April 2013

S/RES/2100

11 July 2013

S/RES/2109

paragraphs 138 and 139 thereof regarding the
responsibility to protect populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity
Libya
“Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to
protect its population,”
Libya
“Reiterating the responsibility of the Libyan
authorities to protect the Libya population and
reaffirming that parties to armed conflicts bear the
primary responsibility to take all feasible steps to
ensure the protection of civilians.”
Cote d’Ivoire
“Reaffirming the primary responsibility of each
State to protect civilians and reiterating that
parties to armed conflicts bear the primary
responsibility to take all feasible steps to ensure
the protecting of civilians…”
South Sudan
“Advising and assisting the Government of the
Republic of South Sudan, including military and
police at national and local levels as appropriate,
in fulfilling the responsibility to protect civilians.”
Yemen
“Recalling the Yemeni Government’s primary
responsibility to protect civilians.”
Libya
“…underscores the Libyan authorities’
responsibility for the protection of the population
including foreign nations and African migrants.”
Libya
“…underscores the Libyan authorities’ primary
responsibility for the protection of Libya’s
population
Mali
“(d) To support the Malian authorities in their
primary responsibility to protect the population;”
Somalia
“Recognizing that the Federal Government of
Somalis has a responsibility to protect its citizens
and build its own national security forces.”
Libya
“…underscores the Libyan government’s primary
responsibility for the protection of Libya’s
population, as well as foreign nationals, including
African migrants;
Mali
“Reiterates that the transnational authorities have
the primary responsibility to protect civilians in
Mali.”
Sudan/South Sudan “Recalling the Presidential Statement of 12
February 2013 that recognized that States bear the
primary responsibility to protect civilians as well
as to respect and ensure the human rights of all
individuals within their territory and subject to
their jurisdiction as provided for by relevant
215

international law, reaffirmed that parties to armed
conflict bear the primary responsibility to take all
feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians

Resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2016 concerning Libya will be discussed more fully in Chapter
Nine. UN Resolution 1674646 was adopted unanimously on April 28, 2006, after reaffirming
previous resolutions concerning the protection of civilians in armed conflict and calling for cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations. The Council stressed the need
for a comprehensive approach to the prevention of armed conflict and its recurrence.
The Council regretted that civilians accounted for the majority of the victims during armed
conflict, and was concerned about the impact of the illicit trade in weapons on the population.
The resolution recognized the role of regional organizations in the protection of civilians and
reaffirmed that all parties to armed conflict had an obligation to protect the civilian population.
Provisions of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the Responsibility to
Protect were reaffirmed. The resolution demanded that all parties to armed conflict adhere to
The Hague Conventions and the Geneva Conventions including Protocols I and II ending
impunity for all states to comply with their obligations in this respect. It further stated all
countries had to comply with the demands of the Security Council. The Council further required
special attention be given to the protection of civilians in post-conflict situations during peace
processes.
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The resolution recognized the important role of regional and intergovernmental organization
regarding the protection of civilians. It indicated that steps would be taken in the case of the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1674 Protection of civilians during armed conflict
and in peace settlements post conflicts April 2006; deliberate targeting of civilians and protected
persons. It also reaffirmed Articles 138 and 139 of the Responsibility to Protect in the Summit
Outcome document 2005. Algeria, China and Russia initially opposed the resolution but
objections from China and Russia were eventually overcome.
Resolution 1706 determines “that the situation in the Sudan continues to constitute a threat to
international peace and security.”647 It agrees to a peacekeeping force of more than 20,000 UN
peacekeepers on the ground to protect civilians in Darfur in the Sudan (August 31, 2006). The
resolution reaffirms the commitment to ensuring the security of women, humanitarian aid and
UN workers, and children in Darfur and builds upon the existing UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)
on the ground. The resolution provides for a peacekeeping force on the ground to protect
civilians, humanitarian aid workers and children. Resolution 1706 also reaffirmed paragraphs
138 and 139 of the Summit Outcome document regarding the Responsibility to Protect. The
resolution expressed deep concern over the recent deterioration of relations between the Sudan
and Chad and called on the Governments of the two countries to abide by the agreement.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1996 was adopted unanimously on July 8, 2011.648
The independence of South Sudan from Sudan was recognized and the (UNMISS) established.649
The mandate of UNMISS was to consolidate peace and security. The resolution reaffirmed its
647
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strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and national unity of
the Republic of South Sudan and affirmed national responsibility as key to establishing
sustainable peace for post-conflict peace building. The resolution presented an approach to peace
consolidation which addressed the underlying causes of the conflict and the principles of security
and development. It expressed its displeasure with the effect on the conflict on the civilian
population, and stressed the need for peace building.

Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter UNMISS was established for an initial period of one year
with possible renewals. The focus of UNMISS was to be on security and development, peace
consolidation and state-building, conflict resolution, the protection of civilians, establishing the
rule of law and strengthening the security and justice sector.650 The resolution allowed for the use
of "all necessary means" to enforce its mandate. It also noted “the importance of sustained
cooperation and dialogue with civil society.”651 In ensuring the protection of civilians, the
resolution referenced the delivery of core government functions, including settling political
disputes peacefully, and the use of existing national facilities to stress national ownership of this
process. The UN is intended to cooperate with national authorities to prevent a return to violence
and support national peace building including human rights and the rule of law. The resolution
demands that all forms of violence and human rights abuses against the civilian population in
South Sudan be stopped, in particular gender-based violence, and abuses against children. It
requires the renewal of the action plan signed in 2009 to end the recruitment and use of child
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soldiers. It promotes women’s leadership and women’s organizations and counters “negative
societal attitudes about women’s capacity to participate equally.” 652

Resolution 2014 expressed serious concern over the situation in Yeman yet reaffirmed the strong
commitment to the unity, sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Yemen. It
encouraged all sides to reach a peaceful resolution. It expressed the need for a comprehensive,
independent impartial investigation consistent with international standards into alleged human
rights abuses and violations, with a view to avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability.
It condemned the use of force against unarmed demonstrators, and called for an immediate
ceasefire and “the formation of a commission to investigate the events that led to the killing of
innocent Yemeni people.”653 It called for the effective participation of women at all stages of the
peace-processes and in conflict resolution. It expressed concern for the existence of Al-Queda in
the region with a determination to address this threat according to the UN Charter and
international law including applicable human rights, refugee and humanitarian law. It demands
that action be taken to end attacks against civilians and civilian targets.
These resolutions illustrate the growing recourse to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect
and strengthens the argument for consideration of the norm as customary international law. As I
have stated earlier the UN is critical to its development. According to this interpretation,
unilateral action or even collective efforts do not award the principle with the needed legitimacy
to move it from soft law to hard law. For some, this lack of a legal framework continues to serve
as an impediment. For example, Carolyn McAskie commented:
To my mind the impediments are both legal and practical. We still do not have a formal
legal framework that defines when and how you can intervene. I do not think we will ever
652
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have a formal criteria. What you will have instead is a case by case argument whereby a
situation will reach a point where some member states will lead a discussion and a decision
will be made that enough people can live with. It is impossible to have that discussion in a
formal situation of member states. Governments will not discuss conditions under which
they can intervene. They are just too nervous. Having the Commission study the question
and come up with the concept was the best way. Perhaps we need a second commission
now. We need a mechanism outside member states to look at what implementation
means.654

III.

The UN – A Facilitator or an Impediment?

One of the interview questions directed toward respondents was about their perception of the
UNs role in the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect. In the question of the implementation
of the Responsibility to Protect, I regard the UN as an institution that can potentially ensure the
fairest deliberations to achieve a collective decision that all member states will regard as binding
upon them. Developing a consensus on military or other forms of intervention involves the full
collective mechanisms of the UN. However, to be legitimate, the decision must include active
consultation with key Third World States, must be transparent, and must involve the
international community. Decisions are made on a case by case basis according to whether the
criteria have been met; i.e., actual or threatened large-scale loss of human life, human atrocities
or ethnic cleansing or war crimes.655

654

Carolyn McAskie interview, Dec. 8, 2011 Carolyn McAskie, OC is described on the University of Ottawa web
page as an “inspiring and influential model of Canadian values in the international community”, Carolyn McAskie
has had an illustrious career with the United Nations, having served in various capacities including Assistant
Secretary General for Peace building Support. Prior to her appointment with the United Nations, Ms. McAskie had
a distinguished career with the Federal Government of Canada as a senior executive. She has earned a reputation as
an effective international diplomat and negotiator in humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping and peace building.
655
Chimni, B.S. “Sovereignty, Rights, and Armed Intervention: A Dialectical Perspective,” Chapter 10. In
Charlesworth, Hilary and Jean-Marc Coicaud, (Eds) Fault Lines of International legitimacy (Cambridge University
Press: New York, 2010) p. 303.

220

At the same time it is clearly very difficult to get all states to agree.656 Pressure is often placed
on states showing hesitation to respect human rights and to make the individual its moral and
political subject. However, this has not always been effective.657 Russia and China, for
example, have in the past argued in favor of diplomatic channels and mediation over peace
enforcement (needless to say good principles) but as one can see in the case of the 2012 Syrian
conflict thousands are dying in the interim leading to questions with regard to Russia’s true
motivation. Tensions have been further exacerbated by the struggle over Ukraine. The fact that
the Permanent Five (P5) have veto power and can block intervention and other UN actions for
narrow political reasons can be a major impediment in cases of the potential implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect.658
A brief history of the veto will aid the reader in his or her comprehension of the significance of
the veto within the Security Council. The veto dated back to 1945 from the foundation of the
League of Nations in 1920 where each member of the League Council, whether permanent or
non-permanent, had a veto on any non-procedural issue. By 1936 there were in effect 15 vetoes,
which proved to be one of the defects of the League by making action impossible. When the UN
came into being, it had already been decided at the UN's founding conference in 1944, that
Britain, China, the Soviet Union and the United States, and, "in due course" France, should be
the permanent members of any newly formed Council. France had been defeated and occupied
by Germany (1940–44), but its role as a permanent member of the League of Nations, its status
as a colonial power and its support for the allies gave it status with the other four.659 The five
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permanent members of the Security Council enjoy the privilege of veto power. Veto power
means that any permanent member can prevent the adoption, by the Council, of any draft
resolutions on "substantive" matters.
Chapter 5 of the UN Charter was the official step in setting up the Security Council dominated
by the five Great Powers that were the victors in World War II. The majority prefer to enlarge
the Council with additional nonpermanent members in order to achieve better representation of
regions, and of diverse kinds of states – poor as well as rich, small as well as large, which can
then create a Council that can act credibly and legitimately.660 Those who support the status quo
often insist that the most powerful countries must be given special privileges at the UN to keep
them involved in the organization. Critics argue the power balances have shifted.
Many reformers, like Colombia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, would like to limit or
do away with the veto and even with permanent membership itself believing “The right to veto
undermines the principle of sovereign equality of states as provided in the Charter." 661 This
power has been intensely controversial since the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945. However,
without the veto privilege the United States and Russia would probably not have accepted the
creation of the United Nations. Many years later there is still active debate regarding the role of
the Security Council, its membership and its work.662
The Council has the authority to make decisions that authorize military action to deal with
threats to the peace as well as acts of aggression:
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... although subsidiary responsibility arguably falls to the General Assembly, the Security
Council was designed to serve as an instrument of action whenever a unanimous vote of
the great powers revealed the existence of a consensus, and a forum for negotiation
whenever the use of the veto revealed the absence of a consensus. In the era of the Cold
War, the Council has had more frequent occasion to function in the latter capacity than in
the former.663
The veto meant the Council was intended to have both executive and diplomatic functions.
However, the veto can be abused by the permanent members in such a way when interpreting
resolutions to allow them to abdicate their responsibilities for peace and security. This
undermines the authority of the Council.664
The veto allows the five Permanent Members to block action on all substantive issues, including
appointment of the Secretary General and revisions of the Charter itself.
The Council enjoys a unique authority under international law. Its decisions stand largely
unchallenged by the World Court or the General Assembly. Its resolutions (unlike those
of the GA) are binding on the UN member states and though they are not always obeyed
– they define what is acceptable conduct (and what is not) in the international arena. 665
Chances of changing the veto are slim since the Permanent Members are in a position to block
the necessary changes in the Charter. In the early years the Security Council mainly dealt with
cases of war between states. But today, it most often takes up conflicts or crises internal to
member states which sometimes lead to intervention.
When I inquired in my interviews what could be done about Russia and China’s veto regarding
efforts to take a stronger stance by the UN Security Council on Syria, one of the main methods
described as a possible response was “shaming” them into conformity through embarrassment or
guilt. Cognitive dissonance theory is often used to explain behavior of actors who experience
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dissonance and thereby try to reduce it by changing their behaviour.666 The difficulty presented
by the veto, however, should not be seen as an immutable impediment to the implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect – as we will see in Libya, it can work and even if nations are
hesitant, they can abstain rather than vote against a resolution. One successful application is
better than none.667
The lack of an institutional authority is an aspect of the discussions concerning global
governance, international organizations and particularly the United Nations. As one of the most
important international institutions, the UN is looked to for leadership. Many of the NGOs,
while wary of its weaknesses, acknowledge its central role. At the same time they remain aware
of its lack of authority to settle differences between states who must decide in the Security
Council when an intervention must be made (and here I speak not only of military intervention
but also of diplomatic endeavors and other soft methods of conflict resolution.)
Problems can also arise when negative motivations are wrongly attributed to individual states or
actors, however, particularly when motivations cannot be proven by empirical means. One can
listen to the arguments for intervening or can look at the outcome but it still often involves a
subjective interpretation of the legitimacy of the decision or action. In order to achieve
agreement at the UN in 2005 on the basis of the ICISS Report, it seems fair to say that states
permitted humanitarian motives to trump the sovereignty principle. A preponderance of states
reached an agreement which rendered international morality coterminous with international
law.668 The achievement of such a coherent system of convictions at the world level was
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immensely challenging due to cultural, social and political differences and thus a momentous
occasion in its occurrence.
However, when crises erupt such as that of Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2012 and when the
Responsibility to Protect is invoked, the motives for action and the questions of legitimacy come
under serious debate once again. With regard to the Responsibility to Protect, whether motives
are perceived to be on the basis of moral, human rights and humanitarian principles or in the
perceived self-interest and imperialist actions of states, the matter is debated inside and outside
the Security Council by states themselves, NGOs, academics, diplomats and international
scholars. These debates flood the literature surrounding the Responsibility to Protect.
In deciding whether or not to act, the Council, guided by the broader international community
and transnational organizations, must consider a number of criteria including the legality, fair
substantive and procedural preconditions, as well as any peaceful and democratic means of
resolving the conflict.669 In addition, however, the state is responsible to their constituents in the
domestic environment. This being the case, questions of self-interest versus morality, values,
ethics and universal principles must inevitably enter into the deliberation. If one argues that
morality must prevail this opens the door to matters of universal morality and any statements
such as neocolonialism or imperialism that oppose any such ideal.670
The UN is a key international organization. While it is understood that it is not perfect, it is in a
strategic position to contribute to the legitimacy of any effort to implement the Responsibility to
Protect. Could we bypass it? No. Can we improve it? Yes. Clearly the Security Council
approval is seen by many as essential. Kyle Matthews and others interviewed addressed the
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limitations, and the need for expansion of the Security Council to include countries like India,
Brazil, South Africa and India as political interests change. As the Council currently stands, it
can be very difficult to get the agreement necessary for a Responsibility to Protect resolution and
there is no overarching authority to enforce it. The veto stands to bring talks of action (even
non-military action) to an end, as has been the case, for example, with Russia and China
regarding any action in Syria. In terms of improvement, one of the proposals one hears is that
there should be some agreement that member states cannot apply their veto in cases where
genocide is taking place. Kyle Matthews admits, however, to being a realist about the likelihood
that countries won’t want to let go of that power which both shields and protects them.671
Those interviewed spoke of some of the weaknesses of the UN, including the absence of an
enforcement capacity, a standing army, peacekeeping missions, and the equipment and resources
necessary to deal with mass atrocities. Michael Ignatieff addressed the problem of
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect and stated the UN Security Council has a terrible
track record and referred to the vetoes by China and Russia.
In Montreal I learned when there is proof that atrocity is going on often states do not
want to take the political risk. There is a lack of political will. Sovereignty was used to
justify inaction in the case of Rwanda. We need to act early on so that we are not forced
to use the military response. The UN does not have a strong enforcement capacity.672
Carolyn McAskie was pragmatic about the future of the UN, claiming
you are not going to get any structure in the UN other than the current one. The Security
Council has been built up since the Cold War in unimaginable ways. It already has
evolved enormously. What you can have is new ways for the Council to work and new
ways to involve other groups.673
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She also sees the legitimacy of the UN and the international community as the vehicle in the
broader sense for solving crises.

This is a legitimate role for the UN. The whole concept of the UN is to put an end to
poverty, and create peace and security. This is also the intention of the framers of the
Charter. If the Security Council is charged with working on behalf of the broader
membership to intervene and decides this is the place to do something then it has to be a
legitimate decision. (That does not prevent it from being a bad decision, of course).674
Marion Arnaud, in mentioning the goals of the coalition of NGOs, talked of the need to
encourage governments, regional and sub-regional organizations and the UN to build the
capacity to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.675
IV.

Reaching Consensus

Towards the conclusion of the interviews, individuals were asked what they considered to be the
major impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect at the international
level. One individual remarked that one of the most serious impediments to its implementation
is the negative view held by some individuals and some countries of the Responsibility to Protect
as a tool to be used by Western neo-imperialists or new-colonialists. Ian Davis commented
“R2P can be seen as Western interference.”676 Louise Frechette noted
Some countries, although they have signed on to the 2005 Summit Declaration, have
strong reservations regarding a law that allows other nations to meddle in their countries’
affairs. There is a significant number of countries that are quite hesitant about the
concept because they are developing countries.677
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This lack of trust can play out in a number of different ways, but often impedes crucial decisions
at the international level through the Security Council veto, and engenders a lack of political
will. This can be defensively framed as” the protection of state sovereignty.” 678 Kyle Matthews
also suggested one of the impediments to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect is
sovereignty and particularly the veto by China and Russia. He cited Rwanda as a terrible
example. Even when there is proof that atrocity is going on nations often do not want to take the
political risk. There is a lack of political will. Sovereignty was used to justify inaction in the
case of Rwanda; the problem was the prospect of infringing on Rwanda’s international
sovereignty. He also stated that, even when mass atrocities are taking place, states still use their
veto.679 Lucie Edwards suggested one of the major strategies for success is for there to be one
country that becomes the champion of the cause and that is willing to commit resources.680
The criticisms of the Responsibility to Protect are exacerbated by previous views of
humanitarian intervention. As a result, one of the impediments is the difficulty of gaining
consensus. “On a case by case basis getting consensus is the biggest stumbling block,”
commented Jillian Siskind.681 Another impediment concerns a misunderstanding of what
constitutes ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ where there is a belief that the Responsibility to Protect
necessarily means military action. The Responsibility to Protect military action is at the far end
of the spectrum in terms of the tool kit; there are sanctions, preventative deployment, and
mediation, among other means that come before that. While I have not explored these tools in
depth, they will be discussed in Chapter Ten, the concluding portion of the thesis, when we talk
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about conflict resolution in general and in particular and its relation to the Responsibility to
Protect.
V.

Can the Responsibility to Protect Principle be Firmly Upheld?

Do we conclude, as some have done, that the lack of an authoritative structure, the power
imbalance, the existence of the veto and differing state incentives make itmpossible for the
Responsibility to Protect principle to be firmly upheld?’ It seems that there are indeed
impediments and the objective of the thesis is to explore these impediments, as well as to
illustrate the interplay between what is intended to be a universal norm or a customary law and
the differing state incentives as they play out in the changing international environment. A
decision to implement the Responsibility to Protect is not a simple matter of invoking a universal
norm based upon an agreed upon moral value; the purpose behind the principle and the principle
itself can be easily overcome by realpolitik and the self-interest of states. Instead, cooperation is
essential to strengthen the universal norm but is often unattainable. In spite of its complexities
and the challenges that exist, Libya shows it can be achieved and that it does and should remain a
fundamentally important humanitarian world norm in the face of continued violence perpetrated
against civilians today in the case of weak or even oppressive governments.
E. H. Carr argues realism ultimately fails because it excludes moral judgments and emotional
appeals and the question of social purpose and legitimacy. The thesis thus addresses itself to
transnational actors and ways in which they are influenced by and make an impact on norms and
ideas. We can see where norms and rationality are intimately connected, particularly when we
examine the action of NGOs who consciously choose to take a moral position on a principle of
humanitarian intervention and then go about acting as its proponents in a strategic way.
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Utilizing a broadly constructivist approach of norm entrepreneurship, this chapter shows how
these NGOs have helped foster change in international law and politics.

Subtle alterations –

even transformations – have occurred in the nature of the ‘logics of appropriateness' and
sovereignty that had earlier been prevalent. 682 Understandings have been reformulated through
the efforts of NGOs. As a result of the work of civil society groups, legal norms, and principles
have been altered.683 While it is difficult to measure the impact that NGOs have (norm
entrepreneurship is not a science) and almost impossible to talk about causal outcomes; it is more
realistic to speak of factors in the human rights reformulations.
VI.

The Responsibility to Protect and Jus Post Bellum

Another area included in the interviews pertains to rebuilding after the fighting stops – what
should be the interveners involvement in rebuilding? These responses will be presented and
discussed in the last chapter as we look at what comes after the conflict ends (ius post bellum).
An important question pertains to the long term impact of military intervention and what will
happen when the military leave. The French way has been described as “Go in, do the job and
get out” – but is this the best way? The Rights Crises report finds that local NGOs are likely to
consult other international NGOs outside their own country if a crisis occurs. “Local NGOs and
organizations, particularly those that promote tolerance and create space to mediate social
tensions, need to be supported.684 A military force may not be properly trained to take on the task
of maintaining law and order in the long run and may even be reluctant to take on policing
duties. Human rights abuses may also need to be brought to justice, particularly if tribunals have
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been established.685 This can be particularly difficult if the military supporting the government
are themselves responsible for war crimes.
Long term commitments - plans to avoid future conflicts - are too often neglected. More
attention is given to exit strategies. State building is a costly and complex task and brings with it
fears of long term commitment. Local NGOs are often pushed by international NGOs because
they have more resources and more experience and often bring in their own programs. They also
have access to government and sometimes hire away local agency workers which further
weakens local NGOs.686 In the long run, a major question pertains to what are the post conflict
responsibilities of the interveners.
The next chapter, Chapter Nine, provides a case study of the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect in Libya in 2011 according to bona fide resolutions adopted by the UN
Security Council. It illustrates that the Responsibility to Protect remains a live principle and can
be agreed to in the UN (because of or in spite of) powerful states right to the use of the veto. The
conditions, however, in which the 'can' may be realised are, as the Libyan case illustrates,
extraordinarily complicated and raise questions about the legitimacy of an action in support of
the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect that must be addressed.
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Chapter Nine: On the Legitimacy of the Libyan Intervention
Adopting Resolution 1973 (2011) by a vote of ten in favor and none against with
five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India, Russian Federation) the Council
authorized Member states, acting nationally or through regional organizations or
arrangements, to take all necessary measures to protect all civilians under threat of
attack in the country, including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force
of any form on any part of Libyan territory – requesting them to immediately inform
the Secretary General of such measures.687

I.

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to assess whether Security Council Resolution 1973 and the
subsequent intervention into Libya in 2011 can be regarded as a ‘legitimate’ instance of the
forceful application of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. The determination of its legitimacy
involves an examination of the legitimacy of the ruling as well as its implementation and
outcome. In order to systematically examine the case, a legitimacy framework will be
established and a number of fundamental matters addressed concerning the primary factors
necessary to ascribe legitimacy to a ruling or action of this nature. Following this discussion, a
subsidiary set of concerns will be examined relating to motives and/or intent, legality, process,
and humanitarian outcomes.688
The first part of the analysis involves establishing the criteria that can be used to qualify an
action such as a humanitarian intervention as legitimate, beginning with a description of the
meaning of legitimacy. Different theories lead to different conceptions of the legitimacy of
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humanitarian intervention. In particular, pluralist and solidarist theories regarding the notion of
international intervention will be explored. The second question in this particular case will be
whether the action was taken according to the approved principle of the Responsibility to
Protect, as agreed to by the General Assembly at the 2005 UN Summit, and whether it can be
regarded as successful. The third question asks whether we can classify the 2011 intervention in
Libya as legitimate. Finally, why Libya and not elsewhere and does this really matter?
Other subsidiary questions arise in the process. Should military action that attempts to alleviate
humanitarian suffering, but fails, be considered as legitimate?689 Is the determination of
legitimacy a purely legal determination? Does it involve a moral determination? Is it “the
ostensibly humanitarian ‘outcome’ of the intervention or the humanitarian motivations of
interveners that legitimate the act?”690 Do motivations matter if the outcome is good?

What if it

is conducted with moral zeal but results in worsening the situation for those in need? The
discussion will outline the debate between motives and outcomes. In regard to these, we will
consider the doctrine of double effect:
The doctrine of double effect means that any action can have two possible effects – one
that is intended and one that is not. For example, in the case of self defense, an
individual may be attempting to save himself and in the process kills the attacker.
However, the lawful act of self defense is subject to the rules regarding proportionality;
otherwise, the killing of the other may be deemed unlawful. In the case of a war, those in
defense must be sure that the response is proportional to the attack. In humanitarian
intervention, the intent must be to save the lives of those under threat.691.
Are the motives totally ethical or are they in the interests of the nation? Does the action have
appropriate authority? Must it be UN-sanctioned or can it be a unilateral or a coalition of the
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willing? Can it be legitimate without the authorization of the Security Council? Must the
persuasive authority of the Secretary General within the UN be initiated?692
Overall the analysis of Resolution 1973 can be captured under three main questions: was the
intervention in Libya subject to due process, was it legitimate, and was it successful? I will
argue, as does Evans, that ultimately decisions in favor of the Responsibility to Protect must be
made on the basis of all three and must involve a combination of ideal values (idealism) and
hard-headed realism. 693 We will see that humanitarian intervention is thus caught up in the
“practical application of ideal standards in a flawed world.”694 The analysis concludes that Libya
represents such an instance of the practical and legitimate application of the Responsibility to
Protect.
II.

The Concept of Legitimacy

Schuman (1995) defines legitimacy as:
A generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper,
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and
definitions.695
It is really about who can do what and when and takes into consideration the context and moral
community in which the action occurs. The main thrust of this definition is toward the
institution that wields the power. My identification of legitimacy is concerned with assessing the
legitimacy of a ruling or approval of a particular resolution toward Libya made within the
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context of the UN (in this case concerning Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and events surrounding
them.) According to Koppell, in order for there to be normative (or moral) legitimacy “there
must be a shared set of beliefs.” 696 Without agreement among the players “moral legitimacy is
effectively impossible.” 697 The normative argument suggests that “(1) humankind are bound
together as a single moral community which transcends the sovereign state and a violation of
rights in one part of the world amounts to a violation of rights everywhere and (2) this world
requires a commitment to those people outside our own national boundaries in an ‘ethos of
responsibility.’”698 To some extent the existence of such a moral community which transcends
sovereignty represents the crux of the problem in the process involved. Some may critique this
as a very ‘Western’ and ‘Northern’ notion of community, but I am following the school of
thought that has led to agreement in the international and transnational community on the
existing principles of human rights, humanitarianism and indeed the Responsibility to Protect.
While they may not be absolutely ‘universal,’ they form the basis of much of current
international humanitarian law as described in earlier chapters.
One aspect of the determination of legitimacy is an emphasis on process. “The legitimacy of a
scientist or a scientific institution, for example, depends in large measure on a demonstrable
consistency with norms regarding the scientific method.”699 Legitimacy requires that the process
be in accordance with legal requirements and in this context the rules and regulations of the
UN.700 Our task is to consider, therefore, the action within the current international environment.
In addition to process, one can also talk about inputs versus outputs. We are concerned not only
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with the motivation or intent of a Responsibility to Protect decision but with the outcome and the
delivery of a public good ‘as promised.’701
Application of the Responsibility to Protect principle at the Security Council permits states to
legitimately employ military force against another state in order to protect civilians in danger. In
principle, the contemporary international society has come to view humanitarian intervention in
exceptional circumstances as a legitimate exception to the non-intervention rule through the
vehicle of the Responsibility to Protect principle. While the principle has been in acceptance
since 2005, its implementation remains contentious. I contend that the Libyan case is the first
time, in fact, the Responsibility to Protect has been truly applied as a forceful intervention into a
state’s sovereignty and that the action was successful; i.e. that it accomplished its purpose of
preventing genocide or further war crimes. It therefore becomes an important case study not
only in itself but in terms of its historical significance and the possible development of
customary law which ensues.
Due to its contentious nature, determining the legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention by the
application of a fixed formula of empirical standards is difficult and reaching a conclusion
without ambiguity almost impossible. Rather, it involves taking into account a broad set of
values and principles that can be applied and used to interpret the legitimacy of the action. This
process can be attributed to the complexity of the problem as well as the varied motives of the
parties concerned. Determining whether a particular humanitarian intervention is justified
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involves empirical analysis along with the consideration of moral, political and legal
perspectives.702
Furthermore, the obligations of states toward humanitarian intervention are still open to dispute.
As acknowledged, there is no absolute normative consensus. While the Responsibility to Protect
has shifted the possibilities in favor of humanitarian intervention, it is still necessary to argue a
compelling value or principle to create an exception to the rule of non-interference with state
sovereignty and to the peremptory principle of the non-use of force beyond the norm of self
defense articulated under Chapter VII in the Charter and in international law.

And further,

while the Responsibility to Protect principle exists, agreement to act still requires a
preponderance of states in agreement in the international community.
States must agree on the violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter for humanitarian
intervention, in response to two critical questions (1) When are the violations of human rights of
an order that the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention can be trumped? And (2) through
what process is this determination to be arrived at? In making these arguments, scholars must
consider the practice of international relations and the question of normative legitimacy and the
normative basis for the use of force rather than solely the specific content of international law.
In the framework which I will establish, legitimacy in the case of Libya will be analyzed
separately from strict legality and formal agreement with international law, and as a consequence
will engage an ethical vocabulary and appear in a language of justice and acceptability. This is
consistent with other such analyses where legitimacy takes precedence in discussions over
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legality (e.g., as in the legitimacy, but illegality, of Kosovo).703 Legal scholars such as Fernando
Teson adopted the position that international law is based on individual rights and popular
sovereignty.704 Elliott notes that Kant “was opposed to intervention” and “took the view that if
states did not voluntarily recognize the principle of cosmopolitan right, there was little that other
states could do to compel them.”705 Michael Walzer argued, on the other hand, there are times
when “it is morally justified to send armed men and women across a border” for the purpose of
defending “an act of solidarity.”706 The principle of the Responsibility to Protect corresponds
more to the Walzerian School of Thought.
Historically, the principles rooted in the Westphalian model - sovereign equality of states and
non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of other states - set out the basic tenet that the
evolution of the international system cannot be separated from the state. This basic principle
applies to the rise of principles in the post-Westphalian model; e.g. the principles of selfdetermination, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights, and cooperation.707
However, there were challenges to state supremacy, including the defense of human rights after
the Cold War. “In this regard, with the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s and the seal of
approval with the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ received in 2005, the state agreed to
the notion that people, not states are the ultimate beneficiary.”708 The legitimacy of the state
came to rest primarily on its being responsible and accountable to individuals.
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Pressure was placed on the state to respect human rights and to make the individual its moral and
political purpose. However, this has not worked as smoothly as some would hope. Russia and
China, for example, claimed to favor diplomatic channels and mediation over peace enforcement
and the use of force in support of humanitarian and human rights concerns and it is very difficult
still to get all states to agree. 709 While the pursuit of peace through conflict resolution techniques
such as diplomacy, negotiation and mediation are highly desirable and should be the
Responsibility to Protect’s first strategy, it is not always sufficient to bring the killing to an end.
We will discuss this further when we consider the criteria of ‘last resort’ in this chapter and in
the final chapter. In reality, one of the major obstacles in reaching agreement among states is the
self-interest of states as opposed to any moral reasoning that may be offered. Agreement is
thwarted by the lack of trust among opposing states.
A key theoretical debate regarding humanitarian intervention can be found in solidarist theory
versus pluralist theory. Pluralism and solidarism are competing approaches to the legitimacy of
intervention. Pluralists are skeptical about the homogeneous moral values involved in
humanitarian intervention.710 Pluralist international society theory defines humanitarian
intervention as a “violation of the cardinal rules of sovereignty, non-intervention and non-use of
force.” States and not individuals are the principle bearers of rights and duties.711 Pluralists
suggest that attempts at individual justice through unilateral humanitarian intervention
jeopardizes the inter-state order. 712
Solidarists, on the other hand, try to strengthen the legitimacy of international society by
deepening its commitment to justice. Individuals have rights but they can only be enforced by
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states.713 States accept not only moral Responsibility to Protect their own citizens, but also
guardianship of human rights everywhere. In order for states to accept the Responsibility to
Protect principle, they must accept this moral responsibility that goes beyond their borders.
Solidarism is committed to upholding certain minimum standards of human rights which places
the victims of human rights abuses at the centre of the theory. This leads to a different emphasis
on motivation. Teson, however, challenges the motives-first approach, but remains in the
solidarist school because he believes that governments that violate human rights give up their
rights to protection of their sovereignty.714 My own argument in support of the Responsibility to
Protect lies comfortably within the solidarist school.
Pluralism and solidarism are therefore competing approaches to the legitimacy of intervention.
Pluralists are skeptical about moral values of humanitarian intervention.715 In R.J. Vincent’s
writings in the mid-1980s he sets out to "develop a comprehensive framework for deciding what
is to count as a legitimate humanitarian intervention and how pluralist and solidarist conceptions
shape dialogue over humanitarian intervention.716 He argues that humanitarian intervention is a
moral duty. Pluralists regard the rule of sovereignty as inviolable and a preemptory rule of
international society. Solidarists, on the other hand, claim global ethical and legal values permit
a right of intervention in extreme cases. They argue “diverse communities can and do reach
agreement about substantive moral standards and that international society has moral agency to
uphold those standards.” 717
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In Saving Strangers, Wheeler suggests that pluralism in the international arena has been
overcome through the recognition of the norm of ‘humanitarian intervention.’718 Humanitarian
intervention exposes the conflict between order and justice.719 Pluralists fear that states acting on
their moral principles will weaken the international order. Bull, however, sees the need to
protect individual wellbeing. Realists, as discussed in Chapter Five, raise further objections:
humanitarian intervention will become a doctrine the strong will use against the weak.720 Unless
there are vital interests at stake, states will not risk their own soldiers’ lives -- the best we can
hope for is a situation where the “promotion of national security also defends human rights; and,
states have no right to risk their soldiers’ lives for strangers -- citizens are the exclusive
responsibility of the state and outsiders have no duty (or right) to intervene even in the case of
lawlessness.” 721
On the idealist side, we are really talking about an ethic of ideal values under the label of
‘responsibility.’ This standard must include a clear concept for legitimate multinational
intervention in instances of gross human rights violations in the form of mass atrocities. These
encompass fundamental human rights such as the right to life and liberty.722 The Responsibility
to Protect principle represents a shift in the norms of international relations from the rights of
states to claim sovereignty as authority toward a new moral stance of sovereignty as
responsibility. State responsibility obliges the state to assure a minimum standard of human
rights, not only internally, but within other states. According to the ICISS, sovereignty implies a
dual responsibility – internal and external. The challenge, however, is that both must adopt at
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least some sort of rudimentary universality to be implementable and can easily come into conflict
with one another.

For some, questions of legitimacy have been treated as irrelevant or moralizing propaganda and
the moral or legal dimensions of policy tend to be ignored. The horizons of hierarchy must be
replaced by horizons of necessity. But if we are among those who do accept the value of moral
reasoning, how do we ascertain that motives exist and what they are or should be?
Bellamy outlines three Augustinian tests to ascertain motives: explore the reasons the state gives;
compare them with other potential explanations for its actions; and, infer intentions from acts –
what measures are taken, for instance, to reduce the risk to non-combatants?723 For example, if
some infer the motivation is oil, is it sufficient to conclude if the US obtains most of the oil that
that was the motivation all along? Or if China or Russia abstained in the resolution is it because
they are trying to assure the oil for themselves? And so the question of motivation in a particular
instance, apart from the normal deliberation of humanitarian intervention and the morality of
such, is a complex one and hard to verify.
To what extent does the process used in addressing the legitimacy matter? When determining
the legitimacy of any action in response to human atrocities, I argue it is necessary to have broad
agreement and collective action. The action must be UN-sanctioned rather than it being
unilaterally devised or a coalition of willing states. To be legitimate it must have the
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authorization of the Security Council. Within the UN the persuasive authority of the Secretary
General that must be initiated.724
It is my contention that individual nations or coalitions of nations, like NATO, can perhaps act
more quickly than the UN, but such actions should not be said to achieve full legitimacy. The
UN, as imperfect as it may be, is in the best position at present to allow its members to maintain
the necessary rules and legal options that are required to fulfill legitimacy. By doing so, the
credibility of the UN may be maintained and thus its legitimacy recognized. Legitimate actions
require cooperation, and the UN is best poised to reach agreement, to monitor the action and
ultimately to participate in rebuilding (the latter topic to be discussed in more detail later in this
chapter and the concluding chapter).
Where there is likely to be a great deal of disagreement, such as in the acceptance or
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, there needs to be an institution of some form of
governance that can ensure the fairest deliberations available to achieve a collective decision that
all member states and others will regard as binding upon them. UN actions offer the best chance
of legitimacy – the right to make a ruling with morally binding force (even in the face of the few
who may disagree). International organizations and NGOs also have the power to influence
and/or to shame which sometimes works to discourage nations from breaking the rules, which
can work for or against humanitarian intervention.
The ICISS and Chesterman (2001) also agree that if we are to achieve both legality and
legitimacy, developing a consensus on military intervention involves the full collective
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mechanisms of the UN.725 While there may be problems in acquiring consensus, the objective
becomes not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the
Security Council work effectively and fairly. The Secretary General should assist by providing
clarification of the actions expected from intervening forces.726 The decision must include active
consultation with the Global South and must be transparent. Decisions must be made on a case
by case basis according to whether the criteria has been met; i.e., actual or threatened large-scale
loss of human life, human atrocities, ethnic cleansing or war crimes.

The fact that the Permanent Five have veto power, as has been discussed earlier, and can block
intervention and other UN actions for narrow political reasons is nevertheless recognized as a
major impediment in cases of the possible implementation of the responsibility principle.727
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Security Council is viewed by some states as
unrepresentative and a poor proxy for ‘international will.’728 But it does not necessarily mean
that any movement toward implementation will fail. In fact I will argue in relation to Libya that
it is a case where it has been implemented even with the veto capability.
Those who argue in favor of a right of humanitarian intervention have frequently asserted that it
predates the Charter. Chesterman concludes that the notion of humanitarian intervention which
emerged in the nineteenth century was not necessarily a legal right but was mainly a matter of
politics, policy, or morality.729 My own argument is that for humanitarian intervention in the
form of the Responsibility to Protect to be deemed as legitimate in the first instance, it must have
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agreement by the United Nations Security Council, and must not take place as a unilateral or
even regional action alone. In order to reach such a decision, there must be an agreement among
UN members that it is necessary. With anything less, the principle will lose its legitimacy. This
means that the situation must be deemed to be consistent with one of the four Responsibility to
Protect categories of genocide, human atrocities, ethnic cleansing or war crimes. In summary,
military intervention according to the principle of the Responsibility to Protect requires not only
a consideration of its place as a moral principle but of the legal process.
Independent actions tend to threaten the legitimacy of the UN in international relations. In terms
of the authority of the UN and legitimacy – at the international level these are sometimes at odds.
The basis of authority is the state but the authority is usually seen as centralized and legitimacy
rests within the UN framework even though there is no enforcement capacity.730 There is a real
need for both authority and legitimacy at the international level. To achieve this, one needs to
unpack authority in connection with the UN – “its institutionalization, its role, its third-party
status and its decentralized constitution,”731 particularly in the context of the sovereign equality
of states and self-determination of peoples. There is a contradiction apparent in that the state is
being challenged at the same time as it remains the source of international authority.732
In spite of its lack of pure authority, one of the organizations that helped to move the
institutionalization of international authority in the past was the League of Nations which led to
the development of the UN and the movement toward a system of global governance. “In this
process, the UN, member states, and international institutions in general became involved in the
regulation of international interactions among states, regional organizations, civil society, the
730
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private sector, and individuals in a multitude of domains.” 733 This helped to lead to the growth
of NGOs and a more horizontal and interactive form of authority. Factoring in civil society
expertise and opinion contributes to the credibility of the UN. The UN increasingly factors in
inputs from the outside world.
Since the early 1990s the UN Security Council has gained more authority and occupies a greater
role in managing humanitarian crises and peacekeeping involving the use of force. Ian Hurd
refers to the Security Council as a prime location of “international sovereignty.” 734 It can thus be
seen as a governing authority with a power over states. The UN is unique in terms of its role as a
normative, moral and political entity. “This authority and the function associated with it have
the overall purpose of determining, communicating and fulfilling, where possible, the various
facets of international legitimacy in service of the socialization of the international realm.”735
Doubts are still expressed, however, about the absence of due process in the UN, its exclusive
membership, and the hegemony of some states.736 Nevertheless, it holds the potential to express
a global version of good will for the entire international community.737 Thus, the negotiations
and disputes occurring among various actors in the disaggregated world order helps to determine
legitimacy.738
III.

Legitimacy Applied

In order to assess the Libyan intervention, the next portion of the Chapter establishes a
framework against which to test the Responsibility to Protect actions. This framework is based
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on a number of known and recognizable criteria in relation to military force. Evans, for
example, suggests there are five criteria that are required to determine whether a certain situation
is indeed a proper case for a UN-mandated mission:739
Seriousness of Harm: Is the threatened harm to state or human security sufficient to
justify the use of military force?740Is there a threat of genocide and other large-scale
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law?
Proper purpose: Is it clear that the primary purpose of the proposed military action is to
halt or avert the threat in question?
Last Resort: Has every non-military option been explored?
Proportional Means: Are the scale, duration and intensity of the planned military action
proportional to the threat?
Balance of Consequences: Is there a reasonable chance of the military action being
successful? The consequences of the action should not be worse than the consequences of
inaction.741
Similarly, Wheeler and the Just Cause framework claim that the responsibility to intervene is
justified when the following six ‘precautionary principles’ have been met: (just cause, legitimate
authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.) And again,
similarly, the ICISS report itself establishes five tests: right cause, right intention, right
authority, last resort, proportionate means, and reasonable prospects to support moral principles.
Table 3 below outlines these three positions. As such, they represent three different, but
reasonably parallel guidelines that have been proposed in the literature to determine the
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.
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Table 5. Military Intervention Framework
Just War Framework and
Wheeler
1. just cause (a ‘supreme
humanitarian
emergency’),
2. last resort,
3. proportional use of
force; and
4. a high probability of
achieving a
humanitarian outcome

Evans
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ICISS Report
Proper Purpose;
Seriousness of Harm;
Last Resort;
Proportional Means;
Balance of
Consequences

1. right cause; right
intention;
2. last resort;
3. proportionate means;
4. reasonable prospects to
support moral
principles
5. right authority;

Taken together, these constitute a framework for assessing the appropriateness of a
Responsibility to Protect intervention in a particular case: just or right cause and proper purpose
including motivation and intent; last resort; proportional means of use of force; balance of
consequences – a high probability of achieving a humanitarian outcome; right authority; and,
added by myself, due process. Anthony Arend and Robert Beck add an additional criteria for a
military intervention to meet if it is to be exempted from the ban on force in Article 2(4); i.e., it
must not involve a regime change. This concern bears great significance in the case of Libya, and
is a common criticism. Regime change will thus be discussed in more detail later when we apply
the legitimacy framework. However, I do not include this qualification in my own determination
of legitimacy and I will explain why I do not.
Just cause occurs only in those extraordinary situations where large numbers of civilians in
another state are in imminent danger of losing their life or facing appalling hardship, and where
the indigenous forces are not able or willing to stop the extreme violation of human rights.742
Right or just cause exists when the only hope of saving lives depends on outsiders coming to the
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rescue and involves those sorts of human atrocities that ‘shock the conscience of mankind.’743 In
assessing the just or right cause, I would suggest it is important to also consider motivations and
intent. We can also consider these in relation to the final outcome and the criterion of ‘success’
and ask “Is it the ostensibly humanitarian ‘outcome’ of the intervention or the humanitarian
motivations of the interveners that legitimate the act?”744 Does it matter about the motivations if
the outcome is good? What if it is conducted with moral zeal but results in worsening that
situation for those in need?
In reaching a determination of last resort, all other appropriate avenues must have been explored.
Forms of conflict resolution such as mediation, negotiation, sanctions and the like must have
been considered and/or tried and failed. In terms of the balance of consequences, one expects
that on balance more lives will have been saved by the intervention than were taken. We also
note that it can never be known in advance “that more lives will be saved by intervention than
will be lost by it...”745 It is wrong, therefore, to judge a humanitarian intervention only by its
outcome. As long as there is no contradiction between the motives and the character and
conduct of the intervention, even a failure can be defined as humanitarian, but not necessarily a
success.746 This will be an important point when we discuss the intervention into Libya.
Justifications for the action that are often put forward may include one or more of the following:
the anti-interventionist regime is out of sync with modern notions of justice -- I would suggest
this is not sufficient reason to intervene but it is potentially influential; without air strikes there
would have been a large refugee movement that threatened the peace and security of other
regions; thousands more civilians would have died; all peaceful means have been tried (this is
743
744
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really a reference to last resort); it is better to uphold basic principles selectively than not at all -this usually addresses criticisms that the application of the Responsibility to Protect is
inconsistent and that there is no absolute standard; and, the NATO action was supported -- air
strikes largely conformed with international humanitarian law.747
Criticisms, on the other hand, may include arguments that the intervention was not morally
justified; i.e., caused more harm than good; did not use the alternative means that were available;
violated international humanitarian laws by bombing of civilian targets; there was little support
for action in the third world; it was not necessary; there was not just cause; and, there was not a
situation of a deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate
response.748
IV.

The Libyan Intervention, 2011

As the thesis intends to illustrate, it is one thing to have the Responsibility to Protect approved at
the international level, as it was in 2005, and followed up and supported in several venues
including the UN. It is another thing entirely to see it implemented in its third pillar form. Such
an implementation, therefore, has historical and legal significance. The Libyan intervention
makes it a landmark international case for study. To bring the principle to fruition has taken a
myriad of players and has required a major international momentum. Now that such an
implementation has occurred, we are in the unique position of being able to assess its legitimacy
according to some or all of the criteria established above. The Libyan intervention proves it can
happen.
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The first step in the three part Responsibility to Protect doctrine is to prevent, using diplomatic,
economic, and humanitarian measures, and, only if necessary, the last resort is to take more
coercive measures authorized by the Security Council. A range of these measures were adopted
through the Human Rights Council, General Assembly, Security Council, Arab League, African
Union, and Gulf Cooperation Council in the case of Libya. At the next level, if the first set of
coercive measures fails, it becomes time to react. The response from Libya, which was
essentially to ignore softer measures, pushed the UN to react in a stronger and harder way. The
continuing threat to the population pushed the international community to react.’ The
Responsibility to Protect intervention in the Libyan case was invoked extensively by civil
society, the media and government officials including the Security Council, the General
Assembly and the Human Rights Council (HRC) as the conflict escalated. What follows is a
series of analyses, op-eds, interviews and articles outlining arguments in favor (and opposed) to
the Responsibility to Protect in the case of Libya, which responds to many of the points raised
and questions asked in the framework introduced in the beginning of this chapter on assessing
‘legitimacy.
This account of the Libyan humanitarian crisis and the determination of the legitimacy of the
subsequent action on the part of the UN will cover the activities of the UN, regional
organizations, influential individuals and member states to bring about humanitarian intervention
in Libya. The text will show how actions, commentary, political and moral pressure and analyses
can be considered through a lens of legitimacy and how they respond to the major framework of
just cause, last resort, right authority, proportionality and reasonable prospects as outlined earlier
as well as the sixth criterion of due process.
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The context for the UN action in the case of Libya corresponds to the three pillar approach of the
Responsibility to Protect described previously749 -- states must protect their populations from
mass atrocities. When necessary it is the responsibility of the international community to assist
states in protecting populations. The international community must respond in a timely and
decisive manner to imminent threats of mass atrocities with a broad range of measures, including
both peaceful and military measures, when states are unwilling or unable to meet their
responsibility.
In Libya, the progression moved rapidly as the situation itself gave little opportunity for
preventive or softer measures. Very little warning of the uprising was known and therefore the
crisis situation almost unpredictable. The result was a rather swift response catapulting the UN
into a ‘third pillar’ type of reaction.750 These steps were climbed rapidly. The political crisis in
Libya, which began on February 14, 2011 with peaceful mass protests, caught the attention of the
international community. Security forces opened fire on the peaceful crowd in Tripoli beginning
February 20, 2011, killing and injuring an unknown number of persons.
The situation seemed to be approaching a full scale civil war with a split between forces loyal to
one side or the other. The country also appeared to be dividing along tribal and regional
lines. There was clearly no quick or easy way out. While it was at this point recognized that
imposing a no-fly zone, bombing airfields or arming the rebels could tilt the balance of power in
the rebels' favour, it was considered unlikely that it would defeat the Gaddafi regime. There were
also fears it might create a difficult dilemma regarding whether the international community
should become more involved or watch a protracted stalemate. It could also bring in Libya’s
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neighbours and compromise prospects for democratic development in other areas, making any
decision complex and extremely challenging.
On February 23, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union Communique dispatched a
mission to Libya to investigate the conflict.751 The United Kingdom and Switzerland froze
financial assets, and imposed travel bans and sanctions.752 The US government also began to
move warships toward Libya. France, the UK and the US started to discuss the possibilities of
imposing a “no fly zone” with the approval of the Security Council.753 Three human rights
organizations, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Human Rights Watch, and
INTERIGHTS, submitted a joint request to The African Commission on Human and Peoples'
Rights on February 24, 2011, asking it to impose measures against the Libyan government that
would end its human rights abuses, including the killing of hundreds of people who participated
in largely peaceful protests by state security forces and mercenaries.754 Ban Ki-moon, the UN
Secretary-General, advised on February 25 that more than 1,000 people had been killed and that
massive waves of refugees fleeing to neighboring countries amounted to a humanitarian
crisis.755 He reported on crimes committed in Libya, warning that fundamental issues of peace
and security were at stake.756 Ms. Pillay (High Commissioner for Human Rights) advised “that
under international law, any official at any level ordering or carrying out atrocities and attacks
751
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could be held criminally accountable and widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian
population could amount to crimes against humanity.”757

Ban Ki-moon, in a speech to the Security Council on Peace and Security in Africa, stated that his
Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect had:
reminded the national authorities in Libya, as well as in other countries facing large-scale
popular protests, that the heads of State and Government at the 2005 World Summit
pledged to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement.758
The Human Rights Council met on February 25, 2011 and opened a special session on “the
situation of human rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”759 It was reported that actions taken by
the Libyan authorities were illegitimate and unlawful under international law.

The Group of Friends on the Responsibility to Protect on February 25th also expressed its grave
concern regarding human rights violations committed in Libya, possibly leading to crimes
against humanity if the violence against civilians continued.760 In doing so, it reiterated
paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome document (A/RES/60/1), and the
responsibility for individual countries and the international community to protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Group of Friends
called upon the government of Libya to meet its Responsibility to Protect its population and all
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the relevant bodies of the United Nations to take appropriate measures to realize the international
community’s commitment to the Responsibility to Protect.761
The Canadian politician Irwin Cotler and Jared Genser, writing in the New York Times on 28
February 2011, argued the firm response to the situation in Libya was aided by Gaddafi’s
targeting of civilians, his comments demonstrating both his intent and disconnection from reality,
and the large defection of his ambassadors, military and civil servants.762 Such action was giving
the international community more and more reason to believe that there was sufficient, necessary
or ‘just cause’ to take more dramatic action. Gareth Evans, former Australian foreign minister,
President Emeritus of the International Crisis Group and author of ‘The Responsibility to
Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All’, wrote in the Financial Times, 27
February 2011 that states cannot deny their Responsibility to Protect their people from crimes
against humanity. When a state fails to protect its citizens it is the responsibility of the
international community to take timely and decisive collective action through the United Nations
Security Council. However, these measures fall short of the threat or use of military force
which he concluded would be necessary to stop the killing. He also understood this was a very
difficult call since declaring a no-fly zone is not a soft option and would mean being prepared to
shoot down jets and helicopter gunships that breach it. Sanctions, embargoes and the diplomatic
isolation of Mr. Gaddafi were considered to be only a minimum of what was then required;
however it was understood military options should always be a last resort, but cannot be
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excluded in extreme cases.763 Romeo Dallaire and Hugh Segal in the Ottawa Citizen 25
February 2011 also joined the appeals.764
The international community was aroused by the words pronounced by Gaddafi, "I will fight to
the last drop of my blood," and his references to protesters as "cockroaches" and blaming Libya's
unrest on foreigners. Gaddafi threatened to "cleanse Libya house by house." Dallaire and Segal
agreed Canada, with a loud and clear moral voice, must abhor what U.S. Senators John McCain
and Joe Lieberman had described as "crimes against humanity." It must demonstrate its
Responsibility to Protect Libyans by endorsing a recommendation that an international arms and
military technology embargo to prevent the sale and further delivery of equipment or support to
Libyan security forces must be imposed, at the same time avoiding commercial sanctions that
would adversely affect civilians.765
Having concluded that there were grave problems in Libya with the actions of the government,
the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution S-15/2 which required:766 1) the Libyan
government to cease all human rights violations; 2) an international commission of inquiry to be
dispatched to Libya; and recommended 3) that the General Assembly suspend Libya from the
Council.767 On March 1, the General Assembly unanimously suspended Libya’s membership in
the Council.768 Some key features of this resolution are that it called upon the Government of
Libya to: meet its Responsibility to Protect its population, to immediately put an end to all
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human rights violations, to stop any attacks against civilians, and to fully respect all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. "It
must release all arbitrarily detained persons"; “... ensure the safety of all civilians and refrain
from any reprisals against people who have taken part in the demonstrations; and, guarantee
access to human rights and humanitarian organizations including human rights monitors.”769

An interim opposition government was established in Libya under the leadership of former
Justice Minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil770 in order to temporarily communicate with foreign
governments and to act as a transitional Head of Government after the departure of Gaddafi.771
The Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC) got together for the first time on
March 5, 2011 as the opposition. This Council declared itself the sole national representative of
Libya and got the attention of the world. France, on March 10, became the first country to
acknowledge the Transitional National Council.772 Over time they began to be recognized by the
rest of the international community as well. The Parliament of Europe also adopted a Resolution
recognizing the Interim National Council as officially representing the Libyan opposition.773 The
Resolution asked for financial and human resources to be made available to support a robust
international humanitarian operation.774
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The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported on 1 March, 2011 that
70,000 to 75,000 civilians fled to Tunisia and a similar number to Egypt; with tens of thousands
stuck at the Tunisian border.775 The UNHCR had been attempting to help the refugee
population;776 but the security situation surrounding Tripoli was considered too dangerous for
humanitarian agencies to assess the need for medicine and supplies.777 Luis Preval, Institute for
Security Studies, advised that people fleeing from Libya are “protected by the non-derogable
right of non-refoulement” and as a result cannot be forcibly returned to a territory where their life
or physical safety are at risk for political reasons.
The 1951 Convention on the International Status of Refugees, the European Convention of
Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EUCFR) and a
whole set of EU Directives are unequivocal in establishing the right of individuals not to be
forcibly expelled, whether directly or indirectly, back to the place where they may suffer
persecution. This right has been widely and consistently interpreted by national and
international courts as an absolute right.778
Preval called on the EU to ensure the ability of those citizens fleeing in the case of an enactment
of the Responsibility to Protect.

The UN’s Human Rights Council on 11 March named a panel of experts to visit Libya in order
to prepare a full report to the Council in June. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Amnesty International were also concerned about those
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stranded within Libya with reports of intensifying violence toward the opposition.779 On 13
March, Human Rights Watch advised that Gaddafi’s “security forces were brutally suppressing
all opposition…UN agencies were shut out from Libya preventing humanitarian access.”780
On March 12th The Arab League made a critical decision to request the UN Security Council to
impose a no-fly zone to protect civilians from Gaddafi.781 The Secretary General of the Gulf
Cooperation Council on March 8 referred to “crimes against humanity.” 782 The League of Arab
States had already suspended Libya as a member on 22 February 2011 and reminded the Security
Council that the protection of large-scale violence against civilians was within its remit. It called
on the Council to take responsibility. The Arab support for a no-fly zone was an important factor
in the decisions that were made in the UN and helped a great deal to counter accusations of the
motivation of self-interest of Western states.
It was felt the UN Security Council needed to impose sweeping sanctions on Gaddafi, his family
and those in the regime responsible for the repression, by freezing assets. It was also agreed that
it should also refer the leaders of Libya to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for an
immediate investigation into possible war crimes and crimes against humanity and establish a
no-fly zone under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and enforced, perhaps by NATO, over Libya to
prevent air attacks against civilians. They applauded the Arab League's suspension of Libya
from participating in its meetings and noted positively the number of Libyan diplomats and highlevel aides who had resigned and continued to defect. The Responsibility to Protect is about the
779
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world responding when a civilian population is under attack - either from its own government or
because its government lacks the means or will to protect it. Libya was a clear examples of a
civilian population under threat.
As indicated, the early legitimate measures intended to isolate Gaddafi within the United Nations
rules and regulations were slow, and proved to be insufficient to protect civilians against
Gaddafi’s forces in the long run. As an important next step and in response to the growing
humanitarian crisis the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970 (2011) on
February 26, 2011. Under Article 41 of the Charter’s Chapter VII, the Council authorized all
Member States to seize and dispose of military-related material banned by the text and to
facilitate humanitarian and related assistance in Libya. In the Resolution the Security Council
imposed an arms embargo, asset freezes, and travel bans. In a striking move, the Resolution also
referred the case to the International Criminal Court.783, 784 Resolution 1970 explicitly invoked
Libya’s “responsibility to protect” and requested that the International Criminal Court investigate
reports of crimes against humanity. The Prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno-Ocampo decided on
March 2, 2011 to launch an investigation.785 The Council also decided to establish a new
committee to monitor sanctions, and to respond to violations, and to designate the individuals
subject to the targeted measures which were listed in an Annex to the Resolution.786 Marianne
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Ducasse-Rogier wrote regarding the significance of the resolution.787 She stated in the case of
Darfur, Kenya, Guinea and Ivory Coast, where civilian populations were the target of human
rights' violations, the Responsibility to Protect was seldom invoked. This, for her, suggested
why UN Security Council Resolution 1970 was so significant.788 By referring the situation in
Libya to the ICC, it also sent a clear signal to leaders that the UN Security Council will bring the
Responsibility to Protect to the forefront in the punishment of gross human rights abuses through
the Courts, another avenue available to the international community. The UNSC Resolution on
26 February 2011 explicitly invoked the Responsibility to Protect and began the process of the
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect principle in its “hardcore” form. The Resolution
cited the Libyan regime’s responsibility to protect its own population. The UN had to be
cautious at the same time not to open itself to criticism that it was taking Libyan sovereignty
lightly or that it was promoting a ‘neo-colonialist project’.789
At the same time warnings were being sent to the Gaddafi government. On March 7, 2011
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon spoke with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and reminded
him that authorities in Tripoli “must uphold their responsibility to protect the country’s citizens
and to heed the Libyan people’s legitimate aspirations to live in dignity and peace.”790
International anxiety grew and it became clear to those outside that the numbers of refugees and
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were rising as the humanitarian crisis worsened in spite of
Resolution 1970. On March 11, UNHCR advised that 230,000 people had fled the violence thus
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far.791 Scores of anti-government protesters were arrested and some detainees were said to have
been subjected to torture. The location and fate of many detainees was unknown.
The International Crisis Group on 10 March 2011 called for a complete ceasefire to be followed
by negotiations to secure a transition to a post-Qaddafi, legitimate and representative
government. In their view, nothing should be allowed to pre-empt or preclude the search for a
political solution with military intervention used only as a last resort, with the goal of protecting
civilians at risk. Nevertheless, on March 8 NATO began a 24-hour aerial surveillance over Libya
to help determine whether to institute a no-fly zone over Libya.792 A no-fly zone is considered a
hard option because it involves taking out air defences, bombing runways and destroying aircraft
that breach it.793 Colonel Gaddafi accused the West of colonial intentions.794
On Monday 13 March 2011 the Security Council began deliberations on a draft UN Security
Council Resolution led by the UK and France. The crisis in Libya brought about a world-wide
debate regarding member states’ commitment to the 2005 agreement on the Responsibility to
Protect and action beyond that taken to date. There were growing calls for a no-fly zone and
Security Council approval under Chapter VII and military enforcement capabilities. Had the
international community now reached a point where more drastic and harder measures must be
employed as a last resort? It was duly noted that military intervention should be viewed as a last
resort under the Responsibility to Protect, and other measures available to the international
community were discussed, including surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance,
791
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enforcement of the arms embargo and sanctions. One of the key criteria was that any intervention
should have a clear legal basis from the UN, and in this case should occur in cooperation with
African and Arab States.
A no-fly zone would mean banning military flights by government forces through Libyan
airspace. Military flights violating the ban would then risk being shot down by international
forces. Gaddafi, of course, would use this to say that external actors were supporting insurgents
(another frequent criticism of international intervention). The question was who would impose
such a zone; the most likely possibility being the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It
was also understood such action would have to be passed by a United Nations resolution.795 A
speech made by Gaddafi saying that “he would rather die a martyr than to step down along with
his calls for his forces to attack and “cleanse Libya house by house until protestors surrender,”
raised the concerns of the international community even further. It was clear that the Libyan
government planned further killing of the civilians.’ The responsibility to protect the Libyan
people clearly needed to be shifted from Libya to the international community.
The Human Rights Network –Uganda recommended that:
African states should refer to the principle of ‘no-indifference’ in Article four of the
AU Constitutive Act and immediately intervene in ending massacres of civilian
population in Libya; Libyan authorities and the belligerents should allow immediate
access for international human rights monitors and humanitarian agencies; and, the
UNSC should draw on its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter by taking
appropriate non-military and military action to restore peace and security for the people
of Libya.796
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Genocide Alert, based in Koln, Germany, launched an email campaign calling for action in
Libya directed at the German government (who has a seat on the Security Council); i.e.
Chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Guido Westerwelle, as well other relevant politicians in
Germany.797
Another article published by Genocide Alert referred to the international community's
responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocities committed by Muammar Gaddafi. The
article pointed to the Responsibility to Protect’s three pillars, including the responsibility to
prevent, and measures that could/should be taken to prevent mass atrocities. It suggested that if
these efforts had failed, however, more comprehensive measures needed to be taken.798
Ramesh Thakur wrote in The Star on 13 March 2011 regarding the situation.799 In
contemplating the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, and one might say in
consideration of reasonable proposals, Thakur’s article addressed three criteria: “military
capacity, legal authority and political legitimacy.” He was certain that military operations would
entail four activities: “surveillance and monitoring, humanitarian assistance, enforcement of the
arms embargo and enforcement of a no-fly zone.”800 He understood that only the West had the
military capability needed. He noted the rebels had been calling for a no-fly zone. One concern,
he had, however, was with regard to mission creep and the fear of the interveners being seen as
Western imperialists. He recommended legal authorization from the UN Security Council
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should be restricted to the four military tasks listed above. The United States were very reluctant
to support such a resolution, but he suggested their opposition could be overcome if and as it
became clear that the Arab, Islamic and African nations, as well as the mass of defecting Libyan
diplomats, supported prompt and effective action to protect Libyan civilians, oust Gaddafi and
promote democratic reforms.801 In the case of Libya the inclusion of Arab bodies was an
important issue in the legitimacy of Security Council’s decision.
Some, however, argued that the proposal crossed the boundaries of legitimate humanitarian
intervention, touching on taboo areas in military humanitarian intervention in the form of
proposals for regime change. For example, in ‘Foreign Policy’ James Traub wrote on 11 March
2011 that effective action was impossible in Burma, Sudan, Zimbabwe and elsewhere so long as
the neighbors insisted on protecting an abusive tyrant.
The goal, of course, would not be to induce Qaddafi to come to the negotiating table -- a
Hitler-like Götterdämmerung is much more likely -- but to damage and demoralize his
forces and thus tip the scales between the government and the rebels. 802
This, as we can see, verges on recommendations for regime change, although it is not explicitly
stated. Taub was also in favor of force as the ‘right thing’ because force could stop Gaddafi, ‘a
ruthless tyrant’ from killing his own people. It would also be to America's benefit because the
United States would be liberating Arab peoples and would gain the approval of the Arab world.
He stressed the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference had all called for a no fly zone over Libya.803
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Iftekhar Ahmad Chowdury and Yang Razali Kassim wrote on March 9 about the situation in
Libya.804 They argued the efforts to bring about ‘regime change’ in Libya need not be a ‘back–
door’ endeavour. There is a real need to end the human sufferings of the Libyan people.
Considering the Responsibility to Protect, all peaceful means to resolve the crisis have proved
futile. Collective action through the Security Council can be supported legally, morally, and in
practical terms. It is a situation ripe for the application of the principle of the Responsibility to
Protect.
One aspect in support of the lack of total neutrality occurred in the first resolution, naming and
blaming Gaddafi, and announcing the call for his arrest. In a BBC interview, Gareth Evans
argued the moral case for the Responsibility to Protect. It was his view that a no-fly zone would
be extremely effective in addressing the imbalance of power, while arming people on the ground
would risk escalating the conflict.
In response to the escalation of violence between government forces and the armed opposition,
international civil society groups, including ICG,805 Human Rights Watch806and the Global
Centre for the Responsibility to Protect807 beyond the U.S. alone also increased urgent calls for
action, noting the compelling obligation of the international community to prevent and halt mass
atrocities. The Gulf Cooperation Council met on 7 March and requested that the “UN Security
Council take all necessary measures to protect civilians, including enforcing a no-fly zone over
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Libya.” They also condemned the "crimes committed against civilians, the use of heavy arms
and the recruitment of mercenaries" by the Libyan government.808
The Arab League barred Libya from taking part in its meetings and also called on the Security
Council to impose a no-fly zone on Libya to protect the Libyan people and foreign nationals
residing in Libya, while respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring States.
It also commended other states like Oman and Bahrain for the non-violent way they were dealing
with their own protests. These statements were very important since Western countries and
NATO had indicated they would not use coercive options without approval from regional
organizations.809
As a result of the increased pressure from the international community and rising threats to the
civilian population and follow-up to Resolution 1970, the Security Council on 17 March voted
on Resolution 1973, calling for a no-fly zone as well as a ceasefire. The resolution also included
an arms embargo, travel bans and asset freezes.810 The resolution emphasized the responsibility
of the Libyan authorities to protect the Libyan population and considered that the widespread and
systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian
population amounted to crimes against humanity. The resolution authorized Member States
acting in cooperation with the Secretary-General, “to take all necessary measures, (…) to protect
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack (…) while excluding a foreign
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occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory…” as a means of ensuring
proportionality. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated that Resolution 1973
affirms, clearly and unequivocally, the international community's determination to fulfill
its responsibility to protect civilians from violence perpetrated upon them by their own
government.811
Boots on the ground and a foreign occupation force were, however, expressly excluded.
Coercive military action was therefore allowed to take two forms, namely “all necessary
measures” to enforce a no-fly zone, and “all necessary measures … to protect civilians and
civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”812 ‘All necessary measures’ in this instance
allowed for the removal of the perpetrator, Gaddafi, which was ultimately necessary for success
since no other less coercive measure had been successful.
The language of this resolution was clear in prescribing the scope and limits of what should be
done. In the case of enforcing the no-fly zone, Resolution 1973 allows the destruction, by aircraft
or missile, of any loyalist jet or helicopter that takes off, any pro-Gadhafi forces’ anti-aircraft
batteries or missile-launch sites, and the disabling of any airstrip. And, as for the wider mandate
to protect civilians, the Resolution allowed airborne attacks against tanks or troop columns
advancing on Benghazi or other rebel-held towns, and any concentrations of forces within those
areas that pose a direct and immediate threat to Gaddafi’s opponents. Any military action
designed specifically to target or ensure a rebel victory in a civil war, or even to achieve a more
open and responsive system of government in Libya was not explicitly in the terms of the
Resolution. In fact, neither is it part of the moral first principles of the “Responsibility to
Protect” doctrine approved by the U.N. General Assembly in 2005. One or more of these results
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might, conceivably, occur but it cannot be its stated objective. Three African countries on
the Security Council - Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon - supported the resolution. The support
of Arab States most likely prompted China, Russia, Germany, India and Brazil to abstain,
permitting the Resolution to pass.813
In spite of news that Libyan authorities declared a cease-fire, fighting continued. Most of Libya
remained off limits to aid workers and thousands of people escaped to neighboring countries.814
On 24 March, the UN Human Rights Council reported that “hundreds of persons have been taken
to undisclosed locations where they might have been submitted to torture or other cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatments or executed.” 815 Such treatment would certainly constitute crimes
against humanity. Two days after the Resolution was adopted, on Saturday 19 March, a military
operation called Operation Odyssey Dawn (a coalition of American, French and British forces)
launched airstrikes against Libyan air defenses, tanks, armored personnel carriers and other
military hardware. The coalition now also included Denmark, Canada, Italy, Qatar, Belgium,
Spain, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates.816 Plans were also being made to have NATO
take over the mission.817
President Obama authorized the U.S. Armed Forces to enforce the no-fly zone and expressed
pride in being part of a coalition that were “prepared to meet their responsibility to protect the
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people of Libya and uphold the mandate of the international community.” On 24 March, the US
announced that it was transferring command and control to NATO with the limited mandate of a
no fly zone.818
The endorsement of Resolution 1973 represents a historic event in support of the Responsibility
to Protect principle agreed to in 2005 and sets a major precedent for the UN Security Council
and the Responsibility to Protect. Gareth Evans, Sydney Morning Herald, 24 March 2011
responded to Resolution 1973 with caution, however, regarding the aspect of proportionality.819
Evans was careful to point out that while the result of the military action may be to kill Gaddafi
or force him into exile, or to ensure rebel victory in a civil war, or to achieve a more open and
responsive system of government in Libya, it is not the explicit legal objective of UN
Resolution 1973. It also follows legally and morally from these first principles that once the
threat to civilian populations has ended the military action should stop.820
Needless to say, controversy began to take place over the implementation and enforcement of the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandated no-fly zone in Libya. Some, including the
African Union (AU), have argued that more than just a no fly zone had been imposed which
exceeds the intentions and objectives of UNSC resolution 1973. Concerns were raised that the
protection of civilians by "any means necessary" allowed for mission creep and ulterior motives
including the possibility of regime change along with self-interest. If it were to be shown that the
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no-fly zone attacks were causing too many civilian deaths the credibility of the action would be
seriously undermined.821
Concerns were being raised by the UNHCR that States may be considering steps to arm the
rebels, or take actions toward regime change which go beyond Resolution 1973 which made
clear that measures using "all necessary measures" to protect civilian areas from attack by
Libyan government forces should only take place while civilians were under threat. 822 In terms
of civilian protection it is notable that NATO officials warned rebels that if they endangered
civilians they may also be subject to attack. In that sense, Resolution 1973 does not distinguish
between civilians who support Gaddafi and those who support the rebels.823
Ian Davis, Director of NATO Watch, wrote in NATO Watch, 31 March 2011, that concerns
continued to be expressed regarding the fact that what started out as an action that observed the
majority of the norms of international law and multilateral consultation was now in danger of
changing. 824 US, French and British muscle and talk of regime change, arming the rebels and
even assassinating Gaddafi could break international consensus. Reference to Resolution 1973
itself, however, established an imbalance. While of course the intent of the United Nations
resolution is to be neutral in its saving of civilians, the use of the term “all necessary measures”
and the call for the arrest of Gaddafi for crimes against humanity suggest the intervention was
slanted toward the opposition forces.825 This does not conflict, however, with it being the last,
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and ‘legitimate’ resort in my view, nor does it extend beyond the principles of the Responsibility
to Protect and the UN resolution. The intervention and the subsequent regime change itself can
be defended according to the Responsibility to Protect and according to the means necessary to
protect civilians. Ramesh Thakur, on 21 March 2011 suggested that Security Council Resolution
1973 was the first UN-sanctioned combat operation since the 1991 Gulf War.826 I would add
that it was a successful intervention. As I will argue below, genocide was averted. Also, many
Libyan diplomats defected and joined the calls for the protection of Libyan civilians and the
ousting of Gaddafi to allow for democratic reforms.
V.

Consequences of the Intervention

As part of these deliberations the Security Council expressed confidence that the action would
succeed. While not necessarily part of the framework, one of the real challenges in determining
the legitimacy of this intervention comes in assessing whether the military action was a success.
When analyzing the outcome, there will always be questions about whether the number of deaths
would have been higher or lower if Libyans had been left to their own devices, which is virtually
an impossible question to answer. More importantly, however, will be to recognize it as “an
‘intervention based on principle’ and not as the ‘petro-imperialist’ plot that Gaddafi claim[ed] it
to be.”827 There is also the question of how much weight should actually be placed on the
outcome if the intervention is ‘right’. And what if the outcome is good but the intentions were
self-serving? One of the frequent questions will be whether the intent was to change the Libyan
regime. If in fact it was, even though regime change is not considered a legitimate goal of
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humanitarian intervention, will getting rid of Gaddafi be considered in the final analysis as a
success if it was ultimately the only way to protect civilians from a brutal dictator who was
eventually replaced by a democratic governing body. I suggest that when a military intervention
occurs as a last resort, and when all other conflict resolution ‘neutral’ strategies have been
explored or tried, the intervention may be pushed into a less neutral zone. If, for example, as in
Libya, the state is the perpetrator of the looming genocide – the interveners may be forced to take
sides.
The final stage of the Responsibility to Protect military action regards rebuilding. The Libyans
were likely to need support – but not interference. This stage requires a political-diplomatic
approach, which allows for the transitional government to govern themselves. Some might
consider pushing the Responsibility to Protect beyond the boundaries of the resolution would be
self-defeating. Gareth Evans, for example, in The Daily Star 25 March 2011 claimed that
“legally, morally, politically and militarily,” the military intervention in Libya had only one
purpose – to protect Libyans from Gaddafi. When that job is done the military intervention
should end. Regime change should be implemented by the Libyans themselves. 828
According to the chosen framework, the question of whether Resolution 1973 and subsequent
action according to due process is still important to a determination of its legitimacy. I have
suggested that no determination of the legitimacy of a Responsibility to Protect action can be
complete without a legal assessment. We can establish the legality of the intervention according
to the fact that it was passed by a UNSC resolution and follows the legal interpretation of the
Responsibility to Protect according to Articles 138 and 139 of the UNGA agreed to in 2005.
International humanitarian law governs the conduct and responsibilities of nations and
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individuals during war and conflict, in relation to one another and to protected persons
(civilians). It constitutes the legal corpus of the Hague Conventions (1989 and 1907) and the
Law of Geneva (1863). Together they set the basis for jus ad bellum, the right to the use of force
in the context of humanitarian intervention and jus in bello, the legitimate modalities for the use
of force, together forming international law governing acceptable practice to be followed in war
and armed conflict. The most important provision of the Geneva Conventions in terms of
humanitarian intervention is the fourth convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War (first adopted in 1949, based on parts of the 1907 Hague Convention). With the
adoption of additional protocols to the Geneva Conventions, the two streams of law converged.
One of the indicators of the future support for the Responsibility to Protect can be gleaned from
the public reaction as revealed through the media and other sources.
Hans Geiser, a former UN diplomat, wrote in the Trinidad Express Newspaper 27 March 2011
that the Resolution regarding "the Responsibility to Protect" is a historic event.829
Juan Cole argues, as I do, the intervention in Libya was prosecuted in a legal way: it was
demanded by the people being attacked, it included the support of the Arab League and was
authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution. The risk of a civilian mass murder
was real.830
Geiser argues that the Security Council has taken legitimate enforcement measures specifically
in line with and in support of the principle to protect innocent civilians and is not in violation of
the Charter provision and therefore does not render the resolution null and void. “We are
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reminded that one of the main roles of the UN in relation to the Charter is the progressive
development of international law, and this is precisely what took place.”831 According to the
Charter Article 27/3 an affirmative vote by nine members is required for decisions including the
concurring votes by the permanent members, and in fact this took place.832
However, the Responsibility to Protect does not create a legally binding obligation in itself.
Rather, it appeals to the “ethical conscience.”833 Needless to write, compelling moral action is
more uncertain than a legal obligation as the thesis has argued throughout. Although the
Responsibility to Protect has not yet reached the status of lex lata, each legitimate case can be
said to contribute to customary law.
Its status as soft law this helps to explain why the international community fails to act in certain
cases today and in the past. The protection of human rights is not always viewed as a compelling
argument. One approach is to try to argue that it is in the state’s self-interest to act; however,
this only tends to aggravate non-Western nations by suggesting to them that self-interest is the
basis of the Western states’ action rather than actions based on moral premises….creating a
Catch-22 situation.834 In terms of determining legitimacy, as suggested, the extent of any UN
endorsement for the Responsibility to Protect in any resolution must be very clearly passed at the
UN on the basis of humanitarian principles.

One of the main questions, however, is how such agreement is achieved. The success of a
Responsibility to Protect decision requires a combination of knowledge of the specific situation,
history, an appreciation and respect for the ethical and moral principle involved and collective
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legitimate action. The legal issues are important but can only be resolved in the transnational
environment with the assistance of the global network of key players. Without sufficient
resources to take effective action, the knowledge of mass human rights abuses may not be a
sufficient deterrent.
Daniel Pipes, the Director, Middle East Forum, 7 March 2011 raised an important point by
asking whether the Libyan intervention would set a precedent and become common law. Would
it mean that international forces all over the world would intervene when governments attack
their own populations? In considering this question, we need to remember that approval for the
Responsibility to Protect was approved to be on a case by case basis. Most, I believe, would not
want to see a law which allowed it to be implemented on a basis of convenience or custom
alone.835 At the same time the fact that it is made on a case by case basis, leading to what can be
perceived as inconsistencies, is not a justification for shelving it, especially if one wants to
establish its legality. Irwin Cotler stated in his New York Times Op-Ed, “Libya and the
Responsibility to Protect” that the situation in Libya “is a test case for the Security Council and
its implementation of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. …It is our collective responsibility
to ensure the Responsibility to Protect is an effective approach to protect people and human
rights.”836

835

“Does the UN Have a Responsibility to Protect Libyans?” The Mark March 7, 2011.
http://www.themarknews.com/articles/4244-does-the-un-have-a-responsibility-to-protect-libyans (accessed July 14,
2011).
836
New York Times “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/01/opinion/01ihtedcotler01.html?_r=3 (accessed July 23, 2011). Irwin Cotler is a member of the Canadian Parliament and a former
minister of justice. Cotler and Jared are co editors of the forthcoming “The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise of
Stopping Mass Atrocities in our Times.”

276

On March 2, 2011, Ramesh Thakur commented on Libya.837 He noted the language of the
Responsibility to Protect refers to state inability or unwillingness as the catalyst for the
international Responsibility to Protect to be called to action. Often the state itself is in fact the
perpetrator of atrocities when security forces, meant to protect people, are instead let loose in a
killing spree. That was the situation in Libya, where many had already been killed and a
carnage was feared. Reminding readers of the history of the Responsibility to Protect, Ramesh
Thakur concluded it provided the normative and political arguments necessary to deal militarily
with Gaddafi's human rights abuses. The UN and the West needed to overcome the stain of
being passive spectators in Rwanda and Srebrenica. He argued the crisis had exceeded the threat
level and the world needed to respond to the challenge. “Libya is the perfect opportunity to
convert the noble sentiments and words into deeds.”838
Tim Dunne wrote in the Interpreter on 3 March 2011, and referred to Srebrenica as a place where
the world permitted atrocity crimes to occur.839 Dunne expressed optimism that the UN Security
Council Resolution of 26 February calling for 'decisive action' and 'tough measures' against the
Gaddafi regime was a move in the right direction. This was the first time in his view that the
Responsibility to Protect was invoked in its hard core form in a Security Council resolution
against a specific country. As an illustration of the role of the international community in
furthering the norm, Dunne takes note of a strongly worded letter to the US president, calling for
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decisive action.840 It was signed by forty policy analysts, and included prominent neoconservatives associated with the George W. Bush Administration such as Robert Kagan,
William Kristol and Paul Wolfowitz, who was deputy-defence secretary under Bush. The letter
demands that the US and NATO develop operational plans to command Libyan waters and air
space.
Questions have been raised about how the engagement in Libya will affect long-term support for
the Responsibility to Protect. Another question pertains to the consistent application of the
Responsibility to Protect to other contexts as mentioned. An important point to remember is that
all states have an obligation to protect their own citizens from atrocities, and the Responsibility
to Protect has a number of measures available (diplomatic, economic, political), with the use of
force being used only as a last resort.
Sheri P Rosenberg841 wrote on 4 April 2011 regarding the situation in Libya.842 When economic
sanctions and travel bans failed to stop Gaddafi’s “no mercy” policy the Security Council moved
to military action as a last resort. Although it is still being questioned by some, there seems to be
little doubt that the world powers were motivated to and intended to protect innocent lives during
the threat of massacres in Libya. The approval of this action, however, has served to raise
controversy again over military intervention which is perceived as another instance of
imperialism.
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Critics need to be reminded that the Responsibility to Protect is a moral principle that is not
exclusively about military intervention. The R2P doctrine makes it clear that protecting
populations from mass atrocities involves a progressive action by states, including preventing
mass atrocity, reaction to the threat or occurrence of mass atrocity, and, if military action is taken
as a last resort at the final stage the goal is to build a durable peace. And there are indeed times
when military action as a last resort, as was the case in Libya, becomes the only way to stop a
potential bloodbath and avoid another Rwanda. Rosenberg reminds the reader that the moral
principles imbedded in the Responsibility to Protect doctrine should be seen not only as military
action, however, but as prevention. And again, military intervention must remain as “the
exception not the rule.”843 On April 1, 2011, Michael Abramowitz844 stated that actions by the
international community reveal an important shift in thinking over the past two decades
regarding preventing mass atrocities.845 The last twenty years has shown changes in policies by
civil society and governments that support the world’s collective capacity to respond to
genocide or threats of genocide which include the creation of an Office of Genocide Prevention
at the United Nations; a new International Criminal Court in The Hague, the adoption of a
doctrine of Responsibility to Protect at the United Nations (invoked in Libya); and steps by
individual governments to strengthen their ability to detect and react to potential genocide. One
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such step has been taken by the United States in the creation of the US Office of the Special
Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.846
David Chandler has written widely in this area. 847 On 19 April 2011 he suggested in Today’s
World, the bombing of Libya cannot readily be grasped in the traditional terms of the state
interests of Realpolitik In 2011, the debate over the ‘humanitarian’ bombing of Libya
demonstrates that we have moved into more of an emerging global cosmopolitanism of human
security. 848 Chandler argues this is humanitarian intervention in a different political or legal
framework than in the 1990s. The Libya campaign should not be posed as intervening in state
sovereignty, but rather should be posed in the post-humanitarian language of capacity-building
and good governance, with the purpose of strengthening the Libyan state through enabling the
forces of democracy.849 The last chapter of the thesis will address itself to the matter of
governance and what it means for a world order based on responsibility rather than the
sovereignty of the nation state alone.
VI.

The Significance of the Libyan Intervention

Much has been written already of the significance of the Libyan intervention and the future of
the Responsibility to Protect and of Libya. A meeting of leaders from thirty-five governments
and NGOs took place in London, England on 29 March, 2011, to discuss implementation of
Resolution 1973, the humanitarian needs of the Libyan people, and the future of
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Libya.850 Conference participants agreed that Gaddafi’s government must be held accountable
for its brutal use of force.851 A contact group was considered with close coordination to be
maintained with the UN, AU, Arab League, Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and
EU.
The Transitional National Council was also present and provided a statement entitled “A Vision
of Democratic Libya” which expressed the Council’s commitment to “a civil society that
recognizes intellectual and political pluralism and allows for the peaceful transition of power
through legal institutions and ballot boxes; in accordance with a national constitution crafted by
the people and endorsed in a referendum.”852 It was suggested, however, that without a
negotiated agreement allowing for an orderly transition to a post-Qaddafi legitimate political
order, the future would be uncertain. It is beyond the scope of this thesis, however, to examine
the situation in Libya post conflict in depth and I have not included it in my criteria for
legitimacy or success. The last chapter, however, will address the need for general concerns of
justice after a conflict ends (ius post bellum) and future governance.
I have taken the Libyan intervention as an appropriate case study of the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect in an international as well as a global governance environment which
includes a multitude of actions. When Special Adviser Edward Luck was asked if the military
intervention in Libya provides an example of the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect,
he confirmed it was and that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 of the United Nations Security Council
850
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referenced it. He also indicated this was indeed the first time that the Security Council employed
the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to implement the Responsibility to Protect. From
Andrew Thompson’s view, for example, Libya came the closest to “meeting the test.” He clearly
saw Libya as an historical example of the implementation of R2P. He commented “On balance,
if you are looking for a case on which to hang the Responsibility to Protect, Libya comes the
closest.”853 From my own analysis, I would agree with these conclusions.
To help with reaching a conclusion with regard to the legitimacy of the intervention, those
interviewed as part of the qualitative study of the Responsibility to Protect were also asked to
gauge whether the Libyan intervention was legitimate and whether it was a success. In the first
instance, respondents were asked their opinion on whether the Libyan intervention could be
regarded as a success for the Responsibility to Protect. A definition of success was not provided
and the respondents were primarily left to create their own criteria. While in some cases there
may be some overlap between the question of successful intervention and legitimacy, the two
questions were treated somewhat independently. Some of the suggested terminology for
defining success entailed the measurement of success, including ‘meeting the goal or mandate of
the action’, or ‘meeting the test’.
On the whole, measuring success was regarded as close to impossible. Nevertheless, Mark Sedra
clearly saw a positive; i.e. that,
the intervention did avert potential massacre. There was a clear danger to a lot of
civilians and it was imperative to act. It was a fairly limited intervention with no ground
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forces. In that sense it was successful in spite of the overarching question of how you
judge success.854
Ian Davis saw the Libyan intervention as “leaning towards the success end of the spectrum”,
although he hesitated to go so far as to call it a “model intervention.”855
One route to providing a judgment was to ask whether further mass atrocities were prevented
including the slaughter of civilians in Benghazi.856 Another criterion used to define success was
the multilateral nature of Security Council endorsement. The matter of regime change was
perhaps the most controversial and generally judgments were clouded. Those interviewed
generally felt that regime change was not a cine qua non for the Responsibility to Protect and
that it should only happen if a country is failing to protect its citizens or is perpetuating the
violence.
Nami Kikoler looked at it from both a practical and a moral perspective.
The reality is that in certain situations there are times when the leadership may
themselves be a serious threat and there may be a need for regime change, but the
Responsibility to Protect should not be used as an excuse to invade or oust the leader of a
country. We also shouldn’t care about the governance structure per se and whether a
government is democratic or not, but we must care about atrocities.857
Andrew Thompson even went so far as to read “regime change” into the resolution. From his
point of view the reference to “all necessary means” opened that door. Respect for human rights
law and trials is important for a definition of a successful government, and Andrew Thompson
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commented for this to be a successful government to replace Gaddafi the government must
uphold respect for human rights. “Trials and so on are necessary,” he said.858
Kyle Matthews suggested the principles of just war are important. “Military force can only be
used when you have a reasonable expectation of success.”859 Timeliness was also a
consideration. Naomi Kikoler concluded “On the whole it had probably been a positive effort. It
shows that the international community and the Security Council can work together and act
quickly.”860 One of the measures in the case of Libya (difficult if not impossible to quantify) was
whether mass human rights violations were prevented. “In spite of the difficulty in determining
this, many referred to this as a criterion of success. Andrew Thompson, for example, asked
“Were mass human rights violations prevented? On balance ‘yes’. How do we know when there
is a human rights violation taking place? – the answer for the Council was when NGOs send out
early warnings as well as UN agencies that sound the alarm.”861
David Welch commented affirmatively “If the main goal was to keep the Libyan government
from slaughtering civilians then it was a success. They were rolling toward Benghazi. The
opposition did not have trained fighters. They did in fact protect civilians so they met their
mandate.” 862 Naomi Kikoler agreed with this view, saying there was likely to have been a
massacre in Bentghazi. She also stated
I think we generally feel that lives were saved in Benghazi. It is important to emphasize
the fact that the international community responded in large part because they believed
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civilians were at risk of mass atrocities. They responded in a timely and decisive way.
There are lessons to be learned from the international response.863
Just War criteria were often referred to in relation to success. Timeliness was also a
consideration. In my view, success, apart from legitimacy of the action, is determined by the fact
that thousands were likely saved which was the primary objective of the intervention. It is not, I
stress, a matter of what happens later, after the objective has been reached. In other words, this
definition does not include an indeterminate period of time.
VII.

Was the Libyan Intervention Legitimate?

There is an important passage in the ICISS report that deals with legitimacy.
The authority of the UN is underpinned not by coercive power, but by its role in the
application of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy acts as the connecting link between
the exercise of authority and the recourse to power. Attempts to enforce authority can
only be made by the legitimate agents of that authority. Collective intervention blessed
by the UN is regarded as legitimate because it is duly authorized by a representative
international body; unilateral intervention is seen as illegitimate because selfinterested.864
Most of those interviewed agreed that the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in
Libya could be regarded as legitimate. However, they had some concerns regarding the role of
the ICC and the change in regime which somewhat clouded the issue for them. Jillian Siskind
stated in terms of the legitimacy of the intervention “The Libyan government was obliged to
protect its own people and was therefore in violation of international law when it did not. Many
states were willing to intervene to protect Libyan citizens.”865 Kyle Matthews suggested the
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principles of just war are important. “Military force can only be used when you have a
reasonable expectation to succeed.”866
Andrew Thompson referred to the six tests in the original ICISS document and commented that
there was
an imminent threat of a massacre; reasonable prospect of success -- Libya is not a big
country so without boots on the ground NATO could neutralize Gaddafi resources; the
right intention – the aim of the intervention in Libya was to prevent large scale loss of
life; and, the right authority. Only with a very liberal reading of the resolution, however,
could regime change be read into it. Russia agreed to a no fly zone, although they never
agreed to getting rid of Gaddafi.867
The efficacy of the reference to the ICC was questioned, however, with reference to the Libyan
intervention as to whether it helped or hindered the intervention. Ian Davis suggested
On the one hand the ICC is one aspect of international law and accountability that brings
the perpetrator to trial. On the other hand, the decision to bring Gaddafi to trial in the
Hague backed him and his supporters into a corner. It meant he had to find a refuge in a
country which does not support the ICC process, or be provoked into fighting until the
finish, which may have prolonged the conflict.
“On balance,” he said “I would still rather see an indictment where appropriate.”868
Kyle Matthews exhibited some skepticism regarding the legitimacy of killing Gaddafi in relation
to the mandate.
While the Security Council resolution itself was saying all necessary means, I think that
is different from saying we are going to go and kill Gaddafi - yet the compound was
targeted. I think they were trying to locate him and take him out of the picture. There is
evidence for that. The Security Council resolution was left vague deliberately.869
On the other hand, he ultimately showed support for the action by stating
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Susan Rice, the US Ambassador to UN reported on military convoys moving toward
Benghazi to an assault against thousands of people. I think when you have a leader that
refuses to step down, uses military force to commit violence against unarmed civilians
and that goes to the public radio and TV channels and says he plans to destroy them you
have an obligation to act. The real issue we have to think about and ask ourselves ‘Can
we leave someone like this in power?’ ‘Will civilians be protected if someone like this is
left in place?’870
Jillian Siskind also expressed some concern as to the possibility that “when states are putting
their own citizens at risk, regime change may be the only logical recourse available. I agree with
Siskind on this point, as indicated earlier. The problem is that regime change brings with it a
whole host of other difficulties. In a situation like Libya there was very little choice as to who is
going to take over power. Ian Davis in fact commented “If we are going to support rebels we
need to understand this group might be left in power.”871
Bill Graham felt that getting the Arab League and the UN on side was a way of gaining proper
legitimacy. He raised some important questions that he said surface when we think about
legitimacy; for example, what sort of interventions do we want? What are we building in terms
of instruments? What are we going to do if we do not intervene? It is not just a military matter.
There is reconstruction - diplomacy, and policies to stabilize and rebuild societies. What justifies
intervention? What are the threshold criteria? What is the effect of technology? Why not just
send a drone? What does that do to the issue of international legitimacy? All of these questions
are appropriate for us to ask.872
Jillian Siskind accepted that there was a legitimate reason to intervene. “We can criticize it now
seeing the problems in hindsight, but ultimately it was a legitimate action.”873 For David Dewitt,
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those countries that voted in favour of the resolution to set up a no fly zone in Libya did so
because they had weighed the evidence that supported the findings of a significant level of mass
violence. One could argue that an implementation of the Responsibility to Protect must be based
on clear evidence according to a strict set of criteria that large numbers of people have been
systematically abused and the regime is unable or unwilling to stop it. Alternatively, It must be a
systematic policy not to act and by not acting allowing the continuation of some structural
violence.874
Mark Sedra considered just war theory and noted the intervention “involved Arab League
support regional support and broad support of the UN Security Council.”875 Carolyn McAskie
clearly believed the Libyan intervention was legitimate. She added that actions with a view to
creating peace and security were legitimate in her view. This is also the intention of the framers
of the Charter. If the Security Council is charged with working on behalf of the broader
membership to intervene and decides this is the place to do that it has to be a legitimate decision.
She added “That does not prevent it from being a bad decision.”876
Marion Arnaud also supported the notion that authorization is legal if it is granted by the
Security Council. This is what it takes in international law. A Security Council resolution
makes it legal. The application of the no fly zone in Libya was ultimately legitimate. Were the
tactics broader than the mandate? Was it about regime change? How do you separate it from
“all necessary measures”? One wonders why the Security Council included language like that
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which left the door open for multiple interpretations. There are very different arguments on
these points. 877
VIII. Summary and Conclusions

The conclusions that I draw from this analysis and the opinions of those professionals
interviewed is that, given the circumstances in Libya, with its own leader killing protesters and
threatening more killing in actions amounting to war crimes and human atrocities, the movement
toward hard and coercive intervention according to the Responsibility to Protect principle had
just cause. The agreement to implement the military operations in Libya had the right intention
to protect civilians from a state that was already killing and was about to slaughter masses of its
citizens. The resolution was agreed to as the last resort and was proportionate. It was also a
legal process with the right authority invoked. The Resolution also enforced sanctions while
explicitly excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory.
Also, by considering the possible underlying motives of those making the decision, my analysis
concludes the action was motivated primarily by humanitarian concerns rather than the selfinterest of states.
In considering ‘right authority,’ I conclude that in addition to the formal approval of the UN
Security Council there existed the backing of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the requests from the Libyan rebel leaders
themselves and a myriad of civil society representatives. The confluence of these different
organizations and people established the legitimacy of the authority for the military operations.
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On the matter of proportionate means, the purpose of a no fly zone and of excluding a foreign
occupation was to maintain proportionality between the regime’s violence and that of the rebels
and to allow Libya to remain in charge of its own destiny without the presence of boots on the
ground. Nevertheless, it does seem that there is a fine line in this case between efforts to stop
Gaddafi from slaughtering civilians and the apparent support of the rebels’ efforts toward regime
change. I would suggest on the issue of force to prevent mass atrocities, it is very difficult, if not
impossible, for external bodies to maintain neutrality and a complete balance of impartiality. In
this sense it is not what we would like to see as conflict resolution. It is a difficult task from the
air to police conflicts neutrally; siding with the rebels may have been the only intervention
strategy that made operational sense. However, it is likely the Security Council never would have
officially endorsed intervention on behalf of the rebels, so intervening governments felt
compelled to cast the entire operation in terms of neutral civilian protection. This dynamic
introduces a significant legitimacy problem for the Responsibility to Protect.878 This is in fact
one way in which the International Criminal Court can be helpful. It is, of course, necessary to
have evidence. It is not like mediation or negotiation as forms of conflict resolution where the
third party does not take sides.

A remaining criterion in assessing the intervention is “the reasonable prospects for success.”
Gaddafi and his forces remained committed to maintaining their power, even as it diminished.
The outcome moved quickly in the direction of the NTC. It seems that the situation was assessed
and determined to be doable. Obviously the outcome, the cessation of the killing and the
prevention of genocide as the criterion for success supports this.
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After the intervention, the National Transitional Council (NTC) began the transition process and
assumed governance responsibilities, discussing the formation of a unity government in Libya
and the re-building of the country. The UN Security Council approved a US-led proposal to
unfreeze $1.5 billion (US) in August to begin the process of re-building the country in the pastGaddafi era. 879 The Arab League also officially supported the rebels as Libya’s new
authority.880 NTC leader Mahmoud Jibril declared on 24 August that there would be free
legislative and executive elections in Libya in eight months.881

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in remarks on 24 August 2011, acknowledged that over the
past year the Responsibility to Protect had become an operational reality. According to Ban KiMoon, our responsibility as an international community is to help the people of Libya realize
their aspirations. The United Nations would be involved in ensuring post-conflict assistance in
all key areas, including economic recovery, elections, human rights, transitional justice and the
drafting of a new constitution.882
Yet the historical context presents difficulty for the task of rebuilding. The new Libyan
leadership faces four decades of an autocratic regime that failed to build genuine state
institutions. The challenge is to establish an “inclusive and representative transitional governing
body; address immediate security risks; and find an appropriate balance between the search for
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accountability and justice and the imperative of avoiding arbitrary score-settling and revenge.“883
Libya’s rulers will need to urgently turn their attention to political legitimacy, security, law and
order, and transitional justice and reconciliation. Significant international work should go into
helping provide sustenance and shelter to those in need.884
In places where they haven’t existed building institutions is a complicated enterprise. It is clear
that those other than the U.S. and Europe will have to take on many of the development and
diplomatic tasks required for a transition from authoritarian ways to a more open and fair society
if that is the direction to be maintained.

Libyans do have access to oil resources, but rebuilding

needs skills and capacity in a variety of economic, social and governance tasks.885

Rachel Gerber (The Stanley Foundation) suggests saying “It’s not your business” is no longer an
acceptable argument to give the international community when it comes to internal violence
targeted at civilians. The Responsibility to Protect is proving to be a dynamic policy framework
that is meant to adjust and adapt as best it can to complex situations involving human atrocity. It
has been shown that compelling moral sentiments can be moved to meet the messy realities of
the world and they should continue to do so.
Although many have classified the campaign in Libya as a mistake because of the complexity,
we need to understand and accept intervention to protect civilians inevitably involves some error.
Civilian protection is not a simple endeavor. Translating a sense of responsibility into effective
policies requires an ability to adapt and create. It is more reasonable to say we have
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accomplished more by doing than by a response of inaction in the face of mass violence. Some
governments seem to understand this problem, and remain committed to preserving the
Responsibility to Protect.886 My own position on the Responsibility to Protect emphasizes this
even more. In my view the doctrine represents a critically important advance in human security.
It was developed in response to tragedies such as Rwanda and Bosnia and other such human
catastrophes and we cannot afford to let our commitment lapse or be destroyed by unnecessary
fears or wrongheaded interests.

As a primary mover in the Responsibility to Protect, what now is the role for Canada in Libya
and elsewhere? According to the World Federalist Movement Canada, the international
community applauded Resolution 1973 as an illustration of the application of the doctrine of the
Responsibility to Protect and as a necessary measure to prevent a humanitarian crisis in the city
of Benghazi. The World Federalist Movement Canada stated that Canadian parliamentarians,
and any renewed House of Commons motion, should develop ‘benchmarks’ for success for
Canada, NATO, and the international community in Libya.887 Furthermore, Canada, through its
government, civil society and industry, can help with drafting a constitution, advising on the
creation of an inclusive, pluralistic parliamentary system, supporting human rights, and
generating economic growth so that young Libyans at last have a future.888 Lloyd Axworthy
expressed his support for the UN-mandated operation in Libya in combination with popular
democratic forces within Libya. He sees this as a “resetting of the international order toward a
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more human, just world.’ It means immediate and appropriate action as called for in the
Responsibility to Protect.”889

Anne-Marie Slaughter, former Director of Policy Planning for the State Department in the U.S.,
notes intervention in Libya has not been perfect, delivering indirect and patchy protection and
putting the region’s long term stability in the hands of fractious, inexperienced and untrained
rebels is uncertain. 890 I believe the main challenge for the norm is to give credit to the United
Nations (and NATO) for success in Libya. This determination of success is not intended to be
measured by events taking place in Libya after the initial intervention in 2011 and the change in
leadership. A lot has happened since then and it is not the intention of the thesis to analyse the
results of any post bellum action. However, this is certainly a question for further research and
consideration of the obligations of this and any Responsibility to Protect intervention.

One of the concerns that have been raised as a result of the application of The Responsibility to
Protect in the case of Libya is why the Security Council has only intervened in Libya when there
are other situations that involve violence to the civilian population to the extent of human
atrocity. For example, Brian Whitaker asks why Libya and not Yemen or Bahrain or other
places with all the popular uprisings that are happening in the Middle East and with all the
civilians being killed or injured. I would suggest Syria today is and has been of the most serious
concern.891 While the international community is contemplating its Responsibility to Protect the
thousands of civilians at the mercy of its leader, any sort of resolution has been criminally slow.
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One suggestion is that the lack of respect for Muammar Gaddafi was a source of motivation in
Libya. Certainly his outright threats to kill his opposition contributed to the decision. But that
would not seem to be the only reason for treating Libya differently. The support of the Arab
States was also a contributing factor, along with the fact that the rebels themselves asked for a
no-fly zone. The veto has also been used to block action in the Security Council regarding Syria
and tensions have only increased between Russia and the West. It is known that Russia has clear
interests in Syria. But these are simple answers on my part – the conflict in Syria is a tragedy
that deserves a comprehensive analysis which must be left for another time.
In response to the question of what it was in Libya that prompted the Resolution, Luck said in an
interview “there seemed to be crimes against humanity, that is, widespread and systematic
attacks on the population with the knowledge of the authorities.” 892 The air attacks on peaceful
protesters were outrageous. Nevertheless, the Security Council tried sanctions first - but the
Gaddafi regime kept advancing. Finally, there was valid reason to believe that “a bloodbath in
Benghazi was imminent” which fulfilled the first test – here was just cause.
It is clear, nevertheless, that the Responsibility to Protect cannot be universally applied and that
mistakes and adjustments will have to be made when it is applied. 893 A debate on the
Responsibility to Protect within the UN General Assembly last September suggests that
governments recognize this and remain committed to preserving the Responsibility to Protect, as
in my view they should.894
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In another interview with Edward Luck, Special Advisor on the Responsibility to Protect,
conducted by Bernard Gwertzman and reported in the Council on Foreign Relations on
September 2011, Luck commented on Libya. He stated Libya represents an important precedent
-- with respect to Resolution 1970895 which talked about sanctions, and sending Gaddafi and
some of his people to the International Criminal Court, and then in Resolution 1973896 which
talked about all necessary measures to protect populations -- all of which invoked the
Responsibility to Protect. The principle was agreed upon and it was clear that a government that
attacks peaceful protesters with military force is not a condition of normal governance and is not
acceptable.
What is yet to be seen is how Libya evolves after the military intervention in the long term and
whether it is able to control its own destiny at the time. European Council President Herman
Van Rompuy stated “Reconciliation and transition must be a Libyan-led process.897 NTC leaders
also met with Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for Post-Conflict Planning for Libya at
the start of September, and requested UN post-conflict assistance in elections, transitional
justice, and reconciliation.898 On 26 August, 2011 Ban Ki-moon met with representatives from
the African Union, European Union, Arab League, and Organization of the Islamic Conference,
and asked them to help deliver a democratic transition to a new government.899 The NTC moved
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forward.900 Human Rights Watch called for countries to help secure resources and urge the NTC
to train police, build judicial institutions, and protect all individuals, particularly those vulnerable
to revenge attacks.901 Nevertheless, we do know today serious problems remain.
As stated, it is not the task of this thesis to analyze the status of Libya after the ending of the
conflict but rather only to assess it as a case of the implementation of the Responsibility to
Protect under extreme circumstances. I leave that as a follow up research study to the thesis. A
judgment of the legitimacy of the intervention should not, however, be based on the long term
results of the intervention, although I do recognize there is a responsibility on the part of the
interveners not to simply walk away. The intervention in Libya was designed to avert the
threatened massacre of regime opponents in the capital of Benghazi and was successful in
meeting its mandate. Although the sole criterion is not whether lives were saved, and the other
legitimacy criteria employed are also important, the fact that the motivation was humanitarian
and a large number of lives were indeed saved is in my view one the weightiest of the six
criteria. Until recently, insistence that the UN could not intervene in any matter that was
“essentially within the jurisdiction of any state” prevented the intervention into state-generated
violence against civilians by the UN Security Council.902 The Libyan intervention constitutes a
dramatic new benchmark for its application.

David Hillstrom raised the broader point that there is now a tangible case through the process
and the consequences of accepting ‘the Responsibility to Protect’ as a guiding principle in
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international affairs which can be subjected to scrutiny (as I have done in this document).903 He
recommended solidifying the framework for the Responsibility to Protect further with a written
legal document to govern future decisions.
This chapter has developed a framework for the assessment of the legitimacy of a military
intervention after the action has taken place. The objective was to test the Libyan intervention
against this framework within the current international legal and political environments. It
concludes that Libya stands up to such a test. Whether future changes in process may occur, the
final question on Libya will be on what the decision in favor of the Responsibility to Protect
means for and to the international community as a collective and as part of an emerging form of
governance. In response to questions of non-interventions elsewhere, one could argue “just
because you can’t do the right thing everywhere doesn’t mean you shouldn’t do the right thing
somewhere.”904
Linked to the question of the assessment of the prospects for success, as suggested, is the
question of the future of the Responsibility to Protect principle itself. There are clearly weighty
implications for the norm of the Responsibility to Protect moving forward.905 However, in my
view criticism of the Libyan intervention should not deter the international community from in
the important work it has done with regards to the Responsibility to Protect and the protection of
civilians from mass atrocity. Instead, the intervention should be used to learn the strengths,
weaknesses, pitfalls and successes of the Responsibility to Protect action.
Tim Dunne, Research Director for the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
in August 2011 focussed on what he labelled as the ‘revolution in moral consciousness’ that is
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symbolized by the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Libya can be used as a
successful example of the Responsibility to Protect mandate with the transfer of full sovereignty
– over land and air – back to the Libyan people.906 Maligned by some, seen as a positive step
forward in atrocity prevention by others, one may conclude the Responsibility to Protect was
transformative and prevented further atrocities at that time. The effort to build a new Libya
whose government is representative, which meets the basic aspirations of its people and avoids
the settling of past scores remains critical. The magnitude of this challenge ought not to be
underestimated. After the end of the no fly zone and the application of the Responsibility to
Protect Lloyd Axworthy wrote that the hard work for the international community was just
beginning in Libya. He suggested the third crucial element, rebuilding Libya on a democratic,
stable foundation – was yet to come (although as pointed out this was not specified as a goal of
the resolution and therefore not part of the analysis).907
Chapter ten brings the discussion to a close and moves on to consider the future of the
Responsibility to Protect. It also identifies gaps in the literature where further research and
investigation would be beneficial.
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Chapter Ten: After the Fighting Stops
The real and lasting victories are those of peace
and not of war. (Buddha)
This dissertation has considered the evolving norm of the Responsibility to Protect with respect
to its two main aspects. The first is that states have a Responsibility to Protect their own
populations from mass atrocities – specifically genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. This duty is founded in international law in a range of established international
and regional human rights conventions and is endorsed in the General Assembly’s 2005 World
Summit Agreement. No state denies this duty.908 Nor do they deny that the society of states may
rightfully hold states to account for the performance of this duty under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter. The second aspect is that bystander states of the ‘international community.’ “.. have not
simply a right but a collective responsibility to assist host states in protecting their populations
and to act to protect these populations in situations where the host state is manifestly failing to do
so.”909 While the full principle was approved in the World Summit Outcome document in 2005,
it remains difficult to implement.
The issue has been whether the principle of the Responsibility to Protect is working - is it being
accepted and endorsed as either an international norm, soft law (lex ferenda) or international
hard law (lex lata) in a global governance environment; and what are the impediments to and
factors that support and enhance its implementation? Are there cases where it has been
implemented and what factors support it or have stood in its way? Which factors are most
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influential? And, ultimately, is it a principle worthy of endorsement or is it a flawed principle,
no longer deserving of continued support?
The research and discussions have referenced the tension between the principles of state
sovereignty and state responsibility to the individual; the legality and legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention; the self-interest of states and altruistic principles; the inclusion of nongovernmental
actors as players in global governance and the balance of power between states and NGOs in the
international community; and, finally the UN and its institutional authority for resolving
conflicts. The research investigates the significance of each issue as it influences the evolution of
the norm in transnational law and any attempts to implement the principle of the Responsibility
to Protect. Through the analysis of its history and development along with the case study in
Libya 2011, my study serves as an analysis of how a fundamental and yet controversial
international norm can be created, promoted, accepted and ultimately implemented in a
transnational environment, regardless of the many impediments that stand in its way. It also
illustrates how a concept or idea can be transformed to eventually become law.
Even though the Responsibility to Protect has been controversial, we have seen from this study
that it has gained considerable support over the past decade, and has been successfully utilized at
least once, and invoked many more times. With the aid of NGOs, norm entrepreneurs and the
United Nations it has rightfully established itself within an international set of legal norms that
holds human rights as sacrosanct.
Further, the Responsibility to Protect is evolving. It has not yet reached the level of customary
law or lex lata. As soft law, it is not only a legal and political doctrine, it is also a moral one
which stands to protect civilians in conflict in the case of the failure of states to protect their own
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population. It is based on human rights principles and humanitarian legal principles concerned
with the rights of the individual. Nevertheless, in the efforts of the international community
obligations to protect civilians in failing states, the response is frequently impeded by politics
and the self-interest and sovereignty of states. The development of international law in the case
of the Responsibility to Protect has been highly dependent on norm entrepreneurs, some of
whom were or are in government or international organizations and many who were not tied to
any government structure. In consequence, NGOs are often in a better position to advocate for
moral values, being less constrained by political interests. As a result of their support and
activity, NGOs become an important aspect of global governance in instances of internal conflict
situations that threaten the peace and stability of states and of the human rights principle.
Regardless of impediments, the Responsibility to Protect is implementable. It is not a flawed
principle but an essential one in today’s environment of intra state conflict. State sovereignty
must give way to state responsibility when citizens are in extreme jeopardy. The United Nations
is the appropriate seat for international decisions regarding the Responsibility to Protect.
Key theoretical findings are that the logic of appropriateness, idealism, constructivism,
liberalism, solidarism and structuralism provide better and more plausible explanations of the
international community’s need to rely on moral values than do the logic of consequences,
pluralism, or realism. In addition, the way that actors perceive the motivations of other decision
makers influence their own decisions and may work to impede their efforts to save civilians.
The development of the norm of the Responsibility to Protect has been described from a
theoretical perspective through the former theoretical perspectives as well as through the lens of
norm entrepreneurship as well as through the accounts of critical scholars involved in the early
stages in the formulation and writing of the ICISS report and its ultimate acceptance by the
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United Nations General Assembly have been sought and taken into account. The analysis of
these theoretical premises illustrates that different perceptions of the norm can influence how
actors respond when making decisions regarding the implementation of the Responsibility to
Protect. The study also demonstrates how the norm goes on to survive in today’s global
environment through a community of actors, including but not limited to the UN and their
adherence to certain basic humanitarian principles.
Key methodological findings are that we can reach a deeper understanding of how norms work
if we investigate not only the actions but the thinking and motivations of significant actors who
contribute to their development and implementation.
I.

The Sovereignty/Responsibility Debate

The norm of state sovereignty has been the cornerstone of international law and states have the
right to self defense and non-intervention.910 Thus any discussion of the Responsibility to
Protect must contend with state sovereignty. The dissertation describes how this foundation has
shifted from the absolute right of the state to the responsibility of the state toward its own
citizens and those of other states. By accepting responsibility, states forfeit their rights when they
are not exercising their sovereignty according to established rules. This normative shift has
accompanied a shift in the nature of conflict itself - from interstate conflict being most common
in the past to the current situation with armed intrastate conflict being the main source of
violence - making the responsibility to protect civilians an even more relevant principle.
In considering the sovereignty/responsibility debate and legal context for the development of the
norm, I consider the new and shifting principle of responsibilities within the UN with respect to
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self-determination, sovereign equality, protection of fundamental human rights, and the
prohibition against the invasion into another state’s territory through forceful intervention. This
latter principle has been a strong force for the maintenance of the status quo and the authority
and the rights of the state. While sovereign states bear primary responsibility for their own
citizens, they have not taken and do not always take responsibility for them consistently.911 As a
result, in embracing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect, states agreed that if a state fails
in its responsibility to its own citizens, the responsibility and authority shifts to the international
community.
The sovereignty/responsibility debate is often couched in the concept of humanitarian
intervention and is caught on the horns of the frequently conflicting principle of sovereignty and
state interest versus the normative ideal of the protection of civilians under threat.912 In part,
because the main state players are often Western countries, the Security Council, NATO, the
CSCE, the EU and the G-7/8, concerns are often expressed regarding the self-interest of states in
the context of the suspicion of Western interventionism. An underlying assumption in some of
the scholarly and political debates is the realist perspective that interested parties cannot be
trusted or relied upon to act in the interest of other national citizens and not in their own
geopolitical interests. This conflict particularly plays itself out in the international arena at
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meetings of the Security Council where the states find themselves prone to deadlock as a
manifestation of the imbalance of power among states and states own self-interest. The quest for
a disinterested regime, which seeks a neutral, principled and unbiased international organ
represents a serious challenge.
I have suggested that ‘universal’ norms such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
various conventions, including the Genocide Conventions and the Geneva Convention to name a
few, that have already become part of the ethos of the United Nations and international law, and
have been endorsed in recent legal, cultural and social history have laid the foundations for the
Responsibility to Protect doctrine. In doing so I have expressed a view that these norms overall
should take precedence over actions taken in self-interest by western and non-western states
alike.913 However, how the Responsibility to Protect and the self-interest of states along with
state sovereignty plays out in cases of human atrocity and whether the principle becomes a
reality when the international community is faced with the death of thousands of civilians is a
major subject of the thesis.
Some try to resolve the sovereignty/intervention contradiction by transcending the parochial
interest of state politics, perhaps using the notion of cosmopolitan interest, and the notion that a
fair interventionist regime is in everybody’s interest in the quest for global governance.914 I take
913
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the position that adherence to the human rights legal agreements and ultimately moral values are
required to trump self-interest if the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is to be implemented,
particularly since its legal status is unclear and there are no mechanisms to enforce it. I go
further still to say this principle is necessary in a world where conflict frequently reflects the
deadly potential of the mass murder of innocents. I even take a further step by demonstrating
that this approach can in fact be effectively applied.
Barriers frequently remain, however, and must be challenged. There is no doubt that the notion
of state responsibility outside its borders represents a shift, and frequently an unwelcome shift,
from the principle of state sovereignty, autonomy and the principle of non-intervention. The
action in the Security Council particularly illustrates how important sovereignty remains as states
vote for or veto resolutions which may affect their responsibilities for civilians at risk.
Along with this shift from state sovereignty to a conception of state responsibility is a shift in the
underlying principle of state rights to non-interference. This shift may be considered as a move
away from states acting purely in their self-interest to a more humanitarian purpose involving the
consideration of the individual, human rights and the rights of civilians to be protected from
humanitarian atrocities, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. While there may be debate
about the universality of these principles and the adherence to their supremacy across the
international and transnational network, they have come to form a principal set of operational
categories within the legal and normative complexity of their environment.
While the Responsibility to Protect is now imbedded in humanitarian international law, it has not
achieved the status of codified law and there is no mechanism to enforce it. Since it must be
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invoked on a case by case basis, there exists the possibility that it could become customary law
but to date the only clear instance of its application in its hard core form has been in Resolutions
1970 and 1973 of the Security Council in the case of Libya in 2011. Security Council resolutions
have been cited to illustrate the instances of the Security Council’s reference to its terms in other
instances as well. I have found, by conducting an analysis of the application of the principle in
Libya that there is little doubt of its having been effective in shortening the conflict. I thus
regard it as representative of a successful case of the implementation of the Responsibility to
Protect. Chapter Nine examined not only the legality but the legitimacy of its enactment in
Libya. By applying a just war theoretical framework plus the principles imbedded in the
Commission’s original report, along with the criteria of legality, the thesis has demonstrated the
legitimacy and success of the action in Libya at the time of the 2011 crisis. Considerations of not
only the legality of the actions but the legitimacy of the actions help to define the authority of the
Responsibility to Protect and future possibilities for the implementation of the norm in a
somewhat weak legal context.
The reference in the Outcome Document to a case by case basis, however, weakens the legality
of the responsibility to protect as far as requirements of generality, clarity and constancy over
time are necessary for customary law.915 Calls for a more representative Security Council speak
to the concern about generality. Clarity requirements are also addressed by calls for criteria to
judge when action needs to be taken. Further guidelines beyond the general significance to the
four general categories would significantly enhance the legality of the norm by subjecting case
by case decisions to over-arching criteria that identify the extreme and exceptional cases. This
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would enable a reasoned judgment.916 The wording ‘on a case-by-case basis’ would seem to
reflect the hesitation on the part of the international community to commit the Council to a firm
duty to act.
An important aspect of the development of the norm is that states are not the sole actors and to
some extent share their power with civil society and nongovernmental and non-state actors in a
global context.
The thesis has demonstrated that nongovernmental actors (NGOs) are a very important part of
not only the development of the norm but in its being kept alive in the current transgovernance
context. In some ways NGOs have more freedom and flexibility than states in acknowledging
the necessity of action, in dealing with state governments and non-armed state actors and in
ascertaining the views and problems of people on the ground. They have been important actors
in the development of the Responsibility to Protect norm and continue to be critical in its
sustainability today. The thesis identifies certain key actors and documents their historical
participation through the application of the theory of norm entrepreneurship. Key organizations
and senior staff have been selected and approached in an effort to provide a thick description of
their role as norm entrepreneurs in the evolution of the norm.

II.

The Theory and the Practice

In particular, I have considered the Responsibility to Protect in terms of its legality and
legitimacy by applying the literature in the fields of legal theory, international relations,
international law and political science and as a form of norm entrepreneurship which includes the
916
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significant contribution of NGOs and civil society. This is intended to increase our understanding
of the functions, origin and meaning of the relevant rules and institutions and to encourage the
consideration of future developments and institutional designs that will be able to deal with
anticipated prospects for a peaceful resolution (or at least an approved agreement in the form of a
legal document.) 917 The focus on the Responsibility to Protect as a centrepiece of multilateral
efforts is justified by the central role the ICISS and the UN and other norm entrepreneurs have
played in the creation and dissemination of a new norm. In this case the new norm is one where
state responsibility trumps individual state sovereignty and pure state self-interest.
In order to consider an emerging norm a success, concrete measures must be implemented
multilaterally (that is, states must change their behavior in tangible ways). As Glanville argues,
“While the legal force of key international statements on the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle
may be weak at best, the international court of justice and the international law commission have
offered bold declarations in recent years which do point towards the gradual development of
legal duties for the extraterritorial protection of populations.”918 The concept of the
Responsibility to Protect has been used recently by NGOs, states, and international organizations
in response to crises in Libya, Syria and Yemen and has been referred to in numerous UN
Resolutions as documented earlier in the thesis as material evidence of its evolution. (See
discussion on resolutions Chapter Eight )..
Peter Uvin argues that changes in discourse do have an impact on the real world by helping to
determine what actions are considered as acceptable and by creating incentives and by
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influencing what expectations dominate. 919 The thesis has focussed on those changes in
discourse that particularly surround the Responsibility to Protect. Even though there are no
enforcement mechanisms, norms can effect critical action.920
III.

Moral and Legal Issues in International Relations

Although complicated, it is necessary to pursue processes and outcomes in the implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect are key. Issues such as ‘trust,’ and ‘justice’ also emerge as
important when considering processes and outcomes. One overriding question in implementing
the Responsibility to Protect decisions in order to respond to crises is how to deal with negative
beliefs - misperceptions, suspicion, mistrust–not only between powerful states in the Security
Council but between groups in conflict within the country in need of assistance. The key to
success in both cases involves the development of trust and an appreciation of differences and
perspectives between powerful states in the Security Council and between groups within the
conflict situation. Powerful opponents may have their own factions within. Agreements, for
example, must be seen to be “just and practical to the parties involved and to the society at
large.”921
According to Buchanan’s moral theory of the ’Natural Duty of Justice,’ we all have a duty to
help ensure that all people have access to institutions that protect their basic rights (basing this on
each person’s obligation to treat every person equally in terms of concern and respect.)922 This
raises the question of how we factor in the wishes of the local population and the rights of
individuals within that society after the fighting ends (ius post bellum). The intellectual tradition
found in democratic liberalism does address some of these issues. Tidwell speaks to his
919
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perception of democratic liberalism by suggesting some of the same principles apply; e.g., the
notions of representation, good governance and the maintenance of legitimacy. 923,924

In terms of the Libyan conflict, giving consideration to the non-state actors’ issue of selfdetermination requires principles of democracy and the rights of persons to be governed by
democratic norms. In some way this resembles Buchanan’s moral theory of the ’Natural Duty of
Justice’925 and raises the importance of including the wishes of the local population in the
process of ending the conflict and asks how we go about doing that. The question of the forms of
governance in multi-ethnic societies, and the matter of global security and sovereignty need to be
a primary consideration. If we consider the role of the United Nations in particular, we realize
the necessity of its participation in all stages of the Responsibility to Protect.

IV.

The Role of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Legal Status of the
Responsibility to Protect

“The High-Level Panel Report, the Report of the Secretary General, and the Outcome Document
postulate that coercive collective action is to be undertaken through the Security Council.”926 The
main documents concerning R2P do not deal with the question, however, regarding
compliance.927
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The veto in the Security Council as described in the thesis can be one of the more entrenched
impediments to the use of the principle in circumstances of serious conflict. The fact that there is
no overarching authority in international law and particularly no mechanism to oversee and
enforce decisions made in the UN Security Council continues to hinder the implementation of
the Responsibility to Protect. This leads to what I believe to be a key impediment to the
implementation of the Responsibility to Protect – the existence of the veto and its use to support
or obstruct the passing of crucial resolutions in the Security Council. The self-interest of states
and realist perspectives still underlie much of the political reality in terms of failure of the
Security Council to act when a crisis erupts. In an atmosphere of suspicion and mistrust, it is
very difficult for states with the right of veto in the Security Council to come to an agreement.
The history and reasons for the veto have been presented in the thesis and alternatives that might
aid in achieving the appropriate power balance are considered in this Chapter. Old and new
shadows of mistrust overhang divisions between the East and the West and between the North
and South, with long term suspicions hampering the vote even in serious situations where many
civilians are suffering and in fact dying in large numbers.
In the case of Libya and the resulting resolutions, Russia and China abstained and the resolution
passed. In the case of Syria in 2012, Russia and China have virtually vetoed all efforts to
implement any aspect of the responsibility of the international community to protect the
thousands of civilians who were being killed. The basis of the disagreement would seem to be
the self-interest of those states, but also their lack of trust of the other countries’ intentions or
motivations towards humanitarian principles – including even those softer sanctions such as
economic embargoes. Fear of regime change and imperialist motivations fuel opposition to
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intervention and there is no arbiter or mediator to bring them to a resolution of their differences.
The thesis raises the problem of the capricious use of the veto in the Security Council. The ICISS
report recommends
a code of conduct for the use of the veto with respect to actions that are needed to stop or
avert a significant humanitarian crisis. The idea essentially is that a permanent member,
in matters where its vital national interests were not claimed to be involved, would not
use its veto to obstruct the passage of what would otherwise be a majority resolution.928
The history of the veto and the reasons for its persistence as presented in Chapter Five helps to
show why the veto is important. It also suggests fair decisions need not be prevented or
impeded. The Security Council needs to have the unhampered opportunity to make a decision
and not abdicate from its responsibility to protect. 929 I myself do not advocate for the
elimination of the veto, only for its judicious use. Eliminating the possibility of a veto in the
case of genocide or human atrocities is also an unlikely and highly controversial option, which
would require strong advocacy in the face of state sovereignty. Ideally it should not be necessary
for the principle to be effective.
While the Responsibility to Protect is not yet a legal prescription, there is some general
agreement that it is based on established legal obligations and legal doctrine in international law,
as well as being dependent on the mobilization of political will. At the moment there is no
punishment for inaction and thus R2P can only be operationalized if states are inclined to do
so.”930 In the event that a situation erupts of intra-state crisis and the state is unwilling or unable
to address it, there is no guarantee that the international community will respond through the
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Security Council.931 The sanctioning of action appears to ‘depend more upon a coincidence of
national interest than on procedural legality.’932 Antonio Cassese states and the thesis accepts
the argument that the Security Council tends to remain selective.933 The ICISS proposed a ‘code
of conduct’ to overcome this selectivity.934 The use of the veto weakens the potential for
consistent decision-making and the calls for the non-use of the veto also raises legality
considerations.935
Ultimately, the Responsibility to Protect will not emerge as a global legal norm unless there is
consistent practice.936 Nevertheless, the responsibility to protect has been increasingly supported
by globally-shared understandings in spite of its critics and the Outcome Document along with
civil society support and Security Council resolutions and all the other material evidenced in this
dissertation provides a platform for efforts to build up its legality. One might question whether,
if the Security Council fails, the burden shifts back to individual states? What happens to the
three substantive components of the Responsibility to Protect (responsibility to prevent, react,
rebuild) as a positive duty to act under international law.
The need to create a Council where the voices of less powerful members can be heard and can
have a serious influence is great. The credibility and legitimacy of the Council as a source of
international law is often raised. In spite of this the number of formal Council meetings have
grown significantly to the point that the Council is now virtually in daily session. Paul suggests
enlarging the Council with non-permanent members in order to achieve better representation of
931
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regions, and of diverse kinds of states – poor as well as rich, small as well as large, which can
then create a Council that can act credibly and legitimately.937 Those who support the status quo
often insist that the most powerful countries must be given special privileges at the UN, to keep
them involved in the organization. Critics argue the power balances have shifted. Many
reformers, like Colombia, New Zealand, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, would like to limit or do away
with the veto and even with permanent membership itself.938
The power of the veto has been intensely controversial since the drafting of the UN Charter in
1945. Yet, without the veto privilege the United States and Russia would probably not have
accepted the creation of the United Nations. Many years later there is still an active debate
regarding the role of the Security Council, its membership and its work.939 In a speech to the UN
General Assembly a bloc of small countries put forward a recommendation that urged the
Permanent Members (P5) of the UNSC to agree to refrain from using their veto power in the
case of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.940,941 The idea of this kind of
restraint on the Council’s veto power in situations of mass atrocities was in fact expressed in the
ICISS 2001 report. The Report stated
...it is unconscionable that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave
humanitarian concern. Of particular concern is the possibility that needed action will be
held hostage to unrelated concerns of one or more of the permanent members – a
situation that has too frequently occurred in the past. 942
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The ICISS report itself recommended that the UNSC agree to a “code of conduct” with regards
to their veto power.
Citizens for Global Solutions (CGS), an ICRtoP member, has further explored the idea of a code
of conduct, and their recommendations were presented in the UN Secretary-General’s (UNSG)
2009 report. Ban Ki-moon stated
Within the Security Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility
because of the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the
Charter. I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto
in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the responsibility to
protect, as defined in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual
understanding to that effect.943
The majority of the five Permanent Members are ‘western’ and four out of five are
‘industrialized’ countries. The four-fifths of the world living in the 'non-western' part has only
one voice – China – among the Permanent Members. It would seem important that the Council
should be more broadly representative. A single veto-wielding power can stop an international
response dead in its track and could totally frustrate the will of the overwhelming majority of the
international community.944
It could be argued that this is evidenced recently by the situation in Syria where China and
Russia have employed their veto powers more than once to block Council’s attempt to resolve
the crisis. In the document regarding the responsibility not to veto, this vote against action in
Syria is “widely believed to have been employed as an expression of their respective national
interests in the situation, and their concerns over the implementation of Resolution 1973 in
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Libya.”945 Russia argues differently. Draft texts need to be approved by each permanent member
before any draft resolution can be adopted. In fact many draft resolutions are never presented to
Council for a vote owing to the knowledge that a permanent member would vote against its
adoption. It is unlikely, however, that any of the P5 would accept a reform of the UN Charter
that could be detrimental to their own national interests.
The veto was put in place to provide the Council with both executive and diplomatic functions.
However, the law can be abused by the permanent members when interpreting resolutions, and
casting vetoes which permits them to abdicate the responsibilities for peace and security. This
undermines the authority of the Council.946 “In general terms of legality and legitimacy Security
Council approval is the golden fleece that powerful states seek to justify not only coercive non
defensive action, but also other actions that infringe on a state’s sovereignty.”947 The Security
Council is concerned to establish a “positive peace, a peace where protection of human rights is
combined with security.”948 The Council is a political body which receives its discretion from
the Charter. Legally precarious decisions also erode the authority of the Security Council.
Strong support also exists for the status quo. One coalition – Uniting for Consensus – which was
led by Italy, South Korea and Pakistan opposed any additional permanent members. In the
meantime, in response to public demand Canada continued its support of the UN and its efforts
toward making it more representative of the world’s regions while at the same time opposing the
addition of new permanent members.949 Concerns about inconsistency also undermine the
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legitimacy of the Council and of the binding character of its resolutions. Some reformers hope
that if the General Assembly asserts its own role in the UN system, it can help balance the power
of the permanent members in their Council. They also encourage citizen groups and political
movements to voice their concerns.
The ‘Uniting for Peace’ resolution by the General Assembly, and the interpretations of the
Assembly's powers that became customary international law as a result, was expected to bring
greater flexibility. By adopting A/RES/377 A, on 3 November 1950, over two-thirds of UN
member states declared that, according to the UN Charter, the permanent members of the UNSC
cannot and should not prevent the UNGA from taking any and all action necessary to restore
international peace and security, in cases where the UNSC has failed to exercise its "primary
responsibility" for maintaining peace.950 Such an interpretation sees the UNGA as being awarded
"final responsibility"—rather than "secondary responsibility"—for matters of international peace
and security, by the UN Charter.

In spite of the original Commission’s willingness to accept the Security Council’s failure to
reach a decision on the Responsibility to Protect and in its place to see the alternative of a
coalition action, I have expressed my concern that the legitimacy of such an action would be lost.
In my view, only the UN should be able to authorize military action on behalf of the entire
international community. It is recognized of course that the UN does not have its own military in
which case NATO is likely to be called upon to act, but this is not the same as unilateral or even
coalition action taken outside the UN authority.
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If the Responsibility to Protect were to become hard law, it would significantly affect decisionmaking in the Security Council. Brunee and Toope claim “Security Council decisions would
have to meet the requirements of the responsibility to protect, and would be measured against the
criteria of legality.”951 However, Stahn suggests
If the responsibility to protect were indeed a primary legal norm of international law, it
would be logical to assume that such violations should entail some form of legal sanction
in case of noncompliance. This specific type of violation, the breach of a positive duty, is
not addressed as such by the regime of the Law of State Responsibility. Nor has it been
conclusively determined whether and under what conditions inaction by an international
organization may entail international legal responsibility. One might argue that a state’s
noncompliance with a duty ‘to protect’ might trigger a certain right, or even duty, of third
parties to protest against this inaction. Yet it is difficult to imagine what legal
consequences noncompliance by a political body like the Security Council should
entail.952
It is clear that while changes may be desired and must be pursed, they are difficult to bring into
fruition. This increases pressures for unilateral or coalition actions to occur which undermine the
legitimacy of the Responsibility to Protect and the Security Council itself.

It is for this reason that I reemphasize the importance of making the moral choice in the absence
of hard law – states need to act cooperatively and in the interests of the civilians placed in serious
jeopardy. In essence a code of conduct already exists in the form of the Responsibility to Protect
– it requires states to act responsibly toward others and not to allow their self-interest to obstruct
their decision making.
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V.

Conflict Resolution

If we consider the Responsibility to Protect in a broader theoretical context and according to the
report of the Commission there is an opportunity to consider the place of conflict resolution in
the implementation of the principle in the international and transnational milieu of today. In
doing so I remind the reader that not all applications of the Responsibility to Protect need be
military in nature. Conflict resolution ranges from doing nothing in the face of conflict to war. I
would like to consider the Responsibility to Protect as a tool or mechanism within this range that
has been created and maintained by the international system to deal with conflict within a
specific set of circumstances.
There can be no doubt that the UN, like its forerunner the League of Nations, has sought (with
limited success) to create alternative methods for resolving disputes. It has offered some glimmer
of alternatives to the traditional models of handling conflicts; for example, the UN Charter
provides for the use of mediation and conciliation in the resolution of disputes, but it has failed to
provide any true systematic method for their resolution. Also, the track record of the UN in
resolving conflicts has been poor and it has been argued that the organization has provided a
model showing the alternatives to be avoided.953
One of the most serious challenges for the international community is dealing with internal
conflict or state failure or both when accompanied by mass atrocities. This is the kind of
situation the Responsibility to Protect was designed to address.954 Within the theoretical
framework of conflict resolution and the ICISS spectrum of prevention, reaction and rebuilding,
concerned states and international actors must focus on techniques, skills and methods of
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prevention, management, resolution and transformation. The means of prevention and resolution
to conflict can vary immensely, depending on the type, complexity, duration, and level of
violence, among other factors, that pertain. Some conflicts are about justice and right and wrong
and require a public and adjudicative resolution through the ICC or other such legal acts while
other conflict situations can potentially be resolved by the parties themselves-- some require a
cease fire, a treaty, a handshake or an apology.955 Many, while they may require much time,
communication, external assistance, expertise and intervention by outside parties, are not
necessarily beyond settlement without coercion. The Responsibility to Protect uses military
intervention as a last resort when other methods such as sanctions, mediation, negotiation and
conflict resolution techniques do not work.
When attempting to reach such a decision, the international community must ask a number of
basic questions: what are the sources of the conflict; do the parties have the will and the
capability to end the conflict themselves; what methods exist for handling or resolving the
conflict; and, what action is recommended (maintaining the status quo and a management
position being considered as one form of action)? 956 Other questions include: what stage is the
conflict at; is it “ripe” for intervention; are outsiders involved; and, what type of conflict is it?
These questions are illustrative of the approaches that scholars and practitioners in conflict
resolution may take. Their consideration in the prevention or resolution of conflict before it
reaches a point of genocide or war crimes becomes part of the Responsibility to Protect’s
contemplation of action.
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Much has been written on methods or techniques for resolving disputes and conflicts.957 These
approaches can come into play at an earlier phase of conflict or later, when such methods have
failed, intervention has occurred and the conflict is ending. Conflict resolution can also be relied
upon after the fighting has stopped and parties need to regroup and address next steps. While the
discipline of International Relations has and continues to be focused on sovereign states, power,
politics, and the military, Zartman considers how conflict resolution can provide a counter
balancing measure with its emphasis on the means of resolution and transformation.958 As the
field of conflict resolution has moved forward, there is more of a trend toward looking at long
term perspectives, including the prevention of intractable conflicts and the transformation of
protracted conflicts into tractable ones.959 In the case of the Responsibility to Protect, a range of
dispute resolution tools can be employed before reaching a decision to intervene militarily, as
well as after any military intervention ends. However, while the importance of techniques such
as negotiation and mediation must not be ignored, it is not within the scope of the thesis to
consider them in depth. Further attention to this area is certainly essential and would be fruitful
for further work on the Responsibility to Protect, bearing in mind that too many frustrated and
prolonged attempts to settle the conflict without the threat of coercion can result in thousands
more deaths in the interim - Syria being a case in point.
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VI.

Rebuilding After the Violence Stops

With respect to the UN and the international community, it is also important to consider what the
scholars of the field and the practitioners seem to have neglected concerning the Responsibility
to Protect. As described earlier in the work, there are three components to the principle as it was
proposed by the ICISS report: (1) prevention (2) reaction and (3) rebuilding. Much of the
analysis has been geared toward the most controversial aspect of the principle, that of ‘reaction’
as it was approved in the UN document, but little attention has been paid to the third dimension
of ‘rebuilding’. A critical dimension of conflict resolution comes when the fighting stops. Here
we ask: What is the responsibility of the international community? This aspect of intervention
has been raised in Chapter Nine of the thesis in relation to Libya. I would suggest that no action
determined to be a legitimate military application of the principle is complete if it has not given
consideration to post-conflict peacebuilding. The application of the Responsibility to Protect also
involves a responsibility to address conflict in the long-term, which in my view is the follow up
to intervention that has not been given sufficient attention by those advocates for the
Responsibility to Protect.960 While responsibility for practical and political reasons must be
limited, this is an area that deserves further investigation and consideration while carefully
walking the line between imperialism and welcome support.
The question of responsible action takes us back again to the original report. What happens after
the fighting has stopped? Should the international community now be absolved of any further
responsibility? Needless to say, of course, ‘rebuilding’ or ‘peace building’ is controversial as a
further form of intervention with the threat again to some of neocolonialism and “mission creep.”
In discussing the responsibility of the interveners to rebuild, I again return to the
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recommendations of the ICISS report itself. Article 5.5 refers to the Secretary General’s
description of the nature of and rationale for post-conflict peace building in his 1998 report
which gives a description of a clear post-intervention strategy. The Security Council defines
post-conflict peace-building as activities that are taken after the conflict has ended to ensure
peace and prevent a new round of armed confrontation.961 The Secretary General notes this
involves more than purely diplomatic and military action, and that an integrated peace building
effort is needed to address the various factors which have caused or may be stimulating conflict.
Peace building is a complex undertaking which may involve the development of national
institutions ensuring fair elections, promoting human rights where abuses have existed, providing
programs that allow for the reintegration and rehabilitation of citizens, as well as establishing
development conditions. Although peace building does not replace ongoing humanitarian and
development activities in countries emerging from crises, it does aim to reduce the risk of
violence again being triggered and “contribute to creating conditions most conducive to
reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery.”962
In article 5.6, the ICISS notes that the Secretary-General’s report goes on to describe in more
detail what is needed in the aftermath of conflict and/or intervention:
Societies which have emerged from conflict have special needs. To avoid a return to
conflict while laying a solid foundation for development, emphasis must be placed on
critical priorities such as encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human
rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity; ensuring the safe,
smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons;
reintegrating ex-combatants and others into productive society; curtailing the availability
of small arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for reconstruction
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and economic recovery. Each priority is linked to every other, and success will require a
concerted and coordinated effort on all fronts.”963
The Report itself raises matters of concern such as reconciliation and the resettlement of refugees
that are important areas for research which need to be expanded upon in relation to the
Responsibility to Protect and rebuilding. The availability of small arms is a contentious issue
also, not only in terms of disarmament, but as an area deserving of attention prior to and during
any conflict which demonstrate the potential for escalation.
Hartzell and Hoddie suggest civil war analysts frequently attribute the arming of sub-state actors
as due to feelings of insecurity. Non-state actors tend to be unwilling or unable to trust
government authorities and thus take up their own arms. The response of the authorities,
however, is that they are not sure whether this is in defense or a sign of an impending attack, and
as a result prepare themselves for attack, leading to a spiraling arms race and the potential for
war.964 International relations scholars refer to this phenomenon as “the security dilemma” and
it is most often used to describe intrastate conflicts. In the post-conflict period, each group is
wary of the other in terms of their motivation to hold troops and weapons in reserve, preventing
them from taking the necessary disarmament steps (a form of security dilemma).
Three critical areas that form the basis of a rebuilding strategy are security, justice and economic
development. Post-conflict societies need security and freedom from violence for all their
members, regardless of where they stood in relation to power. “Adequate security forces are
needed to uphold the peace and enforce law and order immediately after a conflict.” 965
Ultimately peace builders must turn over responsibility to local actors but they may need help in
963
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setting up problem solving mechanisms.966 In post-conflict situations, revenge killings and even
reverse ethnic cleansing may occur. Avery important issue in the post military intervention phase
relates to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of local security forces.
Reintegration takes time but is necessary and represents an element of restoring the country to
law and order. This must be accompanied by rebuilding national armed forces and police,
“integrating as far as possible elements of the formerly competing armed factions or military
forces. The reintegration process is especially important in the reconciliation and the reestablishment of the state once the external forces leave.”967
Walter and Hartzell provide two competing approaches for resolving civil war.968 Walter’s
solution is in peacekeepers/peace enforcers and third party assistance. The form the third party
would take depends on the context of the peace agreement. If power is fairly balanced, third
parties only need to verify compliance. If power imbalances exist, third parties will need to
secure the safety of weaker parties with military capacity. Hartzell and Hoodie characterize this
“as a neorealist means of resolving civil conflict” since it relies on the threat of force. Power
rather than trust is the key.969 For Hartzell and Hoddie the solution is in the construction of
power sharing and power dividing institutions, disarmament and rebuilding state authority with
greater emphasis on peace agreements.
Barbara Walters suggests that lack of success of civil war settlements are frequently due to the
inability of parties to the conflict to adhere to the peace agreements. Too many settlement treaties
966
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include opportunities for exploitation.970 There are four dimensions of government power that
need to be addressed: political (positions within government itself), military (authority within the
armed forces), territorial (opportunities for self-governance among regional groups) and
economic (access to government resources). Hartzell and Hoodie hypothesize that the more there
are power sharing institutions the better disarmament will work.971
The second area, justice and reconciliation, requires a properly functioning judicial system,
including both the courts and the policy, which sometimes makes it necessary to have
transitional arrangements for justice. Another issue is that the legal rights of refugees or
returnees from ethnic or other minorities. Laws must require protection of proper rights. A
number of areas must be developed; for example removing administrative and bureaucratic
obstacles for those returning, ending the culture of impunity for known or suspected war
criminals and the fair use of property laws.972 Refugees will require access to health, education
and basic services, and they must be allowed to participate in improved systems of “promoting
good governance, and long-term economic regeneration of the country.”973
The third area -- the overall recovery of the country -- is an important part of peace building. Just
as the Responsibility to Protect is concerned with human rights in its protection of civilians in
armed conflict, so too is the responsibility to rebuild. 974 Development helps to raise the
populations of developing countries out of poverty. Marks looks at development
as a sub branch of international human rights law dealing with the legal norms and
processes through which internationally recognised human rights are applied in the
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context of national and international policies, programmes and projects relating to
economic and social development.975
Development and human rights come together in efforts to rebuild communication.
I also addressed the matter of rebuilding in my interviews. The responses varied. A number of
interviewees expressed skepticism toward the concept of rebuilding while others were far more
supportive. Kyle Matthews, for example, pointed out the significance of resources to postconflict rebuilding:
Libya has enormous oil wealth, and foreign workers have fled. There is a lack of civilian
knowledge with no checks and balances, no civil society. They are going to have
elections but they have no experience in building political parties. It will be necessary to
prevent abuses and another strong man from taking power.976
In my interview with Jillian Siskind, she suggested that rebuilding has to start before the military
operation with work on the ground, and support for opposition groups. It requires the
development of democracy building exercises, human rights groups, and civil rights
organizations – all those things are needed to build a society from the ground up. She also noted
NGOs play a key role in the rebuilding exercise. 977
Naomi Kikoler felt it was important to take the long term into account and to take measures to
ensure a country does not fall back in terms of these kinds of crimes. She suggested the
Responsibility to Protect has to be more than just a crisis response at the moment, although she
acknowledged just being able to respond to crises is a positive thing.978
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Some of those interviewed expressed some caution regarding rebuilding and were not
enthusiastic about the idea of the Responsibility to Protect maintaining responsibility for the post
conflict period.
David DeWitt, for example, suggested:
There is a responsibility, even an obligation in R2P action. There is a logic to the three parts
but it seems they are very different things, not only in terms of action but in terms of intent.
The decision to intervene is based on the failure to prevent so that the situation escalates
until there is a legal determination that it is appropriate under R2P for the international
community to intervene using particular kinds of instruments. It is a very different decision
to then say ‘Now we are providing the resources to contribute to rebuilding.’ It is by
definition clearly a different set of instruments with different goals. Unless it comes with
some clearly specified criteria about completion it can be problematic. It is potentially a
never end sink. It must be justified.979
Mark Sedra went on to say: “If you tear down someone’s house you are responsible to build a
new structure.”980 Over time it becomes the responsibility of the occupant to get furniture and do
renovations. He also affirmed Libyans’ own responsibility after the 2011 intervention toward
peace building.
Libyans have to put in the security and justice institutions... If Libya falls apart in ten
years it is not the fault of the Responsibility to Protect. The immediate response was to
protect. Is it part of the Responsibility to Protect’s responsibility to support the
reconstruction effort? That sets a pretty high standard.”981
David Petrasek also spoke with skepticism toward rebuilding, suggesting:
Asserting the principle in terms of prevention and rebuilding is just a smokescreen in
order to sugar the pill. In terms of UN post-conflict efforts and all the rebuilding efforts
and all the work done to prevent a situation from becoming genocide, none of it has been
strengthened by R2P. What they wanted to do was assert the principle to use force. I do
not know anyone who thinks it is good...982
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He went on to answer the question of whether rebuilding is really part of the Responsibility to
Protect. In his view this takes it too far: "... we might like to see democracy and unless we get
that we think we have failed so that we go in with all of our government structures. It does not
seem to me that is what is intended by R2P."983 Clearly, as suggested earlier, post-conflict
peacebuilding is a controversial topic which requires much additional thought, research and
cautious contemplation regarding the role of the Responsibility to Protect after the immediate
crises is responded to successfully.
VII.

Responsible Sovereignty

As we can see, sovereignty issues arise not only at the military intervention stage with the
presence of the intervener but also at the post-conflict stage. Any reconstruction and
rehabilitation program must take sufficient account of local priorities and local personnel and the
ability of the country to resume responsibility for its own government. Nevertheless, I believe it
is important to help in the months that follow. International authorities must take steps “to set up
a political process between the conflicting parties and ethnic groups in a post-conflict society that
develops local political competence within a framework that encourages cooperation between
former antagonists.” 984 The local community must resume responsibility, however, to maintain
the legitimacy of the government and the ruling parties. This does not necessarily mean
democratization, however.

There are always those who will be suspicious that intervention has been a form of neo-colonial
imperialism. This suspicion is one of the most significant impediments to the implementation of
the norm and we must work to reassure those skeptics that the motivations of the international
983
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community are not tainted with ulterior motives. Chapter Nine of the thesis laid out the
threshold and the precautionary criteria that must be satisfied in the Responsibility to Protect
cases – just cause, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects and
shows how the determination of legitimacy needs to be made by the wider international
community for the Responsibility to Protect to evolve as a lifesaving principle. The principle
behind the Responsibility to Protect norm is that the international community accepts
responsibility for conflict situations elsewhere that threaten global security.985
Rebuilding international order requires responsible sovereignty, a principle which means states
have obligations and duties towards their own citizens as well as other sovereign states.
Responsible sovereignty is a core principle in restoring international order which implies an
obligation to help weakened states to obtain the capacity to govern for themselves – in other
words a ‘responsibility to build.” 986 Jones et al note that during the Cold War the United
Nations and regional organizations generally did not try to prevent or mediate civil violence
within states. Now they suggest the UN should have not only a leadership role in mediating an
end to the violence but should be involved in post conflict peacekeeping. 987 Jones cautions that
countries recovering from civil war are at risk of conflict breaking out again within the first five
years of following the peace agreement.”988 Therefore responsible sovereignty means keeping
the peace and mediating the conflict along with institutions that operate according to the rule of
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law.989 The role of regional actors is also important in this regard. Regional groups can be more
effective than the UN in preventing a further outbreak of conflict. 990
One problem in peace making is how to interact with non-state actors.991 Many of contemporary
conflicts are between states and non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and within NSAGs. What has
not been addressed is the role of NGOs in dealing with NSAGs in the Responsibility to Protect
and in the protection of civilians. Non-state armed actors may be defined as “groups that are
armed and use force to achieve their objectives and are not under state control.”992 The
identification of a legitimate non-state entity to negotiate with can be a problem. In the case of
Libya the NTO was recognized fairly early on and in Syria there is now some movement to
recognize various constituents of the opposition. In my view the identification of a non-state
entity broadens the range of options available to deal with the conflict (although the role of the
state and the determination of its ability to protect its own civilians is also of great significance).
An important area, not explored at this point but pinpointed for further research, is the difference
between the interactions of states versus NGOs with non-state armed actors (NSAGS). NSAGs
usually operate outside of the national legal framework in fragile or failed states and are not
acknowledged as legitimate actors. Nevertheless, they frequently acquire control over a large
portion of the population. Sometimes they even become the de facto government.
Differentiating between ‘acceptable protagonists’ and ‘unacceptable terrorists’ is a complex
issue. NSAGs usually want to be part of a peacemaking enterprise, and those that have been
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identified as ‘acceptable’ should be involved in disarmament and demobilizations efforts.993 One
of the complexities, however, is that if the interveners engage in formal talks with them, this will
likely give them recognition and legitimacy. On the other hand, NGOs have more freedom to
communicate with them and there is increased opportunity for interaction between NSAGs and
NGOs with regard to education and monitoring processes.994 Unlike states, NGOs can engage
non-state actors without their being attributed with international status. They can also help to
solve problems by using a ‘soft humanitarian approach’ on such issues as landmines, weapons
and child soldiers.
When peace has been achieved it is often followed by peacekeepers. This may provide a
platform for post-conflict stabilization or peace building.995 Peacekeeping operations can play a
significant role in efforts towards security and reconstruction. Military alliances like NATO can
provide cooperative frameworks. The United Nations has no stand-by forces.996 People will
inevitably need to be trained in new forms of governance. The main challenge is to put together
something that can be sustained according to the rule of law after the peacekeepers leave.
Economic alternatives also need to be available, and armed groups need to be demobilized and
reintegrated into society.997 According to an index of state weakness in 2008, many of the failed
states are among the poorest in the world.998 NGOs may also became involved in peace building
and the development of good governance. Jones draws particular reference to the Center for
Humanitarian Dialogue based in Geneva (HD Center) and the European Union, and their
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contributions.999 What this means in terms of responsibility is that there is a further moral
obligation, and a soft legal position of responsibility to others.
Civil society also needs to become more openly and actively involved to protect the society from
power abuses. The root issues that led to the outbreak of the violence may be “exclusion from the
political process, corrupt justice systems, massive poverty, resource disputes and income
equality.”1000 The UN has a Peacebuilding Commission which was formally created in 2005 in
order to coordinate peace building activities; however, it maintains no oversight over peace
building and has limited personnel which weakens its role in conflict management systems.1001
The UNDP is designed to provide support for the rule of law, governance and political
transitions and to form a bridge between the UN’s Peacekeeping Operations, the World Bank,
and other development organizations.1002 Finally, any reforms in the UN peacekeeping measures
– prevention, mediation, peace building – must take care to preserve north-south shared interests
in conflict management.1003
I realize these are tough and costly decisions in light of what may already be happening in the
U.S. and elsewhere – a kind of intervention fatigue can set in prompted not only by a lack of
domestic support and resources but by criticisms of Western bias towards intervention in Muslim
countries. Hopefully, however, the United Nations and international legal agreements to protect
human rights will continue to spur the international community in the crucial direction of ‘saving
strangers.’
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VIII. Gender Violence and the Responsibility to Protect
As I review the literature on the Responsibility to Protect, I find another important area that
merits further research; i.e. that of women in conflict and the Responsibility to Protect. While
much has been written already on gender violence in international criminal law and the centrality
of women’s bodies since 2011 and in the study of women in Afghanistan, the literature on the
Responsibility to Protect and that of gender violence do not speak to one another. I am
particularly interested in addressing what I see as the Responsibility to Protect and its relevance
to rape and sexual abuse as a form of genocide, and the responsibility to intervene in order to
protect women during war. The International Tribunal for Rwanda, established in 1994 by the
UN, for example, found rape to be genocide, which is defined as Common Article Three and
Protocol II in the Geneva Conventions dealing with war crimes in internal conflicts. In the trial
of Jean Paul Akayesu the Trial Chamber held that rape, which it defined as a “physical invasion
of a sexual nature committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive, and sexual
assault, constitute acts of genocide insofar as they were committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a targeted group.” 1004 The trial court found that sexual assault formed an
integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group. In this case, rape was systematic
and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women, manifesting the specific intent required for those
acts to constitute genocide. This has helped to advance the world’s legal treatment of rape and
sexual violence.1005 Clearly women need to be recognized as an important part of states’
responsibility in the areas where they are most vulnerable.
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IX.

Concluding Comments

In doing this work, the thesis has demonstrated the significance of sovereignty as the basis of
international law after World War II. It has also shown the way in which it has evolved in
relation to the Responsibility to Protect and in the context of global governance. Sovereignty has
come to be more invested in people than the state.1006 Human rights have gained significance in
the responsibility of sovereign states toward their own and others. Can we say this is a universal
value? While modern legal theorists may reject the universality of international laws (and
sometimes even their validity) we might ask what country is prepared to defend their own or
others sovereign right to commit war crimes, genocide, human atrocities or ethnic cleansing. An
important dimension of transnational governance discussed in the thesis is the role of not only
hard governance in the form of international organizations like the UN, but soft power or soft
governance in the form of NGOs and their influence in information gathering, and advocating for
the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The thesis has provided the reader with the
views of many of these NGOs on issues pertaining to law, morality, justice, and the place of
military intervention and beyond.
Concerns have been raised regarding the Responsibility to Protect as a neo-colonialist enterprise
-- two questions in particular are pertinent to ask in this regard: If humanitarian intervention is a
neo-colonialist form of intervention, how should we respond to a Srebrenica (Bosnia, 1995) or a
Rwanda? Surely no legal principle such as sovereignty should be permitted to provide a shield
against crimes against humanity. Should a state’s political independence and sovereignty provide
a licence to kill their own citizens? The answer is obviously ‘No.’ The better answer in fact lies
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at the heart of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect – it requires the international
community to cooperate when the necessity arises and to come to responsible decisions to avoid
atrocities and gross human suffering.
In summary, after much research, analysis and thought, I have become committed to the need for
and validity of the principle of the Responsibility to Protect in all three of its aspects:
prevention, reaction and rebuilding. I consider myself a champion of the need to protect
civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and human atrocity when states are unable
or fail to do so. At the same time, I recognize the work necessary to address the tough issues that
face its implementation and encourage further efforts to imbed the principle firmly within the
processes and structures of the United Nations, and international law, particularly in terms of
human rights, conflict prevention and resolution and the protection of civilians. This work is
necessary to aid in the legal operationalization of the doctrine in future.
The supportive work of NGOs and the dedicated work of these bodies in the global environment
becomes even more important - we ought to nurture and encourage them. I also encourage the
pursuit of options for member states to implement the principle domestically in order to build
their society’s resilience to the occurrence of atrocity crimes. I also support new initiatives, such
as the ‘Accountability, Coherence and Transparency’ (ACT) which was launched by a group of
states to partly address, within the broader work on Council reform, the much contested proposal
of the use of the veto by calling on the P5 to refrain from using this power negatively in
situations where the Responsibility to Protect crimes and violations are imminent or ongoing and
urgent action is required. Time, procrastination and opposition can mean thousands of lives lost
while the members of the Security Council consider their next election or what best serves their
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interest - - time on which the lives of many innocent men, women, children and the elderly
utterly depend.
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

What are your primary objectives?
How do you go about achieving them?
What are the criteria for membership in your organization?
What do you think is the motivation for members to join?
What is your relationship with the State?
What role does loyalty to the state play?

They were asked, regarding impediments and the place of moral principles:
7. What do you think are the impediments to the implementation of R2P?
8. How do they impede?
Regarding the question of legality/legitimacy and the moral imperative, interviewees were asked:
9. Is intervention (and R2P) a moral entity or a legal entity and what does this mean in
terms of implementation?
a. What role does human values, ethics play your work;
b. In that of the state – do the views differ?
To understand in greater detail the role of NGOs in global governance, interviews included the
following questions:
10. How do you go about trying to influence decisions at the national, international level?
11. What kind of documents, texts do you use?
12. Do you feel your work makes a difference?
13. Why did you become involved?
14. What is your interaction with other
a. NGOs; interest or civil groups
b. the UN; other global governance organizations (ggos)
c. your government?
15. Do you feel you contribute to democracy and legitimacy at the transnational level?
To discover how the different aspects of R2P (prevention, reaction, rebuilding) are viewed
and/or advocated for, interviewees were asked
16. What is your position on the three different aspects of R2P?
17. Do you focus on all, one or two, and which ones; Why?
18. What is your role in rebuilding?
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19. Who should be involved in the reconstruction – the UN, those who did the damage,
neighboring states?
20. What about the ICC? How important is the ICC in the implementation of the
Responsibility to Protect?
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APPENDIX B: LETTER OF INTRODUCTION
Dr xxx
Date
Dear Dr. xxx,
I am writing to you with regard to my research to be carried out through the auspices of the
Osgoode Law School at York University in Toronto to request permission to conduct an
interview with you regarding my doctoral thesis topic. It is anticipated that this interview would
take approximately one hour or less of your time.
The dissertation research involves a study of the emerging international norm of ‘The
Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) which states that citizens must be protected in cases of human
atrocities, war crimes and genocide where states have failed to do so. It includes questions on
the role of non-state actors, the United Nations, and past and current government individuals who
have knowledge of the past and current support for the principle.
This research project has been reviewed and approved for compliance to research ethics
protocols by the Human Participants Review Subcommittee (HPRC) of York University. If you
wish, the details of our interview would be kept confidential and your comments would remain
unattributed. At the completion of my doctoral work, the records of your interview would be
destroyed. Once completed, you would be entitled to read the thesis and any other work that I
produce related to this topic.
I would like to assure you that participants have the right not to answer any question or to
withdraw at any time. If a participant chooses to withdraw from the study, all data generated as a
consequence of their participation shall be destroyed.
If you have any questions with regard to this request and my current status, please feel free to
contact Lisa Bunker Manager, Graduate Studies Osgoode Law SROSS 867 Osgoode Hall. She
can be reached by email at lbunker@osgoode.yorku or my supervisor, Dr. Annie Bunting.
Should you have any ethical concerns the regarding the ethical concerns of this research, you
may address them to the Manager of the Office of Research Ethics, York University, 309 York
Lanes, phone 416-736-5914.
I look forward to talking with you on November 10th.
Sincerely,

Carolyn H. Filteau
PhD Candidate, Osgoode Law School
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Email: chfilteau@sympatico.
Participant’ Signature

Date:

__________________________

__________________________

Researcher’s Signature

Date:

__________________________

__________________________
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APPENDIX C: SAMPLE THANK YOU LETTER

Dr. xxx

Date

Dear xxx,

Thank you so much for talking with me on xxx and for sharing your thoughts and experience
with the Responsibility to Protect. I really enjoyed our conversation and came away with new
insights and a much richer understanding of the situation as it is playing out in the "real world"
of international relations. You also provided some new perspectives and very helpful ideas that
will benefit my research - which I will be most happy to share with you when the thesis is
complete. Your thoughts about the Libyan and other on the ground situations are especially
useful to me.

Once again, many thanks for your candour, the subtlety and the completeness of your responses.
It has been a great pleasure to talk to you and I thank you for leaving open possible future
discussions. .

Kindest regards,

Carolyn Filteau
PhD Candidate
Osgoode Law School
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APPENDIX D: INTERVIEW DETAILS
Amnesty International – New York and Geneva http://www.amnesty.org/en/contact/542
‐
‐

London http://www.amnesty.org/en/contact
Article http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE19/011/2011/en/569f0509c3db-433f-b023-89aea68dde8e/mde190112011en.pdf

Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. University of Queensland
Berghof Conflict Research http://www.berghof-conflictresearch.org/en/about/geschichte
Canadian Centre for International Justice
Office in New York, Geneva and Others.
Rue de varenbemi, 5th floor
1202 Geneva, Switzerland
Tel: 41 22 312 2550
Email: geneva@ictj.org
Canadian Institute for Applied Negotiation (CIAN) http://www.ciian.org/contact_us1.shtml
Dacre, Ontario
Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights (CLAIHR) 66 Wellington Street West,
Toronto Ontario Jillian Siskind, President
Carnegie Council New York http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/about/staff/index.html
Centre for Global Ethics and Politics http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P.Ministerial2011.pdf
Thomas Weiss, Prof. Carol C. Gould, Director, The Ralph Bunch Institute, 365 Fifth Avenue,
Suite 5203, New York, N.Y. 10016-4309 Telephone 212 (817) 1940
Centre for International Innovation in Governance (CIGI) http://www.cigionline.org University
of Waterloo, previously Ramesh Thakur –Louise Frechette David Dewitt, David Welch, Mark
Sedra http://www.cigionline.org/person/mark-sedra
Centre for Mediation Dialogue http://www.hdcentre.org/ GENEVA Switzerland
Citizens for Global Solutions. “Creating a U.N. Emergency Capacity: The United Nations
Emergency Peace Service,” Citizens for Global Solutions, Washington, DC
<http://www.globalsolutions.org/issues/uneps>
Coalition for the International Criminal Court - http://www.iccnow.org/ Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales (CRIES), Argentina
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East Africa Law Society, Tanzania
Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Villa Moynier, Rue Lausanne 120B - CP 67 - 1211 GENEVA 21
Academy Secretariat : Tel. +41 (0) 22 908 44 83 - info@adh-geneve.ch
Students Office
: Tel. +41( 0) 22 908 44 88 - students@adh-geneve.ch
Fax +41(0) 22 908 44 99 Sent email January 10, 2012 to info adh
Geneva Centre for Security Policy – Geneva, Switzerland http://www.gcsp.ch/AboutUs/Contact
Khalid Koser.
Genocide Intervention Network. “Conflict at Risk Network,” Genocide Intervention Network,
http://www.genocideintervention.net/contact_us Washington, DC
http://www.genocideintervention.net/responsibility_protect.
Global Action to Prevent War New York Global Action to Prevent War
866 UN Plaza, Suite 4050
New York, NY 10017
www.globalactionpw.org
melina@globalactionpw.org
+1 212 818 1815
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the City University of New York
http://globalr2p.org/ 365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203, 212-817-2104 New York - Article
http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/Libya_Time_for_Decision_14_March_2011.pdf
http://globalr2p.org/contact/ Telephone 212-817-2104
Jaclyn D Streitfeld-Hall Research Associate
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies
365 Fifth Avenue, Suite 5203
New York, NY 10016-4309
www.globalr2p.org
Also Book Launch Ralph Bunche Inst. Dec. 5th 5:00 PM Church Center 777 UN Plaza.
The Graduate Institute, Centre for Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Geneva
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ccdp
Human Rights Watch New York
Human Rights Watch Geneva Contact

http://www.hrw.org/en/contact-us#Geneva

378

Initiatives for International Dialogue, The Philippines
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.
International Commission Jurists – GENEVA – Secretary General, Louise Doswald Beck
International Committee of the Red Cross GENEVA http://www.icrc.org/eng/who-weare/contacts/index.jsp Jelena Pejic Legal Adviser
International Council of Voluntary agencies Geneva
http://www.globalhumanitarianplatform.org/ghp.html http://www.icva.ch/secretariat.html
International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org/ Headquarters in Brussels but offices
elsewhere as well Louise Arbour, President and CEO
ICG New York - http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/contact.aspx
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York (see map)
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about/contact.aspx email newyork@crisisgroup.ca
International Parliamentary Committee for prevention of genocide. Art Eggleton recommended
by Jillian Siskind http://www.aegistrust.org/Parliamentary-work/appg-genocide-prevention.html
and the UK http://www.aegistrust.org/Parliamentary-work/parliamentary-campaign-tostrengthen-uk-law-on-international-crimes.html
International Refugee Initiative, New York and Uganda
Kairos Canada. “Strategic Direction and Program Plan for KAIROS 2006-2010,” Kairos Canada,
slide 7, http://www.kairoscanada.org/ Doesn’t look useful
Kofi Annan Foundation Geneva http://kofiannanfoundation.org/contact
Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies.
<http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/about_w2i.htm>Frank Chalk, Director of MIGS, Professor of
History, Concordia University http://www.migsr2pconference.com/speakers
W2i Project Kyle Matthews email: kylematt@alcor.concordia.ca The Will to Intervene Project
(MIGs S– The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies)
http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2I_Project.html
Tel.: (514) 848-2424 ext 5729 or 2404
Fax: (514) 848-4538
Kyle Matthews
Senior Deputy Director
The Will to Intervene Project
The Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies
Concordia University
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1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd West
Montreal, Quebec, Canada
H3G 1M8
NATO Watch UK Contact Ian Davis http://www.natowatch.org/contact
Dr. Ian Davis
Director, NATO Watch
17 Strath, Gairloch
Ross-shire IV21 2BX, UK
Tel: +44 (0)1445 712649; e-Fax: +44 (0)700 601 7404
Mobile: +44 (0)7887 782389
Skype: iandavis1960
email: info@iandavisconsultancy.com
www.natowatch.org
Oxfam International Different countries – Canada in Ottawa Sent email October 20, 2011
International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect ICRtoP Listserv Web:
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org
Marion Arnaud
Senior Outreach Officer
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect
708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor
New York, NY 10017
212.599.1320 x8528
fax 212.599.1332
www.responsibilitytoprotect.org
Contact New York http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/contact-us c/o World
Federalist Movement - Institute for Global Policy, 708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor, New York Tel:
1-212-599-1320
Responsibility to Protect,” World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy,
<http://www.wfm igp.org/site/igp/programs/r2pcs> (accessed November 2 2010). New York
rtop-included-in-security-council-resolution-on-the-protection-of-civilians-initiative-forinternational See ten years after conference in Toronto ICR2P http://www.wfmigp.org/site/igp/programs/r2pcs
IDRC
http://www.idrc.ca http://www.idrc.ca/EN/AboutUs/Contact/Pages/default.aspx
Interparliamentary Group – London http://www.bgipu.org/contact.htm Referred by Kyle
Matthews He can give you contact.
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Project Ploughshares – Waterloo Ernie Regehr, former executive director. Current ED is John
Siebert. Based in Menonite Community in Waterloo http://www.ploughshares.ca/ contact
http://www.ploughshares.ca/contact
The Stanley Foundation. Iowa, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/ Rachel Gerber
Tom Lantose Human Rights Commission – Washington DC referred by Kyle Matthews
http://tlhrc.house.gov/contact.asp
The West Africa Civil Society Institute, Ghana
United Nations Association in Canada, Toronto and elsewhere http://www.unac.org/en/index.asp
http://to.unac.org/contact-us/
UN Office of the High Comissioner for Human Rights GENEVA
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Office_of_the_United_Nations_High_Commissioner_for_Human_R
ights
The United States Institute of Peace http://www.usip.org/contact Washington, D.C. Contact
Jason Gluck re Libya Peace brief email: jgluck@usip.org; telephone 202-429-3886
University of Cardoza - University of Cardoza School of Law. New York Evidentiary standards.
Trying to come up with evidentiary standards and legal criteria. . Contact Daniel Stewart This
project founded by the Australian Government. Sharon Rosenburg.
W2i Project The Will to Intervene Project (MIGs S– The Montreal Institute for Genocide and
Human Rights Studies) http://migs.concordia.ca/W2I/W2I_Project.html
World Federalist Movement Canada. Ottawa
http://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/contact.html
World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy, New York and The Hague – speak to
Bill Pace, 708 Third Avenue, 24th Floor, New York 100171 212 599 1320 CALL
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Individuals
1) David Dewitt, Vice-President of Programs, Center for International Governance
Innovation, 57 Erb Street West, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 6C2
ddewitt@cigionline.org; telephone 519-885-2444 x 292
2) David Welch Balsillie School of International Affairs, 67 Erb Street West,
Waterloo, On N2L 6C2
3) Lucie Edwards, Balsillie School of International Affairs,
4) Carolyn McAskie
Wakefield, QC
5) Elissa Golberg
Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations and the
Conference on Disarmament | Ambassadeure et représentante permanente auprès
des Nations Unies et de la Conférence du désarmement
elissa.golberg@international.gc.ca
Assistant: Violette Talbot violette.talbot@international.gc.ca
Telephone | Téléphone: 41 (0) 22 919 9216
Facsimile | Télécopieur: 41 (0) 22 919 9254
Avenue de l'Ariana 5, 1202 Genève, Suisse
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
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APPENDIX E: GLOSSARY

ACT

Accountability, Coherence and Transparency

AU

African Union

CGS

Citizens for Global Solutions

CIGI

Centre of International Governance

CLAIHR

Canadian Lawyers for International Human Rights

ECOSOC

Economic and Social Council

GATT

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GCSPS

Geneva Center for Security Policy Studies

HD

Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

HRW

Human Rights Watch

ICC

International Criminal Court

ICG

International Crisis Group

ICISS

International Commission on the Responsibility to Protect

ICR2P

International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect

ICRC

International Committee of the Red Cross

IGO

International Organizations

IMF

International Monetary Fund

KLA

Kosvo Liberation Army

MIGS

Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies

MS

Member State

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO

Nongovernmental Organization

NSAG

Non-state armed groups
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OIC

Organization of the Islamic Conference

OSCE

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

P5

Permanent Members

PDD

Presidential Decision Directive

PESD

Bush doctrine of pre-emptive self defense

TWAIL

Third World Approaches to International Law

UDHR

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

UN

United Nations

UNA

United Nations Association

UNAMIR

UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNMISS

United Nations Mission in the Republic of South Sudan

W21

Will to Intervene Project

WFM-IGP

World Federalist Movement- Institute for Global Policy

WMD

weapons of mass destruction

384

